Hans-Johann Glock

This chapter explores a theme which is central both to Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics and to his analytic Kantianism—the relation between concepts and experience. Strawson’s account of ‘the necessary cooperation of sensibility and understanding’ in experience is immensely powerful but also problematic. Strawson is _right_ in diagnosing limits to the concept of a possible experience, yet _wrong_ in suggesting that those limits imply that any conceivable experience must be conceptual and can be enjoyed only by subjects that can ascribe experiences to themselves. Furthermore, these limits are not of a _sui generis_ kind specific to a Kantian metaphysics of experience. They have to do with the role that certain concepts and propositions play within our overall conceptual scheme. The insights descriptive metaphysics has to offer are best conceived neither as synthetic a priori (contrary to orthodox Kantianism), nor as straightforwardly analytic or ‘grammatical’ (contrary to Wittgensteinian commentators), but as conceptual truths of a special, mediated, kind.

Arbitrariness is a distinctive feature of human language, and a growing body of comparative work is investigating its presence in animal communication. But what is arbitrariness, exactly? We propose to distinguish four notions of semiotic arbitrariness: a notion of opaque association between sign forms and semiotic functions, one of sign-function mapping optionality, one of acquisition-dependent sign-function coupling, and one of lack of motivatedness. We characterize these notions, illustrate the benefits of keeping them apart, and describe two reactions to our proposal: abandoning arbitrariness-talk in favor of the newly introduced conceptual vocabulary, or feeding the distinctions back into the parent concept.

Arbitrariness is a distinctive feature of human language, and a growing body of comparative work is investigating its presence in animal communication. But what is arbitrariness, exactly? We propose to distinguish four notions of semiotic arbitrariness: a notion of opaque association between sign forms and semiotic functions, one of sign‐function mapping optionality, one of acquisition‐dependent sign‐function coupling, and one of lack of motivatedness. We characterize these notions, illustrate the benefits of keeping them apart, and describe two reactions to our proposal: abandoning arbitrariness‐talk in favor of the newly introduced conceptual vocabulary, or feeding the distinctions back into the parent concept.

This unique study brings together for the first time two of the most important philosophers of this century. Never before have these two thinkers been compared - and commentators' opinions on their relationship differ greatly. Are the views of Wittgenstein and Quine on method and the nature of philosophy comparable or radically opposed? Does Wittgenstein's concept of language engender that of Quine, or threaten its philosophical foundations? An understanding of the similarities and differences between the thought of Wittgenstein and of Quine is essential if we are to have a full picture of contemporary philosophy. This collection of essays offers diverse and original ways in which to view their relationship.

Conceptual engineering (CE) is the program of deliberately and systematically assessing our concepts, with a view to improving or, where required, replacing them by superior ones (e.g. Cappelen, 2020, p. 132; Eklund, 2021, p. 15). ‘CE’ can refer either to the assessment and amelioration of a conceptual system through philosophical means, or to the meta-philosophical debate on the nature, scope and limits of that philosophical activity. The two sometimes go hand-in-hand, nevertheless it is important to keep them apart. The current debate remains marked by a preponderance of meta-philosophical ruminations over philosophical performance. But for the sake of such ruminations it is convenient to use the label for the philosophical enterprise, unless otherwise specified.

This article explores the connections between analytic philosophy and applied ethics — both historical and substantive. Historically speaking, applied ethics is a child of analytic philosophy. It arose as the result of two factors in the 1960s: the re-emergence of normative ethics on the one hand, and urgent social and political challenges on the other. But is there a significant substantive link between applied ethics and analytic philosophy? I argue that applied ethics inherited important ‘analytic’ ideals such as clarity and argumentative rigour. At the same time these ideals are not the exclusive preserve of analytic philosophy and applied ethics. Moreover, they are under threat from various trends within applied ethics. In this context I rebut the allegation that the anti-revisionist reliance on pre-theoretical moral judgements (aka ‘intuitions’) is less rational than their revisionist dismissal. The article ends with a plea for an analytic approach within applied ethics.

_A COMPANION TO WITTGENSTEIN_ The most comprehensive survey of Wittgenstein's thought yet compiled, this volume of fifty newly commissioned essays by leading interpreters of his philosophy is a keynote addition to the _Blackwell Companions to Philosophy_ series. Full of penetrating insights into the life and work of the most important philosopher of the twentieth century, the collection explores the full range of Wittgenstein’s contribution to philosophy. It includes essays on his intellectual development, his work in logic and mathematics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and action, epistemology, ethics, philosophy of religion, and much else. As well as examining Wittgenstein’s contribution to human understanding in detail, the _Companion_ features vital contextual analysis that traces the relationship between his ideas and those of other philosophers and schools of thought, including the Aristotelian and continental philosophical traditions. Authors also address prominent themes that remain current in today’s philosophical debates, explaining Wittgenstein’s continuing legacy alongside his historical significance. Essential reading for scholars of philosophy at all levels, _A Companion to Wittgenstein_ combines engaging commentary with unrivaled academic authority.

This lucid and accessible dictionary presents technical terms that Wittgenstein introduced into philosophical debate or transformed substantially, and also topics to which he made a substantial contribution. Hans-Johann Glock places Wittgenstein's ideas in their relevance to current debates. The entries delineate Wittgenstein's lines of argument on particular issues, assessing their strengths and weaknesses, and shed light on fundamental exegetical controversies. The dictionary entries are prefaced by a "Sketch of a Intellectual Biography", which links the basic themes of the early and later philosophy and describes the general development of Wittgenstein's thinking. Extensive textual references, a detailed index and an annotated bibliography will facilitate further study. Authoritative, comprehensive and clear, the volume will be welcomed by anyone with an interest in Wittgenstein – his life, work or influence. Each _Blackwell Philosopher Dictionary_ presents the life and work of an individual philosopher in a scholarly but accessible manner. Entries cover key ideas and thoughts, as well as the main themes of the philosopher’s works. A comprehensive biographical sketch is also included.

ABSTRACT Both opponents and proponents of Singer's right to speak about euthanasia have concentrated on the tenability of his claims. They have ignored the question of what legitimate grounds there are for suppressing academic discussion, and have failed to take into account the discussion of freedom of speech in recent legal theory. To do this is the aim of my paper. Section I claims that Singer's position is immoral. Section 2 turns to the question of whether it is protected by freedom of speech, irrespective of its merits. I reject two lines of defence for Singer's opponents, that they had no opportunity to present their case, and the Kantian idea of the primacy of practical reason. Section 3 turns to a defence from legal theory. It argues that Singer's views do not pose the kind of threat to other legal and moral values which would license a suspension of his freedom of expression. I conclude that it is illegitimate to silence Singer, since he does not deny the right to live of his disabled opponents, but legitimate to protest against him, since he denies that some of their lives are worth living, in disregard of their own preferences.