Hugh Benson

While the early Platonic dialogues have often been explored and appreciated for their ethical content, this is the first book devoted solely to the epistemology of Plato's early dialogues. Author Hugh H. Benson argues that the characteristic features of these dialogues--Socrates' method of questions and answers, his fascination with definition, his professions of ignorance, and his thesis that virtue is knowledge--are decidedly epistemological. In this thoughtful study, Benson uncovers the model of knowledge that underlies these distinctively Socratic views. What emerges is unfamiliar, yet closer to a contemporary conception of scientific understanding than ordinary knowledge.

I argue against a formidable interpretation of Plato’s Divided Line image according to which dianoetic correctly applies the same method as dialectic. The difference between the dianoetic and dialectic sections of the Line is not methodological, but ontological. I maintain that while this interpretation correctly identifies the mathematical method with dialectic, ( i.e. , the method of philosophy), it incorrectly identifies the mathematical method with dianoetic. Rather, Plato takes dianoetic to be a misapplication of the mathematical method by a subset of practicing mathematicians. Thus, Plato’s critique of dianoetic is a not a critique of mathematics, as such, but of mathematicians

In the first chapter of The Contribution of Socratic Method and Plato’s Theory of Truth to Plato Scholarship, Rod Jenks argues that since Socrates and Plato take the Socratic elenchus to establish truths and the Socratic elenchus can only establish consistency, Socrates and Plato must be committed to a coherence theory of truth. Jenks denies any explicit recognition of such a commitment in Plato’s early dialogues. The claim is rather that “early Socratic practice as recorded by Plato makes sense only against the backdrop of the assumption of a coherence theory of truth”. It is, according to Jenks, Plato’s solution to “the problem of the elenchus.” In the middle and later dialogues, Jenks argues, Plato exposes the philosophical foundations of this assumption and addresses various problems associated with it, only to return to the Socratic elenchus—now supported by a philosophically grounded CTT—in the Philebus.

Hugh H. Benson explores Plato's answer to Clitophon's challenge, the question of how one can acquire the knowledge Socrates argues is essential to human flourishing-knowledge we all seem to lack. Plato suggests two methods by which this knowledge may be gained: the first is learning from those who already have the knowledge one seeks, and the second is discovering the knowledge one seeks on one's own. The book begins with a brief look at some of the Socratic dialogues where Plato appears to recommend the former approach while simultaneously indicating various difficulties in pursuing it. The remainder of the book focuses on Plato's recommendation in some of his most important and central dialogues-the Meno, Phaedo, and Republic-for carrying out the second approach: de novo inquiry. The book turns first to the famous paradox concerning the possibility of such an inquiry and explores Plato's apparent solution. Having defended the possibility of de novo inquiry as a response to Clitophon's challenge, Plato explains the method or procedure by which such inquiry is to be carried out. The book defends the controversial thesis that the method of hypothesis, as described and practiced in the Meno, Phaedo, and Republic, is, when practiced correctly, Plato's recommended method of acquiring on one's own the essential knowledge we lack. The method of hypothesis when practiced correctly is, then, Platonic dialectic, and this is Plato's response to Clitophon's challenge.

While the early Platonic dialogues have often been explored and appreciated for their ethical content, this is the first book devoted solely to the epistemology of Plato's early dialogues. Author Hugh H. Benson argues that the characteristic features of these dialogues- -Socrates' method of questions and answers, his fascination with definition, his professions of ignorance, and his thesis that virtue is knowledge- -are decidedly epistemological. In this thoughtful study, Benson uncovers the model of knowledge that underlies these distinctively Socratic views. What emerges is unfamiliar, yet closer to a contemporary conception of scientific understanding than ordinary knowledge

This broad-ranging _Companion_ comprises original contributions from leading Platonic scholars and reflects the different ways in which they are dealing with Plato’s legacy. Covers an exceptionally broad range of subjects from diverse perspectives Contributions are devoted to topics, ranging from perception and knowledge to politics and cosmology Allows readers to see how a position advocated in one of Plato’s dialogues compares with positions advocated in others Permits readers to engage the debate concerning Plato’s philosophical development on particular topics Also includes overviews of Plato’s life, works and philosophical method

After an introductory discussion primarily aimed to differentiate her approach to reading the Platonic dialogues from the so-called argument-focused approach, Gordon argues that Socratic dialectic—which she understands as “the question and answer depicted in the dialogues between Socrates and the interlocutors”—does not simply aim at uncovering inconsistencies in the interlocutors’ belief sets, but at urging through extra-logical means the interlocutors to live a particular—philosophical—kind of life. Next, she argues via a discussion of reader response theory for the parallelism between Socrates’ relationship with his interlocutors and Plato’s relationship with his readers. Thus, Plato, like Socrates, should be seen as urging his readers through extra-logical means to live a particular life—‘to turn toward philosophy’. The remainder of the book consists of four chapters devoted to discussing the extra-logical means by which Plato accomplishes this urging—his use of dramatic effects, his use of character development, his use of irony, and his use of images. While I presume that Gordon would not object to my parenthetical inclusion of ‘logical’ in the description of her argument, it is clear that the focus of her attention in this book is the extra-logical means.