My Survey Responses
| Survey Prompt | Response |
|---|---|
| A priori knowledge | Accept: yes |
| Abortion | Accept: permissible |
| Abstract objects | Accept an alternative view: Pleonastic entities which exist atemporally and aspatially rather than outside of space and time |
| Aesthetic experience | Lean towards: sui generis |
| Aesthetic value | Accept an alternative view: Fundamental aesthetic judgements express sensory preferences rooted in human nature |
| Aim of philosophy | Accept an alternative view: Theoretical philosophy aims at conceptual self-understanding (Strawson) and serves critical thinking |
| Analysis of knowledge | Lean towards: other analysis |
| Analytic-synthetic distinction | Accept: yes |
| Arguments for theism | Accept an alternative view: cosmological argument proves first cause but not personal God |
| Belief or credence | Lean towards: credence |
| Capital punishment | Accept: impermissible |
| Causation | Lean towards: counterfactual/difference-making |
| Chinese room | Lean towards: understands |
| Concepts | Accept an alternative view: Kantianism à la Strawson |
| Consciousness | Accept an alternative view: Both wakefulness and transitive consciousness are mental capacities, latter presupposing former |
| Cosmological fine-tuning | Lean towards: brute fact |
| Eating animals and animal products | Lean towards: vegetarianism (no and yes) |
| Environmental ethics | Lean towards: non-anthropocentric |
| Epistemic justification | Lean towards: externalism |
| Experience machine | Accept: no |
| Extended mind | Lean towards: yes |
| External world | Accept: non-skeptical realism |
| Footbridge | Lean towards: don't push |
| Foundations of mathematics | Lean towards: constructivism/intuitionism |
| Free will |
Accept a combination of answers:
|
| Gender |
Accept a combination of answers:
|
| Gender categories | Lean towards: revise |
| God | Accept: atheism |
| Grounds of intentionality | Lean towards: interpretational |
| Hard problem of consciousness | Accept: no |
| Human genetic engineering | Lean towards: impermissible |
| Hume | Accept an alternative view: Scepticism mitigated by naturalism |
| Immortality | Lean towards: yes |
| Interlevel metaphysics | Lean towards: realization |
| Justification | Accept an alternative view: Inferential justification terminates in hinge-propositions à la Moore and Wittgenstein, another form of justification invokes epistemic capacities |
| Kant | Lean towards: two worlds |
| Knowledge | Accept an alternative view: Kantianism à la Strawson |
| Knowledge claims | Lean towards: invariantism |
| Law | Lean towards: legal positivism |
| Laws of nature | Accept: non-Humean |
| Logic | Lean towards: non-classical |
| Material composition | Lean towards: restrictivism |
| Meaning of life | Lean towards: objective |
| Mental content | Accept an alternative view: Logical constructions from capacities of subject |
| Meta-ethics |
Accept a combination of answers:
|
| Metaontology | Lean towards: deflationary realism |
| Metaphilosophy | Accept an alternative view: accept ontological and reject epistemic and meta-philosophical naturalism |
| Method in history of philosophy | Lean towards: analytic/rational reconstruction |
| Method in political philosophy | Lean towards: non-ideal theory |
| Mind | Accept an alternative view: A mind is not a thing but a set of abilities and dispositions (Aristotle and Wittgenstein) |
| Mind uploading | Accept: death |
| Moral judgment | Accept an alternative view: Fundamental moral statements are conceptual; some concepts they articulate are rooted in human nature, others in social conditions |
| Moral motivation | Lean towards: externalism |
| Moral principles | Accept: moral generalism |
| Morality | Lean towards: non-naturalism |
| Newcomb's problem | The question is too unclear to answer |
| Normative concepts | Accept an alternative view: Different levels of normativity: standards < values < oughts |
| Normative ethics |
Accept a combination of answers:
|
| Other minds |
Accept a combination of answers:
|
| Ought implies can | Lean towards: yes |
| Perceptual experience | Accept an alternative view: actualization of capabilities |
| Personal identity | Accept an alternative view: multiple criteria which can come apart |
| Philosophical knowledge | Accept an alternative view: Philosophical knowledge is possible, but conceptual rather than factual |
| Philosophical methods |
Accept a combination of answers:
|
| Philosophical progress | Lean towards: a little |
| Plato | Lean towards: knowledge only of forms |
| Political philosophy |
Accept a combination of answers:
|
| Politics |
Accept a combination of answers:
|
| Possible worlds | Accept an alternative view: 'possible worlds' is a terminology for illustrating - not explaining - modality |
| Practical reason | Lean towards: Kantian |
| Principle of sufficient reason | Lean towards: false |
| Proper names | Accept an alternative view: proper names lack meaning but competent use requires some knowledge about referent |
| Properties | Lean towards: immanent universals |
| Propositional attitudes | Lean towards: dispositional |
| Propositions | Accept an alternative view: propositions are logical constructions from that clauses and ultimately from epistemic capacities |
| Quantum mechanics | Lean towards: epistemic |
| Race | Lean towards: unreal |
| Race categories | Lean towards: eliminate |
| Rational disagreement | Lean towards: non-permissivism |
| Response to external-world skepticism | Accept an alternative view: Moore's strategy of differential certainty: premises of sceptical arguments are more contentious than the knowledge claims they impugn |
| Science | Lean towards: scientific realism |
| Semantic content | Lean towards: moderate contextualism (intermediate) |
| Sleeping beauty | Insufficiently familiar with the issue |
| Spacetime | Accept an alternative view: Not a thing, but the relations constituting it are part of an objective natural order |
| Statue and lump | Accept an alternative view: One thing differently conceptualized |
| Teletransporter | Accept: death |
| Temporal ontology | Lean towards: presentism |
| Theory of reference | Lean towards: deflationary |
| Time | Lean towards: A-theory |
| Time travel | Lean towards: metaphysically impossible |
| Trolley problem |
Accept a combination of answers:
|
| True contradictions | Accept: impossible |
| Truth | Accept: deflationary |
| Vagueness | Lean towards: semantic |
| Values in science | The question is too unclear to answer |
| Well-being | Accept an alternative view: Capability view (Nussbaum) |
| Wittgenstein | Lean towards: late |
| Zombies | Accept: inconceivable |