Georgios Petropoulos

This paper seeks to make a contribution to addiction research by introducing some key phenomenological concepts and discussing how they can illuminate the lived experience of people with addiction. We begin by briefly sketching the historical and philosophical background of phenomenology, highlighting its focus on subjective experience and its clinical relevance. In the second part of the paper we introduce some fundamental aspects of lived experience, for example, temporality, affectivity, embodiment and intersubjectivity, and explore alterations in these aspects that occur during addiction. We also discuss how an awareness of the socio-cultural dimension of such alterations has the potential of improving clinical encounters. In the third part of the paper, we focus on three articles on addiction published in Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology in 2024. We explore how phenomenology can add nuance to some of the ideas discussed in these pieces. Our key message is that phenomenological concepts and a critical phenomenological attitude can make a crucial contribution to current research initiatives.

This paper seeks to make a contribution to addiction research by introducing some key phenomenological concepts and discussing how they can illuminate the lived experience of people with addiction. We begin by briefly sketching the historical and philosophical background of phenomenology, highlighting its focus on subjective experience and its clinical relevance. In the second part of the paper we introduce some fundamental aspects of lived experience, for example, temporality, affectivity, embodiment and intersubjectivity, and explore alterations in these aspects that occur during addiction. We also discuss how an awareness of the socio-cultural dimension of such alterations has the potential of improving clinical encounters. In the third part of the paper, we focus on three articles on addiction published in Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology in 2024. We explore how phenomenology can add nuance to some of the ideas discussed in these pieces. Our key message is that phenomenological concepts and a critical phenomenological attitude can make a crucial contribution to current research initiatives.

This paper seeks to make a contribution to addiction research by introducing some key phenomenological concepts and discussing how they can illuminate the lived experience of people with addiction. We begin by briefly sketching the historical and philosophical background of phenomenology, highlighting its focus on subjective experience and its clinical relevance. In the second part of the paper we introduce some fundamental aspects of lived experience, for example, temporality, affectivity, embodiment and intersubjectivity, and explore alterations in these aspects that occur during addiction. We also discuss how an awareness of the socio-cultural dimension of such alterations has the potential of improving clinical encounters. In the third part of the paper, we focus on three articles on addiction published in Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology in 2024. We explore how phenomenology can add nuance to some of the ideas discussed in these pieces. Our key message is that phenomenological concepts and a critical phenomenological attitude can make a crucial contribution to current research initiatives.

The article explores the rich and varied experiences of a collective writing project, unfolding through an anecdote involving Charlie, a young boy who creatively disrupted conventional photography methods. This incident, during an evening promenade by the sea in Ericeira (Portugal), epitomizes the project's embrace of playfulness and exploration of diverse perspectives–materialized through Charlie's playful insistence on experimenting with different angles. The event embodied the group’s approach to writing, leading to a collective inquiry into the interplay of ages, angles, and other themes like waves, threads, shadows, and liminal spaces. The project, driven by the Between Ages Collective, began with informal gatherings in Plymouth, UK, and expanded into a year-long online reading group. Participants, spanning different generations and academic stages, shared various materials, including films, picture books, and scholarly texts, which inspired individual contributions. Influenced by the Collective's collaborative spirit, these contributions explore the concept of 'between ages' – a metaphorical and literal space of transition and fluidity. Contributors were invited to craft pieces that delve into the 'between ages' theme, often exploring serendipitous moments that transform interactions and experiences. The writing tries to capture a sense of openness and curiosity, embracing the uncertainties and ambiguities inherent in the process. The works do not strictly adhere to conventional academic or narrative forms but rather emerge from the collective's shared experiences, including cooking, eating, swimming and walking together. The article suggests that these writings are not meant to be definitive or conclusive but are explorations that invite readers to engage with the mundane and profound textures of everyday life. The stories and themes explored are marked by their diversity in style, rhythm, and imagery, ranging from reflections on the philosophy of shadows to the profound implications of intergenerational and interspecies relationships. The Collective’s work is presented as an ongoing experiment in thinking and writing together, with each piece offering unique insights into the fluid and often blurred boundaries between different states of being. This openness to the in-between spaces brings into question the notion of fixed identities and experiences, inviting a more nuanced understanding of the relational dynamics that shape existence. The article allows the readers to delve into these narratives and engage with the myriad ways they resonate with broader themes of being, storying, and connecting.

In this paper I juxtapose Heidegger’s account of care with Fink’s account of play. The aim of this juxtaposition is to show how Fink’s account of human play sheds light on a modality of being that disrupts the futurism that characterizes the caring temporality of Dasein. In sections II and III, I argue that future projection plays a pivotal role in Heidegger’s analysis of human existence. In section IV, I discuss Fink’s critical reflections on the futurism of human existence. I examine how our care for our own being can have a limiting effect on how we relate to the world. In section V, I discuss some key features of human play that allow us to think of it as an eventful activity that opens up a more flexible relation to the world. In the final section, I discuss how Fink’s account of play overcomes some of the issues raised in relation to Heidegger’s prioritization of the future.

In his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume presents Pyrrhonian skepticism as an excessive kind of skepticism that is at odds with everyday life. A Pyrrhonist, Hume says, “cannot expect, that his philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind: Or if it had, that its influence would be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge anything, that all human life must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail” (2007, p. 116). Notwithstanding the fact that the charge of “inactivity” (apraxia) has been leveled against the Pyrrhonists since antiquity, Hume's understanding of Pyrrhonism has been a major influence on one of the most famous debates in Pyrrhonian scholarship. Namely, the debate about whether a Pyrrhonist can hold any beliefs at all. This chapter wishes to shed some light on a different interpretation of Pyrrhonian skepticism, one that proves, contrary to what Hume claims, that Pyrrhonian philosophy can be beneficial to society, as well as exert an influence on how we understand our relation to the world and others. I will do so by focusing first on an interpretation that brings Pyrrhonism close to the non-judgmental aspect of mindfulness, and then by showing how Pyrrhonian skepticism sheds light on the human-world correlation in what one might call a proto-phenomenological gesture

This paper is an introduction to the dossier on “the present and the future of doing philosophy with children”, which itself drew inspiration from a conference on the same topic that was held in University College Dublin on the 24th of June 2022. While the conference aimed at building a case for the importance of engaging pre-college students in philosophical thinking, it also aspired to function as a forum where the participants can critically reflect on the practice of doing philosophy with children. The participants were asked to reflect on 1) the ways in which philosophy prepares children to engage with an increasingly complex world; 2) the future challenges of the P4wC movement; 3) the ways in which and the extent to which P4wC practice contributes to the decolonization of childhood discourses; 4) the ways in which and the extent to which the philosophy with children initiative addresses issues of epistemic injustice and educational and social inequalities. Building on the discussions that took place during and after the conference, the authors in this dossier interrogate the hierarchical opposition between child and adult, and cast a critical gaze on adultist assumptions that prevent Philosophy for/with Children initiatives from achieving their full potential.

This paper reflects on the role of philosophy in the school environment, paying special attention to the promise of intergenerational dialogue carried forward by philosophy programmes associated with Lipman’s Philosophy for Children (P4C) curriculum and its current transformation into Philosophy with Children (PwC). There are two basic ideas that constitute the guiding thread of my reflections. Firstly, that philosophical interventions of that kind challenge adult-centric views of education and philosophy. Secondly, that such initiatives carry with them the promise of acknowledging children as equal participants in the process of philosophical questioning and meaning creation. In the first part of the paper, I argue for the importance of understanding the act of philosophizing with children as a disruption of adult-centrism. First, I reflect on a narrow future-directedness that seems to characterize the temporality of school. I suggest that P4wC interventions interrupt such a future-directedness inviting the students to immerse themselves into a dilated ‘now’ of multiple possibilities. Then, I reflect on the ways in which P4wC interventions challenge the assumption that philosophy is an adult preoccupation. Special attention is paid to the work of scholars who challenge our restrictive assumptions about what qualifies as philosophical thinking. In the second part of my paper, I turn to the work of Merleau-Ponty with the aim of sketching out some requirements for the possibility of a dialogue between childhood and adulthood. I suggest that Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on childhood and expressive speech are invaluable in the context of P4wC because they invite us 1) to appreciate the alterity of children without reducing them to inferior ‘others’ and 2) to remain alert to the expressivity of children’s speech.

Research in education indicates that the Philosophy for Children (P4C) curriculum is instrumental in achieving important educational objectives. And yet, it is precisely this instrumentalist conception of P4C that has been challenged by a second generation of P4C scholars. Among other things, these scholars argue that P4C must remain vigilant toward, and avoid subscribing to 1) developmentalism and 2) a reductive identification of thinking with rationality. On the contrary, they suggest that P4C must ensure that it gives voice to childhood, allowing it to enter a genuine dialogue with adulthood. Scholars who defend a non-reductive and non-instrumentalist approach to P4C, highlight the significance of play in philosophy sessions with children. In this paper I examine the extent to which the philosophical inquiry that takes place in the context P4C can be understood as a playful activity. I submit that Fink’s account of play can help us reach a better understanding of what we mean by play, which in turn can help us examine the compatibility between the activities of P4C and play. In the first part of the paper, I examine some of the basic ideas of P4C and raise the question about the compatibility of philosophical inquiry and play. In the second part of the paper, I engage in a philosophical appreciation of play by drawing on the work of Eugen Fink. In the final part of the paper, I show how play – understood along Fink’s lines – is compatible with philosophical inquiry as practiced in school settings.

ABSTRACT This paper examines Heidegger’s remarks about the worldlessness of Judaism in his Black Notebooks. In the first part of the paper I examine Heidegger’s concept of the world in Being and Time and subsequent writings. In the second part, I analyze a distinction that Heidegger draws between mere human actuality and genuine human existence in a 1932 lecture course on The Beginning of Western Philosophy. This distinction, I suggest, relates to the development of Heidegger’s thoughts on nihilism and what he conceives as its gravest danger. In the third part, I argue that the above-mentioned distinction can help us to better understand Heidegger’s remarks on Judaism. In particular, I suggest that the Jewish figure comes to symbolize for Heidegger a kind of unessential human actuality that is irredeemably detached from the question of Being.

This paper draws a link between Heidegger’s reading of Plato’s allegory of the cave and his support for the National Socialist regime during the early 30’s. Three interrelated suggestions are made: (1) That Heidegger’s reading of the allegory of the cave is informed by his preoccupation with the imminent threat of nihilism. (2) That Heidegger’s interpretation radicalizes his critique of the public sphere to the effect that it renders the latter irredeemable. (3) That the unbridgeable gap between philosophy and the public sphere commits Heidegger to the anticipation of a catastrophic event that will open up the possibility of genuine freedom.