Fernando Ramírez

The global pesticide complex has transformed over the past two decades, but social science research has not kept pace. The rise of an enormous generics sector, shifts in geographies of pesticide production, and dynamics of agrarian change have led to more pesticide use, expanding to farm systems that hitherto used few such inputs. Declining effectiveness due to pesticide resistance and anemic institutional support for non-chemical alternatives also have driven intensification in conventional systems. As an inter-disciplinary network of pesticide scholars, we seek to renew the social science research agenda on pesticides to better understand this suite of contemporary changes. To identify research priorities, challenges, and opportunities, we develop the pesticide complex as a heuristic device to highlight the reciprocal and iterative interactions among agricultural practice, the agrochemical industry, civil society-shaped regulatory actions, and contested knowledge of toxicity. Ultimately, collaborations among social scientists and across the social and biophysical sciences can illuminate recent transformations and their uneven socioecological effects. A reinvigorated critical scholarship that embraces the multifaceted nature of pesticides can identify the social and ecological constraints that drive pesticide use and support alternatives to chemically driven industrial agriculture.

La discusión sobre el psicologismo lógico, que parecía ya superada desde Frege-Husserl, ha vuelto a posicionarse hoy en la filosofía de la lógica. Se examina, en primer lugar, la idea según la cual lo que hoy se entiende por lógica respondería en lo esencial a las tesis defendidas por el anti-psicologismo. En segundo término, se plantea que algunos enfoques actuales en ciencia cognitiva, como el de la facultad cognitiva proto-lógica de R.Hanna, y el de los dominios cognitivos, de Stennings y van Lambalgen, permiten apoyar la idea de que la naturaleza de la lógica va más allá de los atributos antipsicologistas.

The philosophical transformation carried out Xavier Zubiri, especially in his mature work: Sentient intelligence allows to rethink the bases of rationality in structural unity with the senses, allowing a plurality of ways of accessing reality on its foundation, and surpass, in that way, the monological rationality promoted by positivism and pragmatism. To this end, we move through the different landmarks of Zubiri’s work: first, the primordial apprehension of reality from its multiple sentient openings; then, we stop at the constitution of meaning by logos emphasizing how culture prioritize one type of sense over the rest, forging a type of openness to reality and determining a horizon of meaning for it; later, we inquire into how reason accesses the foundation of the real, this allows us to show how the different rationalities settle their options for meaning. From here we contrast with religious rationality founded on historical-scientific criterion, and a strictly religious one, which, ultimately, allow us to finish systematizing and giving a unity of meaning to the previews proposals that were made. Finally, all this enables us to explore the consequences for a sociology of knowledge, and to think about the conditions of intercultural dialogue, and, subsequently, the scenarios of and interlogical construction.

Peirce propuso dos esquemas de inferencia abductiva para la generación de hipótesis, las que, normalmente en la literatura actual, no han sido diferenciadas suficientemente. Sobre la base de lo propuesto recientemente por Aliseda y Niiniluoto se busca una estructura tal que sea capaz de hacer ver tanto la diferencia entre ambos modos abductivos así como su interrelación. Peirce proposed two schemas of abductive inference in order to account for hypothesis generation in science. However, these two schemas have not been distinguished enough in the current literature. On the basis of Aliseda and Niiniluoto recent views, in this paper a schema which show both the differences and interrelations between the two modes of abduction is proposed.

Peirce propuso dos esquemas de inferencia abductiva para la generación de hipótesis, las que, normalmente en la literatura actual, no han sido diferenciadas suficientemente. Sobre la base de lo propuesto recientemente por Aliseda y Niiniluoto se busca una estructura tal que sea capaz de hacer ver tanto la diferencia entre ambos modos abductivos así como su interrelación. Peirce proposed two schemas of abductive inference in order to account for hypothesis generation in science. However, these two schemas have not been distinguished enough in the current literature. On the basis of Aliseda and Niiniluoto recent views, in this paper a schema which show both the differences and interrelations between the two modes of abduction is proposed