•  18
    Self-building technologies
    AI and Society 1-15. forthcoming.
    On the basis of two thought experiments, I argue that self-building technologies are possible given our current level of technological progress. We could already use technology to make us instantiate selfhood in a more perfect, complete manner. I then examine possible extensions of this thesis, regarding more radical self-building technologies which might become available in a distant future. I also discuss objections and reservations one might have about this view.
  •  81
    How rich is the illusion of consciousness?
    Erkenntnis 1-17. forthcoming.
    Illusionists claim that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Most debates concerning illusionism focus on whether or not it is true – whether phenomenal consciousness really is an illusion. Here I want to tackle a different question: assuming illusionism is true, what kind of illusion is the illusion of phenomenality? Is it a “rich” illusion – the cognitively impenetrable activation of an incorrect representation – or a “sparse” illusion – the cognitively impenetra…Read more
  •  25
    Voir une tache rouge, éprouver une douleur soudaine à l’épaule, sentir l’odeur du café, entendre le son d’une trompette : voilà des exemples typiques de ce qu’on appelle des «expériences conscientes». Ces expériences conscientes intéressent les philosophes de l’esprit depuis longtemps, notamment car elles semblent poser un problème fondamental à la conception matérialiste du monde. Il semble en effet extrêmement difficile de comprendre comment une expérience consciente – un vécu subjectif, quali…Read more
  •  5
    Nietzsche est souvent perçu comme un philosophe de la critique du " moi ", qui entreprend d'évacuer le sujet souverain pour en faire un simple effet des rapports entre les volontés de puissance. L'ambition de ce livre est de montrer qu'une telle vision est incomplète. Il y a dans l'œuvre de Nietzsche, et particulièrement dans son dernier livre, Ecce Homo, une forte pensée de l'individu et du rapport à soi qui, loin d'éliminer le problème de la subjectivité, le pose à nouveaux frais. Ce livre pro…Read more
  •  18
    Editorial Introduction: Debates on the Meta-Problem of Consciousness
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10): 8-18. 2019.
  •  106
    The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Evidential Approach
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10): 124-135. 2019.
    I present and I implement what I take to be the best approach to solve the meta-problem: the evidential approach. The main tenet of this approach is to explain our problematic phenomenal intuitions by putting our representations of phenomenal states in perspective within the larger frame of the cognitive processes we use to conceive of evidence.
  •  170
    The Normative Challenge for Illusionist Views of Consciousness
    Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6. 2019.
    Illusionists about phenomenal consciousness claim that phenomenal consciousness does not exist but merely seems to exist. At the same time, it is quite intuitive for there to be some kind of link between phenomenality and value. For example, some situations seem good or bad in virtue of the conscious experiences they feature. Illusionist views of phenomenal consciousness then face what I call the normative challenge. They have to say where they stand regarding the idea that there is a link betwe…Read more
  •  1406
    The illusion of conscious experience
    Synthese 1-22. forthcoming.
    Illusionism about phenomenal consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, even though it seems to exist. This thesis is widely judged to be uniquely counterintuitive: the idea that consciousness is an illusion strikes most people as absurd, and seems almost impossible to contemplate in earnest. Defenders of illusionism should be able to explain the apparent absurdity of their own thesis, within their own framework. However, this is no trivial task: arguably, none of …Read more
  •  131
    Does the Explanatory Gap Rest on a Fallacy?
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4): 649-667. 2018.
    Many philosophers have tried to defend physicalism concerning phenomenal consciousness, by explaining dualist intuitions within a purely physicalist framework. One of the most common strategies to do so consists in interpreting the alleged “explanatory gap” between phenomenal states and physical states as resulting from a fallacy, or a cognitive illusion. In this paper, I argue that the explanatory gap does not rest on a fallacy or a cognitive illusion. This does not imply the falsity of physica…Read more
  •  25
    Numerous philosophers have recently tried to defend physicalism regarding phenomenal consciousness against dualist intuitions, by explaining the existence of dualist intuitions within a purely physicalist framework. David Papineau, for example, suggested that certain peculiar features of some of our concepts of phenomenal experiences led us to commit what he called the “Antipathetic Fallacy”: they gave us the erroneous impression that phenomenal experiences must be distinct from purely physical …Read more
  •  67
    The hardest aspect of the illusion problem - and how to solve it
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12): 124-139. 2016.
    In 'Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness', Frankish argues for illusionism: the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Illusionism, he says, 'replaces the hard problem with the illusion problem -- the problem of explaining how the illusion of phenomenality arises and why it is so powerful'. The illusion of phenomenality is indeed quite powerful. In fact, it is much more powerful than any other illusion, in the sense that we face a very special and uni…Read more
  •  1231
    Can you believe it? Illusionism and the illusion meta-problem
    Philosophical Psychology 31 (1): 44-67. 2018.
    Illusionism about consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Embracing illusionism presents the theoretical advantage that one does not need to explain how consciousness arises from purely physical brains anymore, but only to explain why consciousness seems to exist while it does not. As Keith Frankish puts it, illusionism replaces the “hard problem of consciousness” with the “illusion problem.” However, a satisfying version of illusionis…Read more
  •  56
    The Phenomenal Concept Strategy is a popular strategy used to support physicalism in the realm of conscious experience. This Strategy accounts for dualist intuitions but uses the ways in which we think about our experiences to explain these intuitions in a physicalist framework, without any appeal to ontological dualism. In this paper, I will raise two issues related to the currently available versions of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. First, most of the theories belonging to the Phenomenal Co…Read more
  •  185
    In a recent paper, Eric Schwitzgebel argues that if materialism about consciousness is true, then the United States is likely to have its own stream of phenomenal consciousness, distinct from the streams of conscious experience of the people who compose it. Indeed, most plausible forms of materialism have to grant that a certain degree of functional and behavioral complexity constitutes a sufficient condition for the ascription of phenomenal consciousness – and Schwitzgebel makes a case to show …Read more
  •  128
    Dans « Représentationnalisme et langage privé », François Kammerer s’attache à la thèse dite du représentationnalisme qui, au regard de la conscience phénoménale, pose que les propriétés qualitatives d’une expérience consciente sont entièrement déterminées par ses propriétés représentationnelles ; de nombreux arguments ont été proposés en faveur de cette thèse, qui est devenue l’orthodoxie en philosophie de l’esprit contemporaine. L’auteur entend réfuter les arguments les plus significatifs, en …Read more