Hector Sanchez

This essay intends to examine the reception of Arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophy in the period betweeen 1818 and 1848, thereby contributing to a demythologization of the luck of the philosopher’s thought on these three decades prior to the beginning of his fame. In order to achieve this, after showing a general picture of the personal myth that has characterised a great part of the historiographic tradition according to which his philosophy would have been ignored or silenced, we will present the four key lines of his reception, through the analysis of the news that his contemporaries gave of his philosophy in reviews, manuals of history of philosophy, or encyclopedias. Those four key lines are: a reading of Schopenhauer’s philosophy that stressed on its oriental features, an interpretation in an idealistic key which placed a lack of originality in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, an academic community that placed it against “the spirit of the times” due to the secondary place of Reason against the Will and finally, the emergence of the first followers of Schopenhauer’s philosophy.

This book examines the human ability to participate in moments of joint feeling. It presents an answer to the question concerning the nature of our faculty to share in what might be called episodes of collective affective intentionality. The proposal develops the claim that our capacity to participate in such episodes is grounded in an ability central to our human condition: our capacity to care with one another about certain things. The author provides a phenomenologically adequate account of collective affective intentionality that takes seriously the idea that feelings are at the core of our emotional relation to the world. He details a form of group emotional orientation that relies on the fact that the participating individuals have come to share a number of concerns. Readers will learn that at the heart of a collective affective intentional episode, one does not merely find a set of shared concerns, but also a particular mode of caring. In the end, the argument presented in this monograph makes plausible the idea that the emotions through which humans participate in moments of affective intentional community express our nature. In addition, it shows that the debate on collective affective intentionality also permits us to better understand the relationship between two conflicting philosophical pictures of ourselves: the idea that we are essentially social beings and the claim that we are creatures for whom our personal existence is an issue. Thus, aiming at an elucidation of the nature of our ability to feel together, the book offers a detailed account of what it is to situationally express our human nature by caring about something in a properly joint manner.

In this essay, we explore the possibility to find affinities, parallelisms and analogue functions in some aspects of the philosophies of Edmund Husserl and Arthur Schopenhauer. In order to achieve this, we begin taking into consideration the question about Husserl’s relation with Schopenhauer’s works by the means of some biographical facts on the first one; then we analyze the similarities between the concept of “better consciousness” and the liberation from the principle of sufficient reason through “aesthetic contemplation” in the philosophy of Schopenhauer, and Husserlian “phenomenological attitude” and “ἐποχή”. Finally, we show the differences between both authors concerning the ultimate goal pursued with such concepts.

El objetivo de este ensayo es presentar de un modo coherente el sentido y significado del artículo polémico de Carl Schmitt La filosofía del derecho de Schopenhauer fuera de su sistema filosófico (1913) como respuesta a Das Problem des natürlichen Rechts (1912) de Erich Jung. Primero, ofreceremos una imagen contextualizada de esta última obra atendiendo a sus deudas con la filosofía del derecho de Arthur Schopenhauer y, después, presentamos los argumentos esgrimidos por Carl Schmitt en ese texto y mostramos cuáles eran los rasgos generales del pensamiento schmittiano de aquellos años para poner de relieve, en último lugar, su significado filosófico como un ataque a la tecnificación junguiano-schopenhaueriana del derecho y del Estado.

Cas9/guide RNA (gRNA)‐based gene drive systems are expected to play a transformative role in malaria elimination efforts., whether through population modification, in which the drive system contains parasite‐refractory genes, or population suppression, in which the drive system induces a severe fitness load resulting in population decline or extinction. DNA sequence polymorphisms representing alternate alleles at gRNA target sites may confer a drive‐resistant phenotype in individuals carrying them. Modeling predicts that, for observed levels of SGV at potential target sites and observed rates of de novo DRA formation, population modification strategies are uniquely resilient to DRAs. We conclude that gene drives can succeed when fitness costs incurred by drive‐carrying mosquitoes are low enough to prevent strong positive selection for DRAs produced de novo or as part of the SGV and that population modification strategies are less prone to failure due to drive resistance.