Heather Browning

Human brain organoids (HBOs) are three-dimensional structures derived from human stem cells that model aspects of brain development and function, offering potentially unprecedented opportunities for studying neurological disorders and for developing treatments. This consensus paper presents recommendations from the Asia Pacific Neuroethics Working Group, developed through interdisciplinary collaboration among scientists, bioethicists, philosophers, and legal scholars who convened in Singapore in November 2024. We provide a comprehensive analysis of the ethical, legal, and sociocultural dimensions of HBO research, addressing both current realities and future possibilities. The paper examines key ethical considerations, including the potential moral status of HBOs, particularly regarding sentience and consciousness, while identifying and dispelling common misconceptions and “ethical red herrings” arising from sensationalized portrayals. We analyze consent frameworks for cell donation, privacy concerns, dual-use risks, and questions of distributive justice. Legal challenges are explored, including the categorical ambiguity of HBOs within existing regulatory frameworks, intellectual property issues, and cross-border inconsistencies in standards. Sociocultural perspectives emphasize the importance of public understanding, cross-cultural engagement, and empirical research on diverse community attitudes toward HBO research. In our recommendations, we advocate for evidence-based ethical discussions, anticipatory frameworks addressing potential future developments, contextualized analysis comparing HBOs to related experimental models, robust informed consent processes, proportionate responses to consciousness concerns, development of adaptive regulatory frameworks, responsible science communication to manage public expectations, and sustained interdisciplinary collaboration. We emphasize a balanced approach that promotes scientific innovation while maintaining rigorous ethical oversight, recognizing HBOs’ significant potential for advancing neuroscience and medicine. This represents the first comprehensive ethical framework for HBO research from the Asia Pacific region, helping to establish foundational principles for responsible development of this rapidly advancing field.

Human brain organoids (HBOs) are three-dimensional structures derived from human stem cells that model aspects of brain development and function, offering potentially unprecedented opportunities for studying neurological disorders and for developing treatments. This consensus paper presents recommendations from the Asia Pacific Neuroethics Working Group, developed through interdisciplinary collaboration among scientists, bioethicists, philosophers, and legal scholars who convened in Singapore in November 2024. We provide a comprehensive analysis of the ethical, legal, and sociocultural dimensions of HBO research, addressing both current realities and future possibilities. The paper examines key ethical considerations, including the potential moral status of HBOs, particularly regarding sentience and consciousness, while identifying and dispelling common misconceptions and “ethical red herrings” arising from sensationalized portrayals. We analyze consent frameworks for cell donation, privacy concerns, dual-use risks, and questions of distributive justice. Legal challenges are explored, including the categorical ambiguity of HBOs within existing regulatory frameworks, intellectual property issues, and cross-border inconsistencies in standards. Sociocultural perspectives emphasize the importance of public understanding, cross-cultural engagement, and empirical research on diverse community attitudes toward HBO research. In our recommendations, we advocate for evidence-based ethical discussions, anticipatory frameworks addressing potential future developments, contextualized analysis comparing HBOs to related experimental models, robust informed consent processes, proportionate responses to consciousness concerns, development of adaptive regulatory frameworks, responsible science communication to manage public expectations, and sustained interdisciplinary collaboration. We emphasize a balanced approach that promotes scientific innovation while maintaining rigorous ethical oversight, recognizing HBOs’ significant potential for advancing neuroscience and medicine. This represents the first comprehensive ethical framework for HBO research from the Asia Pacific region, helping to establish foundational principles for responsible development of this rapidly advancing field.

The study of animal consciousness typically focuses on the distribution question: i.e., which animal taxa are conscious. However, recent work has instead suggested a dimensional approach to build up ‘consciousness profiles’ for different species; giving us the what it is like to be that animal. Here I apply a similar approach to understanding animal affect, the dimension most relevant to welfare. Different animals will have varied sets of affects, that they may experience to differing degrees. I introduce a framework for mapping out the affective ranges and intensities of different animals, using clusters of physiological and behavioural markers to construct affect profiles for each species or taxa. These profiles could help inform research on the evolution, function, and distribution of animal consciousness and affect, as well as identify the interests and welfare risks for different species.

The last decade has seen an explosion of meta-philosophical work on conceptual engineering. Beyond simple analysis of concepts, conceptual engineering allows for evaluation and improvement of concepts accord- ing to the purposes for which they will be used. This paper sketches a pluralist account of conceptual engineering and provides a distinction between two different and often conflicting kinds of conceptual engineer- ing: naturalist conceptual engineering (NCE) and moral conceptual en- gineering (MCE), distinguished not by their methods, but by their roles, functions, and purposes. Using the examples of health and animal wel- fare, we demonstrate the application of both MCE and NCE and show how the different contexts in which a concept is used can create con- flicting demands but also how concordance between these demands can strengthen a concept.

Mixed martial arts (MMA) is frequently criticized as barbaric and inhumane. This stands in stark contrast with the booming popularity of the sport. Before now, what little philosophical work has been written on MMA depicts it as something inherently wrong (as with Dixon) or as something merely permissible (as with articles by Weimer and Kershnar and Kelly, respectively). Contrary to these foregoing analyses this chapter argues that MMA is not only permissible, but a morally praiseworthy and virtuous endeavor in virtue of developing moral character and recognizing the intimate connection between body and mind.

In this essay, we discuss Simona Ginsburg and Eva Jablonka’s The Evolution of the Sensitive Soul from an interdisciplinary perspective. Constituting perhaps the longest treatise on the evolution of consciousness, Ginsburg and Jablonka unite their expertise in neuroscience and biology to develop a beautifully Darwinian account of the dawning of subjective experience. Though it would be impossible to cover all its content in a short book review, here we provide a critical evaluation of their two key ideas—the role of Unlimited Associative Learning in the evolution of, and detection of, consciousness and a metaphysical claim about consciousness as a mode of being—in a manner that will hopefully overcome some of the initial resistance of potential readers to tackle a book of this length.

This paper addresses what we consider to be the most pressing challenge for the emerging science of consciousness: the measurement problem of consciousness. That is, by what methods can we determine the presence of and properties of consciousness? Most methods are currently developed through evaluation of the presence of consciousness in humans and here we argue that there are particular problems in application of these methods to nonhuman cases - what we call the indicator validity problem and the extrapolation problem. The first is a problem with the application of indicators developed using the differences in conscious and unconscious processing in humans to the identification of other conscious vs. non-conscious organisms or systems. The second is a problem in extrapolating any indicators developed in humans or other organisms to artificial systems. However, while pressing ethical concerns add urgency in the attribution of consciousness and its attendant moral status to non-human animals and intelligent machines, we cannot wait for certainty and we advocate the use of a precautionary principle to avoid doing unintentional harm. We also intend that the considerations and limitations discussed in this paper can be used to further analyse and refine the methods of consciousness science with the hope that one day we may be able to solve the measurement problem of consciousness.

Animal welfare has a long history of disregard. While in recent decades the study of animal welfare has become a scientific discipline of its own, the difficulty of measuring animal welfare can still be vastly underestimated. There are three primary theories, or perspectives, on animal welfare - biological functioning, natural living and affective state. These come with their own diverse methods of measurement, each providing a limited perspective on an aspect of welfare. This paper describes a perspectival pluralist account of animal welfare, in which all three theoretical perspectives and their multiple measures are necessary to understand this complex phenomenon and provide a full picture of animal welfare. This in turn will offer us a better understanding of perspectivism and pluralism itself.

There are many decision contexts in which we require accurate information on animal welfare, in ethics, management, and policy. Unfortunately, many of the methods currently used for estimating animal welfare in these contexts are subjective and unreliable, and thus unlikely to be accurate. In this paper, I look at how we might apply principled methods from animal welfare science to arrive at more accurate scores, which will then help us in making the best decisions for animals. I construct and apply a framework of desiderata for welfare measures, to assess the best of the currently available methods and argue that a combined use of both a whole-animal measure and a combination measurement framework for assessing welfare will give us the most accurate answers to guide our action.

One of the most challenging questions surrounding subjective animal welfare is whether these states are measurable: that is, is subjective welfare an appropriately quantifiable target for scientific enquiry and ethical and deliberative calculation? The availability of several different types of measurement scale raises important questions regarding whether subjective experience has the right properties to be meaningfully represented on the types of scale required for different applications. This methodological question has so far received scant attention in the animal welfare literature. In this paper, I address this omission by examining the types of measurement scale we can reasonably expect to apply to animal welfare measurements, and which we will actually need for our applications. I argue that our different applications will require variously ordinal, interval, and ratio scales, and that we have sufficient reason to believe that subjective welfare is a target with the appropriate characteristics to justify the practice of representing it using each of these types of scales.

One of the primary concerns in animal research is ensuring the welfare of laboratory animals. Modern views on animal welfare emphasize the role of animal sentience, i.e. the capacity to experience subjective states such as pleasure or suffering, as a central component of welfare. The increasing official recognition of animal sentience has had large effects on laboratory animal research. The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (Low et al., University of Cambridge, 2012) marked an official scientific recognition of the presence of sentience in mammals, birds, and cephalopods. Animal sentience has furthermore been recognized in legislation in the European Union, UK, New Zealand and parts of Australia, with discussions underway in other parts of the world to follow suit. In this paper, we analyze this shift towards recognition of sentience in the regulation and practice in the treatment of laboratory animals and its effects on animal welfare and use.

There is increasing recognition that the welfare needs of cephalopod molluscs and decapod crustaceans are important. Current commercial practices involving these animals include a range of potential threats to their welfare, such as conditions of farming, capture, transport, and slaughter. This article draws from and updates our 2021 review for the UK Government, recommending a range of relatively simple and impactful changes that could benefit welfare while highlighting important research gaps that should be prioritised to facilitate the drafting of guidelines for best-practice.

With increasing attention given to wild animal welfare and ethics, it has become common to depict animals in the wild as existing in a state dominated by suffering. This assumption is now taken on board by many and frames much of the current discussion; but needs a more critical assessment, both theoretically and empirically. In this paper, we challenge the primary lines of evidence employed in support of wild animal suffering, to provide an alternative picture in which wild animals may often have lives that are far more positive than is commonly assumed. Nevertheless, while it is useful to have an alternative model to challenge unexamined assumptions, our real emphasis in this paper is the need for the development of effective methods for applying animal welfare science in the wild, including new means of data collection, the ability to determine the extent and scope of welfare challenges and opportunities, and their effects on welfare. Until such methods are developed, discussions of wild animal welfare cannot go beyond trading of intuitions, which as we show here can just as easily go in either direction.

While global aquaculture is rapidly expanding, there remains little attention given to the assessment of animal welfare within aquacultural systems. It is crucial that animal welfare concerns are central in the development and implementation of aquaculture as if they are not prioritized early on, it becomes much more difficult to adapt in future. To this end, it is important to ensure the availability of high-quality welfare assessment schemes to evaluate the welfare of animals in aquaculture and promote and maintain high welfare standards. This paper will first discuss some of the current certification and assessment frameworks, highlighting the primary limitations that need to be addressed, before going on to describe the recommendations for a best-practice welfare assessment process for aquaculture; with the hope that these considerations can be taken on board and used to help improve welfare assessment for aquaculture and, ultimately, to ensure animals used in aquaculture have a higher level of welfare. Any aquacultural system should be assessed according to a suitable framework in order to be considered adequate for the welfare of the animals it contains, and thus to maintain social license to operate.

One of the biggest problems in applications of animal welfare science is our ability to make comparisons between different individuals, both within and across species. Although welfare science provides methods for measuring the welfare of individual animals, there’s no established method for comparing measures between individuals. In this paper I diagnose this problem as one of underdetermination—there are multiple conclusions given the data, arising from two sources of variation that we cannot distinguish: variation in the underlying target variable (welfare experience) and in the relationship of measured indicators to the target. I then describe some of the possible methods of making comparisons, based on the use of similarity assumptions that will have greater or lesser justification in different circumstances, and the alternative methods we may use when direct comparisons are not possible. In the end, all our available options for making welfare comparisons are imperfect, and we need to make explicit context-specific decisions about which will be best for the task at hand while acknowledging their potential limitations. Future developments in our understanding of the biology of sentience will help strengthen our methods of making comparisons.

‘Sentience’ sometimes refers to the capacity for any type of subjective experience, and sometimes to the capacity to have subjective experiences with a positive or negative valence, such as pain or pleasure. We review recent controversies regarding sentience in fish and invertebrates and consider the deep methodological challenge posed by these cases. We then present two ways of responding to the challenge. In a policy-making context, precautionary thinking can help us treat animals appropriately despite continuing uncertainty about their sentience. In a scientific context, we can draw inspiration from the science of human consciousness to disentangle conscious and unconscious perception (especially vision) in animals. Developing better ways to disentangle conscious and unconscious affect is a key priority for future research.

Measurement of subjective animal welfare creates a special problem in validating the measurement indicators used. Validation is required to ensure indicators are measuring the intended target state, and not some other object. While indicators can usually be validated by looking for correlation between target and indicator under controlled manipulations, this is not possible when the target state is not directly accessible. In this article, I outline a four-step approach using the concept of robustness that can help with validating indicators of subjective animal welfare.

Animal welfare has a long history of disregard. While in recent decades the study of animal welfare has become a scientific discipline of its own, the difficulty of measuring animal welfare can still be vastly underestimated. There are three primary theories, or perspectives, on animal welfare - biological functioning, natural living and affective state. These come with their own diverse methods of measurement, each providing a limited perspective on an aspect of welfare. This paper describes a perspectival pluralist account of animal welfare, in which all three theoretical perspectives and their multiple measures are necessary to understand this complex phenomenon and provide a full picture of animal welfare. This in turn will offer us a better understanding of perspectivism and pluralism itself.