Hongjian Wang

Over the past four decades, Heidegger’s philosophy has exerted a profound influence on Chinese intellectual thought. Within Mainland Chinese academia, two primary approaches to interpreting Heidegger’s work can be identified. The “contemporary” approach, championed by Sun Zhouxing, is rooted in the concerns of modernity, particularly nihilism and the dominance of technology, using these issues as a foundation for proposing a philosophy of the future (未來 哲學). In contrast, the “Chinese” approach, represented by Zhang Xianglong, emphasizes cross-cultural comparisons between Heidegger’s philosophy and Chinese traditional thought, seeking to develop a phenomenology of kinship affection (親親現象學) and a “philosophy of family/home” (家哲學). Both approaches constitute concrete practices of phenomenological interpretation, and through their respective explorations, they demonstrate the universal validity and methodological robustness of Heidegger’s phenomenology, showing its applicability across different cultural and conceptual contexts.

In his book, Wang Jun draws on Rombach’s philosophical reflections on the way to the phenomenology of interculturality and presents us with a possible path to Chinese phenomenology. The first half of the book is a theoretical and philosophical-historical reflection on Rombach’s structural phenomenology, image philosophy, and philosophical hermeticism, while the second half explores the theory and practice of phenomenology of interculturality based on these reflections. The two form an organic whole. Of particular interest is the concept of “polylogue” proposed by Wang Jun. The reflections in this review show that “polylogue” is an important complement to “dialogue” and does not replace it. If we consider the philosophical background, we can say that the relationship between hermeticism and hermeneutics is complementary rather than antagonistic.

Gadamer’s appeal to Aristotle’s ethics in the central part of Truth and Method shows that there is a close connection between hermeneutics and ethics. There is an attempt in Gadamer to analyze Aristotelian ethics, especially moral-practical knowledge, in light of the basic problem of philosophical hermeneutics, i.e., the relation between the concrete and the general. It is noteworthy that the generality of φρόνησις is a concrete, historical generality, which is fundamentally different from τέχνη. It is precisely on the basis of this generality that a hermeneutical ethics is possible.

Heidegger’s interest in Eastern culture is well documented and has received widespread attention. It is worth asking whether Heidegger’s philosophy of existence can be regarded as compatible with intercultural philosophy, and even provide theoretical support for it. This paper attempts to analyze the basic characteristics of Heidegger’s philosophy of existence and to reveal its theoretical significance for the construction of an intercultural philosophy, starting from the early Heidegger’s theory of being-with and the later Heidegger’s account of the truth of Being, respectively.

In his interpretation of Nietzsche, Heidegger on the one hand acknowledges the anti‑metaphysical orientation of Nietzsche’s nihilism, but on the other hand considers Nietzsche to be the ultimate metaphysician. This location is based firstly on Heidegger’s reflections on the relationship between metaphysics and nihilism. By revealing the origin and end of metaphysics, it is to be shown that nihilism and metaphysics are two aspects of the same thing. Moreover, Heidegger expands the meaning of metaphysics by ascribing to it the distinction between the sensuous and supersensuous worlds, between beings and beingness. Based on the critique of Nietzsche, he is able to develop a post‑metaphysical philosophical conception. Nietzsche himself, however, is not addicted to metaphysics, and in his overcoming of metaphysics and his vision of post‑metaphysical thinking he is rather a precursor of Heidegger.

Heidegger opposes the translation of οὐσία as substance, while he advocates translating it directly as being. Following Aristotle, Heidegger tries to discover the being in the light of the daily productive experience, so that he connects οὐσία with the form (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι). At the same time, focusing on the phenomenon of motion, οὐσία is understood as the realization of the form, that is its constant presence. However, to develop an interpretative model that corresponding to the life practice, Heidegger must go beyond Aristotle. Exposing the various dimensions of the concept of δύναμις and emphasizing the element of absence, Heidegger proposes the concept of the original absence so that he can understand the process of movement again from his own sight. Accordingly, a new interpretative model is developed, through which the οὐσία is understood as the concrete, future-oriented being.

Das vorliegende Buch versucht, Heideggers frühes Denken im Lichte einer Ontologie der Praxis zu interpretieren. Gezeigt wird die grundlegende Bedeutung Heideggers für die Rehabilitierung der praktischen Philosophie, die von den Schülern Heideggers initiiert wurde. Es handelt sich um die Entwicklung der formal anzeigenden Methode, durch die die neue Bestimmung der Philosophie zustande gebracht und die Zusammengehörigkeit zwischen Sein und Praxis erschlossen wird. Ferner wird deutlich, inwiefern Heidegger in diesem nihilistischen technischen Zeitalter noch eine wichtige Rolle spielen kann.

From the hermeneutics of facticity to phenomenological destruction, Heidegger’s constant effort has been to achieve a non-metaphysical, pre-theoretical methodology of philosophy. His ideas finally lead to the development of the method of formal indication. In this essay, I will consider first the methodological function of historical things, in order to illustrate the method of destruction. Then, I will explain the definition of philosophy from the point of view of formal indication, thereby showing how different this method is from traditional philosophical methods. Finally, I will analyse the importance of this transformation of methodology, in order to reveal in which sense a concrete universality is possible and how it contributes to the foundation of the ontology of life.