Gabriela Teresa Besler

As is well known, Heinrich Scholz and his academic society maintained good scientific contacts with Polish logicians before, during, and after the Second World War. My interest here is to examine the details of their collaboration by presenting Scholz’s unpublished correspondence with Fr. Józef M. Bocheński. The following topics are discussed here: Polish logicians who survived the war and their current place of work; reorganization of the scholarly environment, didactic activities, duties, scholarly trips; current research topics, prospects for post-war publications, and future publishing plans; information about Jan Łukasiewicz, Bolesław Sobociński, and Joachim Metallmann; personal matters.

In 1893 and 1903, two volumes of the most important of Frege’s works Grundegezte der Arithmetik were published. This period can be called the peak of Frege’s logicism. Although the subject of truth in Frege’s logical and philosophical works has been repeatedly investigated, there is a lack of studies on his view in this period, especially in Polish literature. In this article, therefore, I carry out the following research task: to collect and order Frege’s statements about truth during the period of publishing the two volumes of Grundegezte der Arithmetik. I refer to the texts published during Frege’s life, published posthumously and his correspondence. Particularly noteworthy are: Grundegezte der Arithmetik and the unpublished Logik. That is why there are two separate sections dedicated to these two texts, whereas the discussions of truth from other texts are grouped thematically: the problem of antinomy, geometry, expression of generality, and others. The subject of truth appears there in relation to logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, philosophy of mathematics and ontology.

W latach 1893 i 1903 ukazały się dwa tomy najważniejszego dzieła Fregego Grundegezte der Arithmetik. Ten okres można nazwać „szczytem logicyzmu” Fregego. Chociaż temat prawdy w logiczno-filozoficznej twórczości Fregego był podejmowany wielokrotnie, to brakuje pozycji skupiającej się na badaniu poglądów w tym okresie. Dotyczy to w szczególności literatury polskiej. Moim zadaniem jest zebranie i uporządkowanie wszystkich wypowiedzi Fregego na temat prawdy w okresie wydawania wspomnianych tomów. Realizując to zadanie, badam użycie tego pojęcia w pierwszym tomie Grundegezte der Arithmetik oraz w niepublikowanym tekście Logik. Podejmuję zagadnienie funkcjonowania tego terminu w szczególnych kontekstach: antynomii, geometrii i wyrażania ogólności. Na koniec zasygnalizuję kwestię sposobu rozumienia późniejszych wypowiedzi Fregego na temat prawdy.

Although the connections between Frege’s and Russell’s investigations are commonly known, there are some topics in their letters which do not seem to have been analysed until now: 1. Paradoxes formulated by Russell on the basis of Frege’s rules: a) „»ξ can never take the place of a proper name« is a false proposition when ξ is a proposition”; b) “A function never takes the place of a subject”. A solution of this problem was based on the reference/sense theory and on the distinction between the first- and second-level names. 2. The inconsistency in Frege’s system may be avoided by the introduction of: a) a new kind of objects called quasi-objects ; b) logical types ; c) mathematics without classes ; d) some restrictions on the domain of function. 3. Since the inconsistency is connected with a class, what is class? In one of the letters, Frege compared a class to a chair composed of atoms. This approach seems to be similar to the collective understanding of a set. 4. Russell doubted that the difference between sense and reference of expressions was essential. Hence, Frege found some additional reasons to distinguish between them: semiotic, epistemological, from identity, and from mathematical practice. This discussion can be seen as a next step in developing the theory of descriptions by Bertrand Russell.

In this paper I tried to give a metaphilosophical characteristic of a philosophical method. I define a philosophical method, indicate its components, describe its relation to the subject matter and aim of investigation, and list difficulties connected with it. I assume that a philosophical method differs from the scientific one. Each philosophical method is based on philosophical theses. This connection between philosophical theses and an assumed philosophical method is shown on the example of the method of the philosophy of God. At the end of my paper I formulated an algorithm which can be used in examining a philosophical method.

In his philosophy P. F. Strawson employs the method of analysis, which he describes as \"[...] resolution of something complex into elements and the exhibition of the ways in which the elements are related in the complex.\" During fifty years of his philosophical activity Strawson has worked out two conceptions of analysis: the analysis of ordinary language and the connective analysis. In general Strawson\'s contribution to philosophy may be viewed as an elaboration of his conception of analysis and its deployment for particular cases. In the article the Author presents Strawson\'s criticism of the following conceptions of analysis: reductive analysis, therapeutic analysis and analysis as construction of a conceptual map. Then she gives an account of Strawson\'s analysis of ordinary language and his connective analysis. In conclusion she tries to point out difficulties connected with this method of analysis