•  977
    In this paper we advocate the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. The main advantage of the thesis is that we can accept both the Wittgensteinian and Sellarsian assault on the given and the claim that only subjective and private states can do justice to the qualitative character of experience. We hint that if we take qualia to be tropes, we dissolve the problem of inverted qualia. We develop an account of sensory concept acquisition that takes the presen…Read more
  •  505
    Schaffer (2010) argues that the internal relatedness of all things, no matter how it is conceived, entails priority monism. He claims that a sufficiently pervasive internal relation among objects implies the priority of the whole, understood as a concrete object. This paper shows that at least in the case of an internal relatedness of all things conceived in terms of physical intentionality - one way to understand dispositions - priority monism not only doesn't follow but also is precluded. We c…Read more
  •  261
    When my own beliefs are not first-personal enough
    with Manuel De Pinedo García
    Theoria 22 (58): 35-41. 2007.
    Richard Moran has argued, convincingly, in favour of the idea that there must be more than one path to access our own mental contents. The existence of those routes, one first-personal—through avowal—the other third-personal—no different to the one used to ascribe mental states to other people and to interpret their actions—is intimately connected to our capacity to respond to norms. Moran’s account allows for conflicts between first personal and third personal authorities over my own beliefs; t…Read more
  •  137
    When my own beliefs are not first-personal enough
    with Manuel de Pinedo
    Theoria 22 (1): 35-41. 2007.
    Richard Moran has argued, convincingly, in favour of the idea that there must be more than one path to access our own mental contents. The existence of those routes, one first-personal —through avowal— the other third-personal —no different to the one used to ascribe mental states to other people and to interpret their actions— is intimately connected to our capacity to respond to norms. Moran’s account allows for conflicts between first personal and third personal authorities over my own belief…Read more
  •  98
    In this paper we put forward the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. Further, we maintain that Wittgenstein hints in this direction. We also find in Wittgenstein elements of an account of language acquisition that takes the presence of qualia as an enabling condition. We conclude by pointing out some difficulties of this view.
  •  61
    Sense and Sensibility Educated: A Note on Experience and (Minimal) Empiricism
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5): 741-747. 2012.
    Abstract McDowell?s minimal empiricism holds that experience, understood as providing conceptually articulated contents, plays a role in the justification of our beliefs. We question this idea by contrasting the role of perceptual experience in moral and non-moral judgments and conclude that experience per se is irrelevant in the former case and should also be so in the latter one: only with the help of adequate beliefs experience can provide a connection with the world. We conclude with some re…Read more
  •  54
    Minimal empiricism without dogmas
    with Manuel Pinedo-Garcia
    Philosophia 35 (2): 197-206. 2007.
    John McDowell has defended a position called minimal empiricism, that aims to avoid the oscillation between traditional empiricism’s commitment to a set of contents working as external justifiers for our system of beliefs and a coherentist position where our thought receives no constraint from the world. We share McDowell’s dissatisfaction with both options, but find his minimal empiricism committed to the idea of a tribunal of experience where isolated contents are infused into our network of i…Read more
  •  54
    Soft facts: Thinking practices and the architecture of reality
    Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 61 7-21. 2014.
    It is common to criticize the idea of objectivity by claiming that we cannot make sense of any cognitive contact with the world that is not constituted by the very materials of our thinking, and to conclude that the idea must be abandoned and that the world is ‘well lost’. We resist this conclusion and argue for a notion of objectivity that places its source within the domain of thoughts by proposing a conception of facts, akin to McDowell’s, as thinkable while independent of any act of thinking…Read more
  •  39
    Brandom on Thought and Reality: Showing Receptivity the Way out of the Bottleneck
    with Manuel de Pinedo
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 26 (1): 21-36. 2006.
  •  38
    Epistemic virtues and transparency
    with Manuel De Pinedo
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3): 257-266. 2011.
    Transparency is commonly held to be a property of one’s beliefs: it is enough for me to examine an issue to establish my beliefs about it. Recent challenges to first-person authority over the content of one’s beliefs potentially undermine transparency. We start considering some consequences in terms of variations of Moore’s paradox. Then we study cases where, in the process of acquiring and managing beliefs, one pays excessive attention to how reliable, empirically adequate, coherent, or widely …Read more
  •  37
    Por uma metafísica de tramas: o mundo sem arché
    with Tomás Ribeiro Cardoso
    Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 53 (125): 281-298. 2012.
  •  34
    When my Own Beliefs are not First-Personal Enough
    with Manuel de Pinedo
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22 (1): 35-41. 2007.
    Richard Moran has argued, convincingly, in favour of the idea that there must be more than one path to access our own mental contents. The existence of those routes, one first-personal —through avowal— the other third-personal —no different to the one used to ascribe mental states to other people and to interpret their actions— is intimately connected to our capacity to respond to norms. Moran’s account allows for conflicts between first personal and third personal authorities over my own belief…Read more
  •  29
    Holism and Singularity Towards an Ontology of the Unfitting
    with Manuel de Pinedo
    Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 17 15-22. 2008.
    Holism about thought content – especially coupled with a measure of semantic externalism – can provide us with an attractive account of how thinking relates to the world. It can help us to tell a neat story that starts out with the inseparable entanglement of truth and intelligibility: in order to understand thought, to confront it to the world and to give verdicts about that confrontation, we need to grasp a considerable amount of truths. A variety of positions that emerge under the influence o…Read more
  •  24
    I only know that i know a lot: holism and knowledge
    with Manuel de Pinedo
    Epistemologia 37 (2): 234-254. 2014.
  •  19
    Sobre o que Não Aparece (ao Neopirrônico)
    with Paulo A. G. De Sousa
    Discurso 23 53-70. 1994.
    O artigo critica a posição filosófica neopirrônica defendida por Oswaldo Porchat Pereira (Porchat 5). Argumentamos que uma de suas noções básicas, a de fenômeno, carece de uma definição apropriada. Além disso, mostramos que o neopirronismo abre as portas para o irracionalismo e que a ciência moderna traz problemas para essa postura
  •  15
    I only know that i know a lot: holism and knowledge
    with Manuel de Pinedo
    Epistemologia 2 234-254. 2015.
  •  15
    A imagem de que restrições do mundo às nossas crenças e enunciados não são internas ao pensamento parece motivar a separação entre verdades de razão e verdades de fato. Esta separação parece ser crucial para entendermos argumentos em favor de certas versões de externismo. Neste texto, depois de considerar como pode ser feita a separação entre verdades de fato e verdades de razão, apresento uma distinção entre duas formas de externismo e defendo uma delas. Termino recomendando uma específica abor…Read more
  •  14
    Depois de anos de deflação galopante, O que sobrou da verdade?
    Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia 8 (1). 2003.
    Este texto considera algumas maneiras alternativas de pensar na verdade e no que queremos com ela. Analisa também os problemas com a concepção da verdade como correspondência e procura um diagnóstico do tipo de frustração que esses problemas trazem. Considera em seguida as alternativas deflacionistas e seus problemas em oferecer aquilo que comumente queremos de um predicado de verdade. Avalia então as vantagens e falhas das concepções da verdade como indefinível e da concepção de verdade como id…Read more
  •  14
    In this paper I consider two related threats to the idea that our beliefs compose a genuine worldview the global skeptic challenge to the clam that our beliefs are somehow grounded and the suspicion that our beliefs have no relation to the world whatsoever I consider these two threats from the point of view of our activity of doubting m order to establish what follows from our capacity to doubt any claim although not at once I argue that the two threats can be dispelled if we attend to a careful…Read more
  •  11
    Towards an Indexical Paradoxico-Metaphysics
    Open Philosophy 1 (1): 155-172. 2018.
    This paper sketches a metaphysical view according to which the furniture of the universe is made of indexicals. The view draws from work in the philosophy of language and thought concerning demonstratives, proper names and other deictic operations. It also draws on Levinas‘ conception of the Other as beyond any substantive description. Indexicalism, as I call it, is compared with object-oriented views such as Harman‘s and Garcia‘s. Indexicalism lapses into paradox concerning totality and proves …Read more
  •  10
    Kim recomenda uma forma de fisicalismo que seria, segundo ele, a única alternativa fisicalista para evitar o epifenomenalismo. Neste trabalho, mostro que esta alternativa não é viável: o fisicalismo de Kim também não consegue lidar de maneira satisfatória com o problema da causação mental. Considerando algumas características da simulação de estados mentais e a motivação para entendermos as propriedades mentais como separáveis das físicas, esboço uma maneira de pensar nos estados mentais que evi…Read more
  •  8
    Pode Deus determinar o valor de pi?
    Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 48 (115): 47-66. 2007.
  •  7
    Horizonte e irredutibilidade: Eudoro de Sousa e o originário na ontologia
    Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 8 109-114. 2012.
  •  4
    When my Own Beliefs are not First-Personal Enough
    with Manuel de Pinedo
    Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 22 (1): 35-41. 2009.
    Richard Moran has defended the need for two modes of access to our mental contents, a first-personal and a third-personal one. In this paper we maintain that, in the moral case, an excess of concentration on the a third-personal perspective precludes accounting for our responsibility over our own beliefs and our capacity to normatively respond to the world.
  •  4
    Beats and being
    Rhuthmos. forthcoming.
    This presentation has been performed in the conference “Performance Philosophy,” University of Surrey, Guilford in 2013. In the original, parts that are here in bold have been struck out by the author but unfortunately this website does not support strikethrough characters. We are sorry for the inconvenience. Tic. Right now. Tac. Something irrupts. At this moment. Something takes place. Something occupies the place. Something takes over the place. The place where things happen. The land of - Phi…Read more
  •  4
    O pensamento sem estaca zero
    Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 45 (110): 209-223. 2004.
  •  3
    Horizonte e irredutibilidade: Eudoro de Sousa e o originário na ontologia
    Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 8 109-114. 2012.