Gerardo Ó. Matía Cubillo

The Parmenides is known as the dialogue in which Plato makes a criticism of his theory of forms. Through paradoxes, the character Parmenides criticizes the theory of forms presented by Socrates in the dialogue, targeting the relation they have with sensibles and with each other, call for participation, and the discoursive consequences of this relation. I present a reading of the Parmenides that suggests that the self-criticism points out inconsistencies in the Platonic theory of participation as it is presented in the Parmenides, and that will be corrected later in the Sophist

Contemporary philosophers find Plato's discussion in the Sophist about the problem of negation and falsity as interesting and difficult. It is interesting in the sense that in this dialogue, and others that are considered by Plato scholars to belong to the late period dialogues, we seem to find a Plato who makes less use of the theory of Forms. It is difficult in the sense that It invites us to use the notational convention of modern symbolic logic to provide a coherent picture of Plato's view. Charlton prefers a Platonizing Interpretation on the issue and quantifies over Forms. Given this context, the paper inquires whether logical quantification is the correct route to pursue in order to better understand the Forms. It will also discuss the crucial role of Plato's theory of Forms in the middle and late period dialogues in relation to knowledge and its very possibility.

One of Plato’s central tenets is that we can know forms. In Parmenides 133b4–134b5, Plato presents an argument whose sceptical conclusion is that we can’t know forms. Although he indicates that the argument doesn’t succeed, he also says it’s difficult to explain how it fails. Commentators have suggested a variety of flaws. I argue that the argument can be defended against some, though not all, of the alleged flaws. But I also argue that Plato hints at a crucial distinction that hasn’t been brought to bear in this context, and that indeed he is sometimes thought not to draw: that between the content and object of knowledge. Once we are clear about this distinction, we can see that the sceptical argument doesn’t imply that we can’t know forms.