Hernan Bobadilla

Despite a growing effort in recent years to theorize epistemic justice as a species of distributive justice from within a Rawlsian framework, there is as yet no well-worked out capabilities-based account. In this paper, we set out to provide one. According to our sufficientarian conception, epistemic justice requires a distribution of capabilities that ensures to all individuals opportunities for minimal epistemic agency, publicly conceived. We argue that this conception has advantages over existing resourcist accounts of distributive epistemic justice inspired by Rawls as well as over Miranda Fricker’s tentative capabilities-based alternative. We contend that epistemic justice concerns a plurality of capabilities for epistemic agency, where the scope and nature of these capabilities is ultimately left open to discernment through public reasoning, but where equal emphasis is placed on contributing as well as retrieving epistemic goods and resources from common pools and on exerting combined capabilities as well as developing internal ones in the first place.

This article provides an epistemological assessment of climate analogue methods, with specific reference to the use of spatial analogues in the study of the future climate of target locations. Our contention is that, due to formal and conceptual inadequacies of geometrical dissimilarity metrics and the loss of relevant information, especially when reasoning from the physical to the socio-economical level, purported inferences from climate analogues of the spatial kind we consider here prove limited in a number of ways. Indeed, we formulate five outstanding problems concerning the search for best analogues, which we call the problem of non-uniqueness of the source, problem of non-uniqueness of the target, problem of average, problem of non-causal correlations and problem of inferred properties, respectively. In the face of such problems, we then offer two positive recommendations for a fruitful application of this methodology to the assessment of impact, adaptation and vulnerability studies of climate change, especially in the context of what we may prosaically dub “twin cities”. Arguably, such recommendations help decision-makers constrain the set of plausible climate analogues by integrating local knowledge relevant to the locations of interest.

Interpretation plays a central role in using scientific models to explain natural phenomena: Meaning must be bestowed upon a model in terms of what it is and what it represents to be used for model explanations. However, it remains unclear how capacious and complex interpretation in models can be, particularly when conducted by the same group of scientists in the context of one explanatory project. This paper sheds light upon this question by examining modelling and explanatory practices related to the Olami-Feder-Christensen model of earthquakes. This case study shows that various interpretations are intricately connected in the overall meaning of a model used for model explanations. This leads to a manifold picture of interpretation, according to which scientific models are construed as networks of interconnected meanings. As scientists ponder and integrate these various interpretations, guided by locally attended epistemic interests, they achieve model explanations with layers of content, both in their explanantia and explananda.

The prospective formalization of the Anthropocene as a chronostratigraphic unit by the International Commission on Stratigraphy has been intensely debated. This paper explores and assesses the stakes of this process from a philosophical perspective. I distinguish two senses of formalization—the descriptive and the evaluative—and argue that: 1) there are descriptive and evaluative formalizations of the Anthropocene beyond the confines of the ICS; 2) incoherencies between Anthropocene proposals and the ICS’s current tenets are not a decisive reason for deferring descriptive formalization; and 3) the prospective evaluative formalization of the Anthropocene by the ICS would be impactful.