Hector Sanchez

Este artículo pretende esclarecer la posición mantenida por Julius Frauenstädt, uno de los discípulos de Schopenhauer, durante la polémica del materialismo (en concreto durante su primera fase). Para ello, en primer lugar, se presentarán las líneas generales que dieron lugar esta disputa analizando las obras de Carl Vogt y de Rudolph Wagner; para después pasar a analizar, en segundo lugar, la figura de Frauenstädt como pensador autónomo y su juicio acerca del materialismo. Finalmente, a modo de conclusión, se estudiará cómo la participación en la polémica por parte de Julius Frauenstädt supuso un punto de inflexión en su relación intelectual con Arthur Schopenhauer debido a las discrepancias acerca de las consecuencias prácticas del materialismo.

In this chapter I begin to address the issue of collective affective intentionality by discussing some of the considerations that animate the general debate on collective intentionality—a debate that turns on the question of what it is to share an intentional attitude in a sufficiently demanding sense of the verb ‘to share’. I eventually express my preference for a membership account that stresses the relational nature of collective intentionality as well as the normative character of the tie between the participants. In accordance with an objection repeatedly leveled against Margaret Gilbert’s account of so-called collective guilt feelings—which constitutes one of the most prominent exceptions to the tendency to neglect the realm of the affective in the early debate on collective intentionality in analytic philosophy—, I argue that a theory of collective affective intentionality able to capture the affective, the intentional, and the collective nature of the phenomenon at issue has to take as its point of departure the idea that collective affective intentionality is a matter of joint actualizations of our human faculty to feel-towards together. My main goal here is to provide a first glimpse of what has to be done in order to offer a philosophical account of collective affective intentionality which could be considered adequate in light of important insights gained in the course of both the debate on affective intentionality and the general debate on collective intentionality.

In this chapter I argue that the mode of affective togetherness we are interested in discloses an essential character of our human nature: we are beings that can exist as some particular group we (together with certain others) constitute. I begin by explicating Heidegger’s proposal that Dasein essentially is its possibilities. This discussion results in the following suggestion: to care about something in a particular situation presupposes being able to exist as such-and-such in the context of this situation. Pulling together a number of thoughts articulated in different parts of this book, I discuss the sense in which the idea of an affective attunement to the world is related to the claim that a person essentially is her existential possibilities. A central thought of this discussion is that only against the background of certain already defined ways of valuing the occurrences one faces, one can come to press ahead into the actualization of some concrete possibility, thereby coming to project oneself into this specific possibility—thereby coming to be this possibility. On this basis, I come back to the claim that the emotional responses by means of which a number of individuals participate in a moment of affective intentional community characteristically have a for-the-sake-of-which that encompasses a plurality in some particular unity. I reformulate this claim by arguing that our capacity to participate in episodes of collective affective intentionality is grounded in our ability to exist as some specific group in the context of particular situations.

This chapter elaborates on the idea that, in order to jointly actualize our ability to feel-towards together, we have to be able to exist as our group. It articulates the following proposal: the faculty we human individuals have to emotionally respond to certain occurrences in a genuinely joint manner is grounded in the ability we have to exist in certain situations in terms of some possibilities we share with concrete others—the ability we humans have to jointly be our (shared) possibilities. The chapter begins with a clarification of what it means to have a justifiable sense to the effect that we (the involved individuals) constitute some particular social group. By means of a sort of case study I then explore some intuitions concerning the idea of a number of individuals caring with one another about something. I suggest that we can best cash out this idea in terms of the image of a number of persons existing in the relevant situation in light of some possibility they feel able to jointly actualize. I propose that in these situations the involved individuals are, in virtue of a non-purely instrumental actualization of their ability to be the relevant group, pursuing a joint actualization of some of their personal abilities—of some existential possibilities. To understand this idea is fundamental in order to make sense of the following suggestion: in those situations in which we are jointly actualizing our ability to feel-towards together we are caring about something ultimately for the sake of a group we take ourselves to co-constitute. This discussion allows me to further clarify the sense in which emotionally responding to some occurrence in a genuinely joint manner can be understood as a characteristically human ability.

En este trabajo utilizaremos la tipología schmittiana de pares conceptuales teológico-políticos como marco interpretativo para estudiar cómo el panteísmo fue considerado en la Alemania decimonónica como una doctrina revolucionaria en un sentido político. Esto lo haremos presentando brevemente los antecedentes ilustrados de esta problemática y analizando tanto los debates sobre la personalidad de Dios surgidos a raíz de la publicación de Das Leben Jesu de Strauß como los textos de la izquierda hegeliana en los que se reconoce explícitamente un proyecto político revolucionario vinculado al panteísmo.

This chapter spells out what is special about our joint acts of feeling-towards together. It does so by pointing to a distinct felt conviction that phenomenologically defines the experiences that are at the heart of a collective affective intentional episode: the conviction that we (the participants) are jointly caring about something. The chapter elucidates what, in two different respects, grounds this felt conviction: what justifies this conviction and what, from a phenomenological point of view, serves as an experiential foundation for it. This allows me to, first, bring to light a distinctive mode of caring-about disclosed by our joint acts of feeling-towards together, and second, argue that certain pre-intentional feelings prepare us to feelingly understand certain circumstances as situations in which we (the participants) are caring about something as a group. In the course of this discussion, I introduce two notions: the notion of caring-with and the notion of feelings of being-together. I show that, leaving aside the image of some ‘fused feelings’, it is possible to develop an account of the phenomenon of collective affective intentionality that satisfies the two basic conditions of adequacy determined in the first part of this book. That is, an account that, first, makes visible that acts of felt understanding are at the heart of collective affective intentionality, and second, permits us to tell apart in a principled way the situations in which the involved individuals are feeling together from the situations in which they merely are feeling alongside each other.

This chapter articulates a proposal concerning what it means for a number of individuals to respond in an authentically affective and properly joint manner. It does so by elaborating on Schmid’s insight pertaining to the fundamental role the sharing of a concern plays in situations in which two or more individuals come to jointly actualize their ability to feel-towards together. By discussing Bennett Helm’s account of emotions as felt evaluations, I lay down some theoretical foundations needed to develop the following idea: collective affective intentionality could be understood in terms of interdependent acts of feeling that disclose and co-constitute the significance a given occurrence has for the participants qua members of a particular group, i.e. in terms of interdependent acts of feeling that disclose a shared evaluative perspective. Against this background, I begin to anchor the notion of collective affective intentionality in Martin Heidegger’s theme of a care-defined human mode of being by arguing that human intentionality may be understood in terms of an essentially shareable (but not necessarily collective) openness to the world. Appealing to another set of Heideggerian themes rearticulated by Matthew Ratcliffe, I discuss the role certain feelings play in setting up this essentially shareable relatedness to the world. This allows me to characterize our human openness to the world as an affectively enabled and essentially shareable world-belongingness. By means of this argument I prepare a claim that is central to the spirit of my proposal: the affective acts that actualize our ability to feel-towards together express in an outstanding manner our human nature.

This introductory chapter discusses the challenge of providing a phenomenologically adequate account of collective affective intentionality and states the main claim of the book. It delineates the subject matter and limits the scope of the inquiry by explaining why certain expressions which seem to refer to the ability at issue do not really point to the kind of phenomena the book intends to elucidate. Drawing on Max Scheler, I point to a human ability that becomes actualized in situations in which, in an interrelated way, two or more individuals come to understand their emotional feelings as feelings that constitute one and the same experiential act. The discussion emphasizes that any account of collective affective intentionality should offer a principle to differentiate between situations in which the individuals involved are feeling together and situations in which they merely are feeling alongside each other. After addressing the difficulties of reconciling a number of insights gained in the course of different philosophical debates, I suggest that the study of our ability to participate in episodes of joint feeling sheds light on the fundamental issue concerning the kind of beings we humans are. Appealing to a characterization of transcendental arguments offered by Charles Taylor, I explain my way of proceeding which is based on the idea that we can explicate experiential phenomena by specifying their conditions of intelligibility. In closing the chapter, I outline the general structure of the argument to be developed in this book.

In this chapter I clarify the sense in which we can speak of an essentially affective mode of intentionality. I argue that this mode of openness to a world that, to put it in McDowellian terms, is ‘embraceable in thought’ cannot be exhaustively characterized in terms of the intentionality of other mental states, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. Emphasizing the strong relationship between the intentional character of our emotions and their rational intelligibility, I argue that human emotions are best characterized as responses properly so called and examine the complex structure of our human affective responses. The chapter closes with an attempt to spell out the specificum of affective intentionality. I suggest that the best way to capture the genuinely affective nature of our emotional world-relatedness is by conceiving of this mode of openness to the world in terms of our capacity to feelingly understand particular situations as being a certain way and therefore meriting and calling for certain sorts of responses. In this context, I coin the notion of acts of felt understanding. This discussion allows me to provide an overview of the contemporary debate on affective intentionality and determine the terms in which I want the topic of this book to be discussed.

In this chapter I discuss Hans Bernhard Schmid’s account of shared feelings which elaborates on the idea that affective intentionality is a matter of world-directed feelings. I reconstruct the philosophical problem Schmid is seeking to solve, which I call The Problem of Shared Feelings. This problem concerns the conflict between two deep-seated intuitions: the intuition that we humans can come to feel together and the intuition that only individuals, and not groups, can be understood as legitimate subjects of feeling. I expose Schmid’s solution to this riddle which attempts to show that feelings can be shared in a non-metaphorical sense of the verb ‘to share’; the point being that collective affective intentionality can be claimed to be a matter of shared feelings. Seeking to motivate a suggestion concerning the terms in which we should conceive of collective affective intentionality, I articulate a question Schmid’s proposal may be argued to leave unanswered: what does it mean for two (or more) qualitatively different feelings to ‘match’ one another? I argue that, in order to offer a qualified answer to this question, we could appeal to a suggestion Schmid may be taken to make in a later version of his analysis of shared feelings: at the heart of a collective affective intentional episode we always find a shared concern. This thought, I propose, indicates a direction we could take in order to spell out a phenomenologically adequate account of collective affective intentionality along the lines of the view proposed at the end of Chap. 3.

Este trabajo presenta como objetivo revelar la influencia de los contextos socioeconómicos en las maneras de afrontamiento al cáncer como enfermedad. Se muestra un análisis sobre el cáncer como problema social y de salud; se analiza el papel de algunos entes sociales involucrados, el acceso de los enfermos a las terapias y de los productores de fármacos a las nuevas tecnologías. Se reflexiona acerca de la sobreevaluación de los fármacos que dificulta el acceso a novedosas y efectivas terapias; la supeditación del saber tecnocientífico a los intereses del capital; la creciente contaminación ambiental como detonante al incremento de casos; y la escasez de tecnologías para la prevención y el saneamiento en países subdesarrollados. Finalmente se refiere el programa cubano de lucha contra el cáncer, su situación actual y proyecciones. This paper aimes at revealing the influence of the socioeconomic contexts on the way cancer is faced as a disease. An analysis about cancer as a social and health problem is presented; the role of some social organizations involved the sick's access to therepies and drug producers' access to new technologies. It is reflected on the over-asessment of drugs which makes access to new and effective therapies difficult; the subordination of the technoscientific knowledge to the interests of the capital; the growing environmental pollution as a trigger for cases increase; and the limited technological resources for prevention and cleanup in underdeveloped countries. Finally, it is made reference to the Cuban cancer fighting program, its current status and scope.

© 2014, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. To examine change from 1991 to 2001 in disability-free life expectancy in the age range 60–90 by gender, race, and education in the United States. Mortality is estimated over two 10-year follow-up periods for persons in the National Health Interview Surveys of 1986/1987 and 1996/1997. Vital status is ascertained through the National Death Index. Disability prevalence is estimated from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys of 1988–1994 and 1999–2002. Disability is defined as ability to perform four activities of daily living without difficulty. Disability-free life expectancy increased only among white men. Disabled life expectancy increased for all groups—black and white men and women. Racial differences in disability-free life expectancy widened among men; gender differences were reduced among whites. Expansion of socioeconomic differentials in disability-free life at older ages occurred among white men and women and black women. The 1990s was a period where the increased years of life between ages 60 and 90 were concentrated in disabled years for most population groups.

Black-white mortality disparities remain sizable in the United States. In this study, we use the concept of avoidable/amenable mortality to estimate cause-of-death contributions to the difference in life expectancy between whites and blacks by gender in the United States in 1980, 1993, and 2007. We begin with a review of the concept of "avoidable mortality" and results of prior studies using this cause-of-death classification. We then present the results of our empirical analyses. We classified causes of death as amenable to medical care, sensitive to public health policies and health behaviors, ischemic heart disease, suicide, HIV/AIDS, and all other causes combined. We used vital statistics data on deaths and Census Bureau population estimates and standard demographic decomposition techniques. In 2007, causes of death amenable to medical care continued to account for close to 2 years of the racial difference in life expectancy among men and women. Causes amenable to public health interventions made a larger contribution to the racial difference in life expectancy among men than women. The contribution of HIV/AIDS substantially widened the racial difference among both men and women in 1993, but its contribution declined over time. Despite progress observed over the time period studied, a substantial portion of black-white disparities in mortality could be reduced given more equitable access to medical care and health interventions. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.

El objetivo de este ensayo es presentar de un modo coherente el sentido y significado del artículo polémico de Carl Schmitt La filosofía del derecho de Schopenhauer fuera de su sistema filosófico (1913) como respuesta a Das Problem des natürlichen Rechts (1912) de Erich Jung. Primero, ofreceremos una imagen contextualizada de esta última obra atendiendo a sus deudas con la filosofía del derecho de Arthur Schopenhauer y, después, presentamos los argumentos esgrimidos por Carl Schmitt en ese texto y mostramos cuáles eran los rasgos generales del pensamiento schmittiano de aquellos años para poner de relieve, en último lugar, su significado filosófico como un ataque a la tecnificación junguiano-schopenhaueriana del derecho y del Estado.

This book examines the human ability to participate in moments of joint feeling. It presents an answer to the question concerning the nature of our faculty to share in what might be called episodes of collective affective intentionality. The proposal develops the claim that our capacity to participate in such episodes is grounded in an ability central to our human condition: our capacity to care with one another about certain things. The author provides a phenomenologically adequate account of collective affective intentionality that takes seriously the idea that feelings are at the core of our emotional relation to the world. He details a form of group emotional orientation that relies on the fact that the participating individuals have come to share a number of concerns. Readers will learn that at the heart of a collective affective intentional episode, one does not merely find a set of shared concerns, but also a particular mode of caring. In the end, the argument presented in this monograph makes plausible the idea that the emotions through which humans participate in moments of affective intentional community express our nature. In addition, it shows that the debate on collective affective intentionality also permits us to better understand the relationship between two conflicting philosophical pictures of ourselves: the idea that we are essentially social beings and the claim that we are creatures for whom our personal existence is an issue. Thus, aiming at an elucidation of the nature of our ability to feel together, the book offers a detailed account of what it is to situationally express our human nature by caring about something in a properly joint manner.

Cas9/guide RNA (gRNA)‐based gene drive systems are expected to play a transformative role in malaria elimination efforts., whether through population modification, in which the drive system contains parasite‐refractory genes, or population suppression, in which the drive system induces a severe fitness load resulting in population decline or extinction. DNA sequence polymorphisms representing alternate alleles at gRNA target sites may confer a drive‐resistant phenotype in individuals carrying them. Modeling predicts that, for observed levels of SGV at potential target sites and observed rates of de novo DRA formation, population modification strategies are uniquely resilient to DRAs. We conclude that gene drives can succeed when fitness costs incurred by drive‐carrying mosquitoes are low enough to prevent strong positive selection for DRAs produced de novo or as part of the SGV and that population modification strategies are less prone to failure due to drive resistance.