•  2
    Aristotle's Rational Powers and the Explanation of Action
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 74 (1): 53-79. 2020.
    In this paper, I discuss Aristotle's notion of rational powers as presented in his Metaphysics Θ.2 and Θ.5. I argue, first, that his account cannot serve as the model for explaining human rational actions in general. The role of rational powers is restricted to the explanation of arts and their exercises, including the exercises of knowledge through teaching. The exercises of character virtues do not follow the same pattern that is discernible in the exercises of rational powers. Second, I try t…Read more
  •  10
    Good Luck, Nature, and God: Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics 8.2
    Res Philosophica 96 (4): 471-493. 2019.
    In this paper I argue that the basic form of good luck that Aristotle identifies in his Eudemian Ethics 8.2 is the divine good luck, which is not also natural good luck, as is commonly assumed by interpreters. The property of being lucky is neither a primitive nor a natural property, nor such that it is based on some natural property, but a property bestowed by god. Hence, the only satisfactory explanation of good luck must be theological. Furthermore, I argue that Aristotle’s account is neutral…Read more
  •  24
  •  7
    Aristotle on Co-causes of One’s Dispositions
    Elenchos 38 (1-2): 107-126. 2017.
    In this paper I offer a close reading of Aristotle’s argument in the Nicomachean Ethics 3.5.1114a31–b25 and try to show that despite considerable interpretive difficulties, some clear structure can nevertheless be discerned. While Aristotle’s main concern in this passage is to refute the so-called asymmetry thesis – the thesis that virtue is voluntary, but vice is not – there is much more in it than just a dialectical encounter. Aristotle wants to respond to a more general objection, which has a…Read more
  •  10
    Apraxia, Appearances, and Beliefs
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 16 (3): 441-458. 2016.
    According to the objection of inactivity, the skeptics cannot live their skepticism, since any attempt to apply it to everyday life would result in total inactivity, while any action they would perform qua skeptics would be a sign that they abandoned their skepticism. In this paper I discuss the ancient Pyrrhonists’ response to the objection as is presented in the writings of Sextus Empiricus. Sextus argues that the Pyrrhonists are immune to the apraxia objection because it is based on the misun…Read more
  •  55
    Bryan Frances, Scepticism Comes Alive
    Prolegomena 7 (1): 103-107. 2008.
    Bryan Frances, Scepticism Comes Alive, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005, xii + 209 pp.
  •  2
    Aristotle against the Determinist: Metaphysics 6.3
    International Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2): 127-136. 1998.
  •  69
    Sextus empiricus on the possibility of inquiry
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4): 436-459. 2008.
    Abstract: In this paper I discuss Sextus Empiricus' response to the dogmatists' objection that the skeptics cannot inquire into philosophical theories and at the same time suspend judgment about everything. I argue that his strategy consists in putting the burden of proof on the dogmatists: it is they, and not the skeptics, who must justify the claim to be able to inquire into the nature of things. Sextus' arguments purport to show that if we consider the dogmatists' inquiry, we should conclude …Read more
  • Pironizam i relativizam: Pyrrhonism and Relativism
    Filozofska Istrazivanja 27 (4): 823-841. 2007.
    U ovom se radu pokušava pokazati da postoji određena vrsta relativizma koja je spojiva sa skepticizmom Seksta Empirika. Tvrdi se da se u PH I.217–219 Protagora ne shvaća kao aletički ili epistemički relativist, nego kao relativist u minimalnom smislu riječi, te da takvo stajalište nije protivno pironizmu kako ga Sekst karakterizira u PH I. Potom se pokazuje da nam prihvaćanje toga aspekta pironizma može pomoći da objasnimo neke inače problematične relativističke zaključke što ih nalazimo u Sekst…Read more
  •  61
    Investigative and Suspensive Scepticism
    European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4): 653-673. 2014.
    Sextus Empiricus portrays the Pyrrhonian sceptics in two radically different ways. On the one hand, he describes them as inquirers or examiners, and insists that what distinguishes them from all the other philosophical schools is their persistent engagement in inquiry. On the other hand, he insists that the main feature of Pyrrhonian attitude is suspension of judgement about everything. Many have argued that a consistent account of Sextan scepticism as both investigative and suspensive is not po…Read more
  •  97
    Aristotle on the Akratic's Knowledge
    Phronesis 47 (4): 336-358. 2002.
    This paper is an analysis of Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics 7.3." Aristotle's discussion in this chapter is motivated by the Socratic doctrine, elaborated in Plato's "Protagoras," according to which it is impossible to know what is good and act against this knowledge. Aristotle wants to rebut this doctrine and show that there is a sense of "know" such that this is possible. I argue that this is all that he wants to do in EN 7.3, and that his discussion is not meant to provide an explanation of …Read more
  •  7
    Aristotelians and Stoics on money and the good life
    Disputatio Philosophica 7 (1): 27-36. 2005.
  •  1
    Nicholas White, Individual and Conflict in Greek Ethics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2002
    Rhizai. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 2 301-305. 2005.
  •  4
    Alan Bailey, Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 403-408. 2004.
  •  95
    Sextus Empiricus on the Goal of Skepticism
    Ancient Philosophy 26 (1): 141-160. 2006.
    In this paper I take a closer look at Sextus Empiricus’ arguments in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.25-30 and try to make sense of his account of Skepticism as a goal-directed philosophy. I argue that Sextus fails to mount a convincing case for the view that tranquility, rather than suspension of judgment, is the ultimate goal of his inquiries.
  •  35
    Plato's Meno and the Possibility of Inquiry in the Absence of Knowledge
    Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter 4 (1): 19-40. 1999.
    In Meno 80d5-e5, we find two sets of objections concerning the possibility of inquiry in the absence of knowledge: the so-called Meno's paradox and the eristic arguments. This essay first shows that the eristic argument is not simply a restatement of Meno's paradox, but instead an objection of a completely different kind: Meno's paradox concerns not inquiry as such, but rather Socrates' inquiry into virtue as is pursued in the first part of the Meno, whereas the eristic argument indicates a mann…Read more
  • Luck and human action in Aristotle's' Physics'
    Filozofski Vestnik 21 (1): 179-194. 2000.
  •  5
    Ancient Scepticism (review)
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (3): 219-223. 2013.
  •  26
    Aristotle against the determinist: Metaphysics 6.3
    International Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1998): 127-136. 1998.
    The article tries to show that Aristotle's refutation of causal determinism in Metaph. 6.3 is grounded mainly on two assumptions: a. that there must be a first member of any causal chain, and b. that the origin and the outcome of the chain have to be of equal status.
  •  16
  •  12
    Pyrrhonism and Relativism
    Filozofska Istrazivanja 27 (4): 823-841. 2007.
  •  111
    Aristotle's notion of experience
    Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 88 (1): 1-30. 2006.
    Aristotle's notion of experience plays an important role in his epistemology as the link between perception and memory on the one side, and higher cognitive capacities on the other side. However, Aristotle does not say much about it, and what he does say seems inconsistent. Notably, some passages suggest that it is a non-rational capacity, others that it is a rational capacity and that it provides the principles of science. This paper presents a unitary account of experience. It explains how exp…Read more
  • What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology (review)
    Prolegomena 9 (2): 344-349. 2010.