Henny Blomme

In Being and Time, Heidegger nowhere treats the phenomenological reduction. In his Groundproblems of Phenomenology though, he designates reduction, construction and destruction as the three groundparts of phenomenological method. The whole of this method has thus to be seen as Heideggers alternative for Husserls reduction. But for a subject to be able to undertake this three-part methodological project, it has first to be converted from Husserlian ego to properly ‚Dasein‘. I show that the analytic of existentials of Being and Time can be seen as containing a rather precise description of the course of this conversion. It starts from originarity to end up with the subjects momentary participation in the project of being. It is structured by three turns that I call transcendental, not only because they are not initiated by the subject itself.

Les Cahiers philosophiques de Strasbourg 52 contains an Introduction and 9 new research articles in French & English on Friedrich Schiller's philosophy in relation to German Idealism. All fully available online on Open-Edition and as free e-book. Edited and introduced by Henny Blomme, Laure Cahen-Maurel, & David W. Wood. With contributions by Frederick C. Beiser, María del Rosario Acosta López, Cody Staton, Jeremy D. Hovda, Laure Cahen-Maurel, Quentin Landenne, Katia Hay, Louis Carré, and Charlotte Morel. SOMMAIRE / CONTENTS Introduction: Friedrich Schiller, a German Idealist? (Henny Blomme, Laure Cahen-Maurel & David W. Wood) 1. Frederick C. Beiser. Schiller’s Humanism 2. María del Rosario Acosta López. Une dimension esthétique de la critique : la temporalité du beau dans les lettres de Schiller Sur l’éducation esthétique 3. Cody Staton. In Search of Play: Schiller’s Drive Theory as a Turn Away from Kant 4. Jeremy D. Hovda. Bildung between Kant and Schiller 5. Laure Cahen-Maurel. Fichte avec Schiller : La querelle des Heures à la lumière de Grâce et Dignité 6. Quentin Landenne. La Bildung chez Schiller et Fichte, entre esthétique et politique 7. Katia Hay. On the Tragic-Sublime and Tragic Freedom: Thinking with Schiller and Schelling 8. Louis Carré. Vicissitudes de l’État organique : Kant, Hegel, Schiller 9. Charlotte Morel. Conjoindre idéalisme et réalisme après Hegel : Les lectures de Schiller par Lotze et Lange Résumés / Abstracts

In a pioneering text,Udo Thiel has claimed that, among the conceptions of apperception that were held by Kant’s contemporaries, it is Johann Bernhard Merian’s which comes closest to Kant’s own theory of apperception (Thiel 1996). I argue that Thiel’s claim must be strongly nuanced because of two important differences between Merian’s and Kant’s conception of apperception. First, Merian’s dismissal of obscure representations against Kant’s explicit recognition of them as a fundamental part of his doctrine; Second, I show that the Kantian distinction between apprehensive and reflexive apperception must be understood as a further development of Leibniz’ distinction between perception and apperception. As a consequence, for Kant the awareness of one’s existence that Merian claims to be clearly implied in both the apperception of oneself and of other things can be no more than an undetermined, and therefore necessarily obscure, perception.

Scholars who consider that the Transcendental Analytic contains the core of what Kant calls ‘transcendental idealism’ are mistaken. Indeed, Kant’s transcendental idealism of space, time and spatiotemporal objects is sufficiently proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic and does not depend on complementary claims made later on in the Critique. This does not mean, however, that we are allowed to subscribe to the so-called separability-thesis, which states that we can endorse Kant's views in the Transcendental Logic without endorsing the results of the expositions and arguments laid out in the Aesthetic. Nor does it mean that the Aesthetic contains the only proof for transcendental idealism. Indeed, as Kant himself explicitly recognizes, the antinomies provide the premise for an indirect or mediate proof of his position with respect to the nature of space and time. First, I analyze Kant’s argument for the claim that the production of transcendental illusion is inherent to the function of human reasoning, and therefore inevitable. I then follow the presuppositions and the argumentation of the mediate proof of transcendental idealism and argue that it has a more general validity than could be assumed on the basis of Kant’s text, because it is in its essence independent from the particular determinations of the cosmological idea in the form of the four antinomies. Indeed, as I argue, the nature of reason itself and the content of the general cosmological idea suffice as elements for a mediate proof. Thus, I claim that transcendental idealism can be mediately established on the basis of the general antinomical relation between transcendental realism and material idealism, without any requirement to refer to the particular realisations of this antagonism as they are presented in the four antinomies. If the argument is correct, it shows that the mediate proof of transcendental idealism does not depend on a sympathetic account of the antinomies and is not automatically invalidated if the proofs of thesis and antithesis are considered unconvincing.

In this text, I offer an investigation of the role played by “fundamental concepts” within the first sketches of two projects of a reform of metaphysics: the project of Johann Nikolaus Tetens and the project of Immanuel Kant. One year before the Berlin Academy published its famous Prize Question of 1761 (which asks for a comparison of the methods of metaphysics and geometry), Tetens had already published a short text in which he inquired into the causes of the small number of accepted truths within metaphysics. Although the method of geometry has to be recommended, Tetens also thinks that it cannot simply be translated into philosophy, where it never could generate the clarity it is able to bring about in mathematics. Indeed, for Tetens, an essential preliminary for a metaphysics that contains irrefutable truths and that will be able to apply the geometrical method is the inquiry into fundamental ontological concepts. As for Kant, in 1763 he explicitly replied to the question of the Academy, but it is certainly not false to state that his quest for a definitive answer ended only in 1781, with the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason. Presented as a solution to the crisis in metaphysics, this work offers a new theory of objectivity. As we know, within this theory, the first concepts of the understanding (the categories) play an important role. How come that both Tetens and Kant connected the problem of first concepts with the problem of objectivity? And who is indebted to whom?

In the first edition of his book on the completeness of Kant’s table of judgments, Klaus Reich shortly indicates that the B-version of the metaphysical exposition of space in the Critique of pure reason is structured following the inverse order of the table of categories. In this paper, I develop Reich’s claim and provide further evidence for it. My argumentation is as follows: Through analysis of our actually given representation of space as some kind of object (the formal intuition of space in general), the metaphysical exposition will show that this representation is secondary to space considered as an original, undetermined and as such unrepresentable intuitive manifold. Now, following Kant, the representation of any kind of object involves diversity, synthesis and unity. In the case of our representation of space as formal intuition, this involves, firstly, a manifold a priori, i.e. space as pure form, delivered by the transcendental Aesthetic, secondly, a figurative, productive synthesis of that manifold, and, thirdly, the unity provided by the categories. Analysing our given representation of space – the task of the metaphysical exposition – amounts to dismantling its unity and determine its characteristics with respect to the categories.

The goal of Chiba’s book is to answer the following question: Is Kant’s ‘transcendental idealism’ ‘realism’ or ‘idealism’? (p. 2) Chiba concludes that Kant is an anti-realist: objects do not exist independently of our cognition. Chiba’s book contains a lot of interesting and precise analysis of parts of Kant’s argument in the Critique of Pure Reason. So it should be clear that the following remarks, although they express disagreement or reservation, are in no sense meant to hold back anyone from reading Chiba’s book. The contrary is the case: although I do not agree with everything Chiba affirms and defends, I can recommend his in its detail very informative dissertation to anyone who is interested in the attempt to link Kant’s theory to the contemporary ‘realism’ debate.

Le manuscrit dont nous donnons une première édition française fut rédigé en décembre 1862 et représente la première ébauche des trois premières sections du livre III du Capital. De fait, Marx l’a intitulé « Chapitre 3. Capital et Profit », en référence au plan rédigé un mois plus tard, dans lequel ce chapitre devient la « troisième section » du Capital, soit le futur Livre III lui-même. -/- Marx y traite en effet de la transformation de la plus-value en profit et du taux de plus-value en taux de profit, de la transformation du profit en profit moyen et de la loi de la baisse tendancielle du taux de profit. Ce chapitre est accompagné de quelques pages intitulées Miscellanea, notes complémentaires aux développements du texte principal. À en juger par le sous-titre que Marx a donné au texte, Heft Ultimum (cahier ultimum), on peut penser qu'il en était suffisamment satisfait pour qu'il serve de matériau principal à la rédaction définitive. Néanmoins, bien que le texte présente une unité et une cohérence théoriques, il faut noter que le temps a marqué le manuscrit de son empreinte, certaines pages nous étant parvenues à l'état de fragment. -/- Concernant la transformation des valeurs en prix de production, le texte prend à revers l’histoire du long et fastidieux commentaire sur le problème du calcul de la transformation, en insistant sur l’oubli de l’origine de la plus-value provoqué par la forme profit et achevé dans le taux général de profit qui s’établit par la concurrence des capitaux. D’une manière générale, Marx manifeste en permanence dans ce texte son souci de bien distinguer l’essence des phénomènes économiques de leur mode d’apparition dans la réalité immédiate. C’est pour lui la seule tâche justifiant le caractère scientifique de l’économie politique. Les lois abstraites de la plus-value, en effet, ne peuvent être démontrées directement à partir du profit empirique – c’est ainsi que Marx qualifie le taux général de profit – dans la mesure où celui-ci rend invisibles les lois fondamentales de la production capitaliste. -/-.

Die 4. Auflage bringt zunächst die Kommentierung der Präambel und der Art. 1 bis 19 auf den aktuellen Stand von Judikatur und Literatur. Die grundlegende Struktur des Kommentares wurde beibehalten und um neuere Entwicklungen wie die Implikationen der Europäisierung und Digitalisierung sowie der Corona-Pandemie ergänzt.Die Herausgeberschaft des Kommentares hat ab der 4. Auflage Frauke Brosius-Gersdorf übernommen. Auch im Autorenkreis sind personelle Veränderungen zu verzeichnen: Mit Ausnahme von Frauke Brosius-Gersdorf, Alexander Thiele und Ferdinand Wollenschläger, die bereits an der 3. Auflage mitgewirkt haben, liegen die Kommentierungen in den Händen neuer Autorinnen und Autoren.Der Kommentar erscheint in drei Bänden und wird nur geschlossen abgegeben.Der Grundgesetz-Kommentar ist Bestandteil des Moduls Verfassungsrecht PREMIUM, das bei beck-online.de erhältlich ist.

Mit dem Terminus 'ursprünglicher Raum' wird der Raum bezeichnet, der Kant innerhalb der transzendentalen Ästhetik als reine subjektive Form der Anschauung des äußeren Sinnes bestimmt. Man könnte ihn auch den 'ästhetischen Raum' nennen. Auf jeden Fall muss er vom (proto-)geometrischen Raum unterschieden werden, da letzterer eine Einheit voraussetzt die auf einer Synthesis beruht, und dadurch – weil bei Kant alle Synthesis unter den Kategorien steht – weniger ursprünglich zum Anschauungsvermögen gehört. Es ist diese Unterscheidung zwischen dem ursprünglichen Raum, der „Form der Anschauung“ ist, und dem (proto-)geometrischen Raum, der „formale Anschauung“ ist, auf die Kant in einer bekannten Fußnote im §26 der transzendentalen Deduktion der B-Auflage anspielt. Die Bedeutung der Unterscheidung zwischen (proto-)geometrischem und ursprünglichem Raum liegt unter anderem darin, dass sie stipuliert, dass das ursprüngliche Wesen des Raumes vor und unabhängig von dem erreichbar ist, was durch jedwede Mathematik der Ausdehnung von ihm ausgesagt wird. Das bedeutet nun aber nicht, dass diese Unterscheidung uns zwingt, anzunehmen, dass das ursprüngliche Wesen des Raumes auch von uns erreichbar ist. Und nehmen wir mal an, dass wir tatsächlich über eine Art Zugang zu diesem Wesen verfügen, dann noch stellt sich überdies die Frage, ob ein solcher Zugang sich innerhalb der Sphäre der Erkenntnis befindet, mit anderen Worten: ob das ursprüngliche Wesen des Raumes vom Philosophen auch wirklich erkannt – das heißt: in Erkenntnisurteile gefasst und ausgedrückt – werden kann.