Hayate Shimizu

In the ethical literature on robot design, considerable attention has been devoted to the risks that human-like robots pose to humans. In particular, the resemblance of robots to humans has been associated with concerns about social disruption, deception, and potential harm, leading some authors to argue for restrictions or bans in certain contexts. However, while the ethical significance of human-like form has been widely recognized for humans, significantly less attention has been paid to the implications of animal-like robots from the perspective of nonhuman animals and human–animal relations. This paper addresses that gap by examining how the design and deployment of animal-like robots may affect animals both directly and indirectly. We argue that the use of animal form in robotics is not ethically neutral, as it can shape human perceptions of animals, influence patterns of interaction, and potentially contribute to harms such as mislearning, objectification, and alienation. By shifting the focus from human-centered concerns to the impact on animals, we identify a set of ethically relevant risks associated with animal-like robots and analyze their broader implications for human–animal relations. On this basis, we propose preliminary guidelines aimed at supporting the responsible design and use of such technologies.

Van der Horst and Puzio’s target article reorients what it means to “queer sex robots” by moving beyond design diversification toward the relational formation and transformation of desire, drawing Queer Lacanian Psychoanalysis and New Materialism in tandem. This commentary sharpens the paper’s theoretical stakes by making explicit an ontological thesis it presupposes: the relational self, understood as an alternative to atomistic individualism and illuminated through comparative resources such as Watsuji’s analyses of aidagara and fūdo. On this basis, we argue that the paper’s tandem is most promising when read as dismantling the self-transparent chooser and treating technological mediation as constitutive of sexual self-understanding. We then examine the paper’s practical “pointers,” especially designing for friction, as interventions into self-formation that generate distinctive obligations concerning psychological safety, consent, and responsibility. To sustain the theoretical promise of queering in design practice, further reflection on ethical risks and safety is needed, and we call for continued debate on how such reflection should proceed.

This paper explores the implications of applying Kantianism, traditionally focused on human moral agents, to the ethics of human–robot interaction. Kantian approaches have often been regarded as ineffective for assessing whether non-human entities like robots deserve moral consideration. However, this paper argues that Kantian resources provide more substantial support for the moral consideration of robots and the value of human–robot relationships than is commonly assumed. The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, the paper examines Kant’s doctrine of ends in themselves, which has traditionally viewed robots solely as instrumental means. Second, it discusses a Kantian perspective on indirect duties, emphasizing how human interactions with robots influence human virtue and moral feeling. This framework justifies norms against cruel behavior toward robots to protect one’s moral character but remains insufficient as it only prescribes “avoiding cruelty insofar as it affects one's character.” Finally, to address this limitation, the paper introduces a Kantian perspective grounded in the duty to promote others’ happiness as an obligatory end. This approach enables the derivation of a duty to protect human–robot relationships based on moral concern for individuals who find happiness through such relationships.

John Danaher and Sven Nyholm (2024) examine how personal digital duplicates (PDDs) might impact on the value of human individuals. Their analysis centers on what they call the Scarcity Thesis (ST), which posits that individual value derives in part from their scarcity. While acknowledging the value of their framework, we argue that their bipartite distinction between instrumental and intrinsic scarcity overlooks a crucial, distinct form: functional scarcity. Functional scarcity is the rarity of a person who possesses the ability to perform a certain task valued in an economic or social exchange. We contend that this form of scarcity significantly contributes to individual human value and is particularly vulnerable to being undermined by PDDs. Therefore, a truly holistic assessment of PDDs must involve an examination of their effects on functional scarcity.

In this paper, I explore the grounds for the moral treatment of robots by proposing a new relational approach inspired by Japanese animistic thought. Traditionally, two major approaches have dominated discussions on the moral treatment of robots: (1) The properties approach, which bases moral treatment on intrinsic properties such as consciousness and sentience (Sparrow in Ethics Inf Technol 6(4):203–213, 2004; Bryson in Wilks (ed) Close engagements with artificial companions: key social, psychological, ethical and design issues, John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 2010; Mosakas in AI Soc 36(2):429–443, 2021; DeGrazia in Perspect Biol Med 65(1):73–88, 2022), and (2) the relational approach, which bases moral treatment on the appearance of robots within relationships (Coeckelbergh in Philos Technol 27(1):61–77, 2014, Coeckelbergh in Minds Mach. 31:337–360, 2021, Coeckelbergh in Ethics Inf Technol 25(3):44, 2023; Gunkel in Robot rights, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2018, Gunkel in Loh and Loh (eds) Social robotics and the good life: the normative side of forming emotional bonds with robots. transcript Verlag, Bielefeld, 2022). Building on the foundational work on the relational approach of Coeckelbergh and Gunkel, I explore the potential and implications for expanding the relational approach by introducing an animistic understanding of the mind. To do so, I adopt an animistic perspective, distinguishing between two forms of animism: mind-reading animism and mind-infusing animism. The distinction between these approaches lies in their understanding of the “mind.” Mind-reading animism interprets the mind as an inherent, static property, making moral treatment dependent on human-like properties. In contrast, mind-infusing animism, drawing on Ōmori Shōzō’s philosophical view, interprets the mind as dynamically constructed through interaction. Rather than focusing on static, human-like properties, this approach emphasizes the relational process in which robots are infused with a mind through interaction. By framing the moral treatment of robots within this relational dynamic, mind-infusing animism provides a new relational framework for evaluating the moral treatment of robots. Finally, while mind-infusing animism provides a meaningful contribution to advancing relational approaches, we point out that it also faces limitations.

The world faces various problems, such as starvation and infectious diseases. One approach to solving these problems is Effective Altruism (EA), which seeks to make the world as good as possible based on objective evidence and careful reasoning. EA has been supported by utilitarians such as Peter Singer. In fact, many people who support EA are utilitarian. However, in recent years, some previous studies have defended EA in non-utilitarian approaches. This paper argues that EA is justified not only from utilitarianism but also from other forms of consequentialism and a Kantian perspective, which existing studies have not yet examined. This paper also discusses the difference between consequentialism and the Kantian perspective in supporting EA. First, this paper introduces and briefly explains William MacAskill’s definition of EA. According to that definition, an EA act maximizes the good based on careful reasoning and objective evidence. Next, this paper shows that the practice of EA is justified by some form of consequentialism, which takes the consequence of an action as the basis for moral evaluation. Second, a Kantian perspective requires altruistic acts to promote the happiness of others as a duty. This paper focuses on two points to suggest that altruistic acts from Kantian duty can meet the definition of EA acts. 1. non-intuitive and non-emotional reasoning about the happiness of others; and 2. taking an impartial standpoint. From these points, this paper shows that from a Kantian perspective, it is argued that we must aim to help others and act in a way that promotes the well-being pursued by others as far as possible. The last part of this paper explores the differences in approach when justifying EA acts from a consequentialist or Kantian perspective. Specifically, this section compares the selection of donation recipients and the level of self-sacrifice under each viewpoint.

Chatbots powered by large language models (LLMs) are increasingly capable of engaging in what seems like natural conversations with humans. This raises the question of whether we should interact with these chatbots in a morally considerate manner. In this chapter, we examine how to answer this question from within the normative framework of virtue ethics. In the literature, two kinds of virtue ethics arguments, the moral cultivation and the moral character argument, have been advanced to argue that we should afford moral treatment to social robots. However, we propose a moral character argument against the view that we should afford moral treatment to LLM-based chatbots drawing on the notion of practical wisdom. Practical wisdom in this context consists in the skill to discern genuine and artificial sociality. Drawing on ideas from phenomenological philosophy, we argue that this involves the ability to distance oneself from direct social perception and the ability to widen one’s awareness over one’s apparently social interactions. We conclude by suggesting that this skill is a kind of technomoral wisdom required to live well with advanced, social AI systems.