Giuseppe Tosi

Analyzing different works and in particular Habermas' reflection on Kant, the author reconstructs, first, his approach to international law and his political and legal cosmopolitanism. Second, he presents some critical observations on Habermas' cosmopolitanism in the context of his more general discursive theory of law and state. In this perspective, he discusses the problems of peace and of the role of the United Nations, the strategy of protection of human rights, and the question of world citizenship. He argues that Habermas' cosmopolitanism is a radicalization of Kantian tradition based on a centralization of international power and a cosmopolitan law. Finally, he develops realist arguments in favour of a non‐globalistic conception of international law.[Link]

La explosiva fecundidad de Luhmann no puede explicarse sin referencia a un extraordinario método de trabajo, selectivo y combinatorio a la vez, basado en el automatismo interactivo de un elaboradísimo fichero por materias. ¿Será precisamente la estructura laberíntica del fichero y de la obra de Luhmann la clave interpretativa de la consideración excepcional, persistente y creciente que ha merecido en el círculo de la cultura italiana de los setenta-ochenta? La primera recepción de Luhmann en Italia es realizada por (y coincide con el clima de fragmentación de) las tradicionales subculturas italianas del marxismo y el catolicismo, que se sienten "irresistiblemente provocadas', especialmente por la concepción luhmanniana del Estado de Derecho. La recepción de los años ochenta, sin embargo, está caracterizada por un incontenible splitting, que amenaza la propia identidad del autor, y por el auténtico "agujero negro" de la teoría de la autopoiesis en su doble cualidad de teoría biológica y teoría epistemológica. Difícil que, con estos dos obstáculos, el nuevo programa de investigación de Luhmann produzca resultados apreciables

The essay that Luigi Ferrajoli published inTeoria politica is a partial, althoughvery important, preview of an importanttheoretical work on which he has been labouringfor several years. Ferrajoli is knownto be aiming at achieving a rigorousformalisation of the theory of subjectiverights, an undertaking to which he first turnedhis hand at the beginning of the seventies,with the book Teoria assiomatizzata deldiritto, in which he laid the foundations forhis subsequent work, including his extensivetreatise of the theory of criminal law,Diritto e ragione.So it is quite natural that this new essaycontains a quantity of references to conceptualcategories that come together in a veritableWeltanschauung, as it used to be called at onetime, in addition to an epistemology and ageneral theory of law.In order to discuss all his theses in thisessay as seriously as they deserve, we reallyshould go back to that set of philosophicalpremises to which they refer – and whichFerrajoli tends to nurture in a sort oftheoretical latency – and try to focus on anddiscuss them. As this is not the place for such amassive task – for which I may not even havethe necessary competence – I shall restrictmyself to touching on just a few points thatconcern me more closely. I apologise for thisselective and thus not very systematicapproach, made necessary to some extent also bythe large numbers of theoretical and politicalquestions that Ferrajoli's essay tackles,raises or merely touches on. Nevertheless, myselection will be aided by the criticalsignificance that Ferrajoli dedicates to someof my opinions. In short, I shall not try to doany more than to respond indirectly to hiscriticisms. And I shall do so with the greatestof respect, as Ferrajoli well knows, for histheoretical work and for the profoundmotivations that inspire him.

This article discusses the definition of and relationship between two political views of the state: the rule of law of the liberal political tradition, which had its origins in the realm of the political philosophy of modern legal naturalism, and the Hegelian view of the state, which influenced the right-wing and left-wing alternatives to the liberal state in the 19th and 20th centuries. Freedom and equality, political democracy and social democracy, liberalism and socialism are the central thematic poles of this debate. After the end of Nazism after World War II and the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, the state of law appears as the hegemonic and dominant political theory in the present. However, the reemergence of the debate between libertarians and communitarians, mainly in the Anglo-Saxon world, shows that the issues of the previous debate have not been solved yet and that they reappear, although in different contexts and with different meanings, in their whole complexity and dramatic character. This article attempts to define, using the human rights language, some of these crucial issues for contemporary political theory and to make proposals for the construction of a “republican” ethics and politics. Key words: Liberalism, Socialism, Democracy, Rule of law, Ethical state.

La teoria delle élite, sviluppata da Pareto, Mosca e Michels, è una teoria antidemocratica perché nega il principio fondante della democrazia, cioè la competenza politica dei cittadini. La teoria, tuttavia, ammette diverse letture, tra cui una lettura democratica, che influenzò gli autori liberali e antifascisti italiani come Gobetti, Dorso, Burzio, Einaudi, Croce, Salvemini. Bobbio interpreta questo aspetto democratico dell'elitarismo non come la negazione dell'esistenza di regimi democratici, ma come una visione realistica della "democrazia così com'è", e non idealista di "come dovrebbe essere". Bobbio viene così inserito tra gli autori ispirati alla dottrina dell'elitarismo democratico, come Hans Kelsen e Joseph Schumpeter. Da questa prospettiva, Bobbio analizza l'influenza che l'elitismo ha avuto sulla sinistra socialista e comunista italiana e internazionale, in particolare sul pensiero di Antonio Gramsci. Il presente lavoro discute una possibile lettura "elitaria" del pensiero politico gramsciano, che mostra le critiche e le differenze che lo separano dagli elitisti, ma allo stesso tempo gli elementi di una teoria elitista di Gramsci presenti in alcuni concetti chiave della sua concezione politica: intellettuali, partito, egemonia, blocco storico, avanguardia, relazione massa/intellettuali governanti/ governati.

In the debate on the origin of modern natural rights, the French philosopher Michel Villey became famous for his counter current theses: that the origin of modern subjective rights was a “deformation” or “degeneration” of the ancient and medieval concept of law; that those responsible for this rupture were Ockham and his nominalist disciples, as well as the Scholastics of Salamanca; that these last ones betrayed the thought of Aquinas on the right adhering to the nominalist. These theses serve the purpose of justifying Villey’s radical opposition to the subjective foundations of modern human rights. The reply of the historian of medieval law, the Englishman Brian Tierney, is that Villey’s conception of ancient and medieval law is too restricted; that already in Roman law there was a notion of subjective rights; that the origin of modern subjective rights does not depend only on Ockham’s nominalism, but was already present in the medieval canonists; that the scholastics of Salamanca did not betray the Thomist thought, but they brought it up to the challenges of the new times; and that the idea of ​​subjective natural rights does not depend on a particular ideology, but is compatible with different ideologies and worldviews. In revisiting this debate, our main interest concerns the conclusions that Villey draws from the entire long historical trajectory he has studied, and the criticism that Tierney makes of his radical opposition to human rights. Finally the debate gives rise to some more general considerations about the history of concepts and the distinction between the historical genesis of the ideas and their validity.

Analyzing different works and in particular Habermas' reflection on Kant, the author reconstructs, first, his approach to international law and his political and legal cosmopolitanism. Second, he presents some critical observations on Habermas' cosmopolitanism in the context of his more general discursive theory of law and state. In this perspective, he discusses the problems of peace and of the role of the United Nations, the strategy of protection of human rights, and the question of world citizenship. He argues that Habermas' cosmopolitanism is a radicalization of Kantian tradition based on a centralization of international power and a cosmopolitan law. Finally, he develops realist arguments in favour of a non‐globalistic conception of international law.