Giulio Sacco

The term “paradox of fiction” refers to the puzzle whereby, when we watch a film or read a book, we feel emotions toward fictional events, despite knowing that the characters involved do not exist. This issue has been at the center of debates in analytic philosophy of art. However, it has not been adequately addressed by philosophers of emotion. In this article, I use the paradox of fiction as a stress test to evaluate the three major theories of emotion, assessing how each can account for two ordinary intuitions concerning emotions toward fiction: (1) that they are not irrational per se, and (2) that they are not substantially different from the emotions we have in ordinary life. I examine how the three most influential accounts—the feeling theory, the cognitive-evaluative theory, and the motivational theory—can respond to the challenge posed by the paradox of fiction, arguing that, contrary to a widespread scholarly assumption, the cognitive theory stands the best chance of satisfying both desiderata. Moreover, I show that the motivational theory faces greater difficulties in dealing with the paradox of fiction.

This paper reevaluates Walton’s and Radford’s claims about fiction-directed emotions by proposing to interpret their arguments through a motivational theory of emotion, rather than the cognitive framework typically employed. I first demonstrate that no cognitive theory justifies their conclusions. I then argue that a motivational account can alternatively support either Radford’s or Walton’s position, depending on whether we accept that emotions toward fiction involve action tendencies, as ordinary emotions do. If they do, the motivational theory justifies Radford’s claim about the irrationality of fiction-directed emotions. If, by contrast, we deny that emotions for fiction involve readiness for action, the motivational account favors Walton’s view of quasi-emotions. After developing this line of argument, I revisit textual evidence from Radford’s and Walton’s works that aligns with my interpretation.

Nietzsche’s theory in The Birth of Tragedy is traditionally considered as opposed to Aristotle’s Poetics. The essay aims to show that there are some genuinely Aristotelian elements underlying Nietzsche’s account of tragedy. I will first argue that Nietzsche’s own criticism of Aristotle is directed at an unattractive reading of the concept of katharsis. After providing an updated interpretation of Aristotle’s account, I will argue that two of its pivotal elements are also at the core of Nietzsche’s view: 1) the explanation of the sympathetic identification with the tragic hero; 2) the account of the effects of the tragedy on the attendants. I maintain that both the accounts underline the importance of the undeserveness of the hero’s sufferings, in order to pity them; and that, for both Aristotle and Nietzsche, tragedy allows us to grasp some universally painful traits of human existence, while teaching us to confront them with joy.

ABSTRACT‘Recalcitrant emotions’ are those emotions that contradict one's explicit beliefs, such as fearing flying while claiming not to believe that it is dangerous. Emotional recalcitrance has often been used to challenge cognitivism, because of its comparison between recalcitrant emotions and contradictory beliefs. There are two main problems: (i) the irrationality underlying recalcitrant emotions seems to be more common and less severe than that of holding contradictory beliefs, and (ii) while people are generally willing to acknowledge and correct inconsistencies in their reasoning, it is more challenging to convince someone with a recalcitrant fear of flying to change their mind. This paper argues that these objections are based on two dogmas of ideal rationality, which, according to psychology and behavioural economics, are systematically violated by ordinary people. I argue that findings from behavioural economics can provide a proper ground for defending a cognitive account of recalcitrant emotions.

Alcune delle sfide più pressanti del mondo contemporaneo riguardano le generazioni future. La sostenibilità del sistema pensionistico e dei crescenti debiti pubblici, la denatalità, così come la crisi climatica, sono problemi che impatteranno principalmente sulle vite dei più giovani e di coloro che ancora non sono nati. Per secoli, la filosofia e le scienze umane si sono focalizzate sulle relazioni sincroniche, cioè tra individui che vivono nello stesso tempo. Oggi, i problemi transgenerazionali sono al centro del dibattito pubblico, e la filosofia deve confrontarsi con “la sfida del domani”. Il volume offre una prospettiva interdisciplinare su questioni transgenerazionali di stretta attualità, per aiutare il lettore a orientarsi nella discussione.

The term “paradox of fiction” means the puzzle by which, when we see a film or read a book, we feel emotions before fictional events, even knowing that the characters involved do not exist. The dilemma has been at the center of the debate in the analytic philosophy of art. However, it has not been adequately confronted by the philosophers of emotion. In the article, I show why dealing with the paradox of fiction from the perspective of the philosophy of emotion could be useful both for the study of emotion and for the philosophy of art. After having outlined the usual argumentative patterns in the philosophy of emotion, I argue that the paradox of fiction can be used as the counterpart of the so-called problem of recalcitrant emotions (i.e., the emotions that contradict our better judgments), to evaluate the major accounts of emotion. I will show how my approach overlaps some recent attempts, among the philosophers of art, at renewing the debate about the paradox of fiction and that it can help philosophers of emotion to assess their theories. Finally, I will apply the test I propose to the cognitive account of emotion, arguing that, contrary to a widespread cliché, it does not commit us to the claim that our emotions for fiction are either irrational or non-genuine.

The aim of the paper is to confront some challenges raised by intergenerational justice from the perspective of Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. After having sketched her account, the essay deals with some objections to it from an environmental perspective, arguing that, contrary to some critics, it can be a valuable basis for reflecting on our duties towards future generations. More precisely, I focus on how the CA provides promising insights to address two central problems of intergenerational ethics: 1) the so-called ‘circumstances of justice;’ 2) the problem of the asymmetry between present and future generations. In both cases, I argue that the philosophical anthropology underlying the CA is better suited than the contractualist one to include future generations into the realm of justice and ground our motivation to care for them. After underlining the potential of the CA, in the concluding remarks I will underline a potential flaw of this theory, i.e. the lack of guidance when it comes to the trade-offs between our rights and well-being and those of the unborn.

It is more difficult to feel emotions for future generations than for those who currently exist, and this seems to be one of the reasons why we struggle to care for the future. According to a number of authors, who have recently focused on the psychological flaws that prevent us from dealing with transgenerational issues, the main problem is “future discounting”. Challenging this common view, we argue that the main reason we struggle to care about future generations lies in two features of our daily emotions: the «identified victim effect» and the decrease in empathy for people who are different from us. These traits give rise to two puzzles we call the problem of the indeterminateness of future persons and the problem of dissimilarity. After having analyzed these problems of our moral psychology, we show how they allow us to account for some differences in affectivity towards a number of entities that do not currently exist, such as future generations, past generations and fictional characters. Bearing in mind the real limits of our emotions when dealing with future people, we sketch an alternative proposal on how to develop emotions to provide citizens of liberal democracies with a motivation to act in favor of future generations.

The capabilities approach is the theory according to which, in order to assess people's quality of life and reflect on the basic political entitlements, we should consider what people are capable of doing and being. Focusing mostly on Nussbaum's account, a number of scholars analysed the metaethical structure underlying the approach, showing her Aristotelian and Kantian sources. This article explores another aspect of Nussbaum's theory which has so far been somewhat overlooked: the role of emotions in the justification and motivational support of the approach. After showing the importance Nussbaum places on compassion (and other benevolent emotions) to warrant her moral theory, I argue that – assuming her own cognitive account of compassion – her argument begs the question. I will then contend that Nussbaum's case does not have the inner tools to overcome such a circularity, trying to suggest, in conclusion, a possible way out which is consistent with it.

The term ‘recalcitrant emotions’ refers to those cases where we feel an emotion that apparently contradicts our better judgements. For instance, one may be afraid of flying while claiming not to believe that it is dangerous. This phenomenon is commonly conceived as an objection to cognitivism, according to which emotions are based on the subject's beliefs, insofar as it would force us to ascribe to the subject who feels them an excessive degree of irrationality, comparing recalcitrant emotions to contradictory beliefs. For this reason, many philosophers have developed perceptual theories which describe emotions as forms of perception, allowing us to explain recalcitrant emotions without attributing to the subject contradictory beliefs, treating them as perceptual illusions. Facing the most compelling of these attempts, the article shows that perceptual accounts fail to explain in what sense recalcitrant emotions (and people who feel them) are irrational, keeping the comparison with optical illusions, which are not. Having rebutted three popular perceptual proposals, I conclude that the analogy between emotions and perceptions is flawed and that the appeal of these theories lies on a surreptitious shift in the meaning of the term ‘perceive’.

The philosophy of emotions has long been dominated by the view called «cognitivism». According to it, emotions are characterized not by mere physical impulses but by a cognitive evaluation of their object. However, despite their success, cognitive theories have to deal with various objections and are divided on how to answer to them. In this essay I want to defend the form of cognitivism claimed by Martha Nussbaum from the most common criticisms. After a brief summary of her account, I confront some of the objections that have been raised against it. In Section 2 I deal with the classic problem of emotions in infants and animals, which lack linguistic abilities. Later, I confront the potential problem represented by cases in which one’s emotion and reasoned judgment seem to differ: in paragraph 3 I consider irrational phobias and fears, to show how they can be accounted for in terms of judgments and thoughts, and not only of perceptions; in paragraph 4 I deal with the objection that «judgementalist» theories violate the «principle of charity», for they ascribe an excessive irrationality to people. I argue that experimental evidence suggest that it is not implausible to assume that people have contradictory beliefs under conditions of uncertainty, and that perceptual theories of emotion fail to account for some fundamental aspects of these phenomena. Finally, in paragraph 5, I deal with the objection according to which a cognitive-evaluative theory cannot explain the sense of passivity that we commonly experience in emotions.

Feminist thinkers have commonly interpreted Edith Stein’s “dual anthropology” as a form of essentialism and difference feminism. For them, men and women have (or should have) different functions and capabilities. The article argues against this traditional account. Starting from two distinct criticisms of difference feminism – that of Judith Butler and that of Martha Nussbaum – it claims that the best way to read Stein’s position is to consider it a liberal feminism, for the emphasis that she puts on the uniqueness of every single human being.