Hye Young Kim

This paper develops a phenomenology of we as home, integrating Edmund Husserl’s concept of the homeworld (Heimwelt) with a new account of presubjective relationality. It argues that selfhood is not founded in an isolated ego but in an originary we-condition—a relational field that precedes and grounds individual subjectivity. Drawing on Husserl’s threefold distinction of static, genetic, and generative phenomenology, the study adopts a generative orientation to show how meaning, embodiment, and belonging arise within a historical and communal horizon. The presubjective self designates the level of lived relatedness prior to reflective self-awareness, where the “I” and the “we” co-emerge in mutual dependence rather than opposition. Through close reading of Husserl’s later manuscripts—especially Umwelt, Heimwelt and the C-Manuscripts—the paper reconstructs the idea that the “lowest stratum” of subjectivity is not the ego, but the home to which the ego belongs. The homeworld is thus understood as the generative soil of selfhood: a network of intersubjective, cultural, and historical relations through which personal identity and normality take shape. Extending this insight, the article elaborates the notion of we as home to describe the ontological, embodied, and ethical dimensions of belonging. Embodiment is treated as the medium in which this relational structure becomes lived and tangible: the body of the individual is always part of a larger communal body. Memory, likewise, functions as the temporal mode in which the we endures, transmitting shared meaning across generations. Finally, the ethical horizon of we as home lies in its openness—the recognition that genuine dwelling is achieved only when the boundaries of home expand to include the stranger. By uniting phenomenological, ontological, and ethical analyses, the paper proposes that we as home offers a generative paradigm for understanding selfhood, community, and universality. It shows that to be human is to dwell together in a shared world—to be, from the beginning, each other’s home.

The concept of the collective “we” has recently gained renewed attention through philosophy’s we-turn, as proposed by Yasuo Deguchi, raising new questions about the nature of intersubjectivity and shared experience. This article revisits Edmund Husserl’s late notion of the Ur-Ich (primordial I) through Shigeru Taguchi’s interpretations to illuminate a fundamental paradox of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. The Ur-Ich represents a level of selfhood that is neither a solitary metaphysical ego nor simply one among many egos, but a pre-subjective condition for the constitution of any “we.” In dialogue with this, I develop the idea of the pre-subjective self – “we as self” – as the primordial relationality underlying individual self-awareness. The paradox emerges that the self is both one (a singular “I”) and many (a plural “we”), a contradiction only in formal terms. To address this, the article introduces a topological approach using Louis Kauffman’s knot theory. By modeling the Ur-Ich and the pre-subjective “we” through the knot set theory (including self-referential loops, the trefoil knot, and Borromean rings), we find a structural way to understand how the self can be both unique and inherently relational. This topological analysis offers a novel framework for conceiving the “we” as a primordial intertwining of self and other.

This article critically examines the traditional concept of subjectivity as rooted in Christian theology and Western philosophy, revealing how it has historically reinforced patriarchal structures and the marginalization of women. Engaging with Mary Daly’s feminist critique and reinterpreting biblical narratives through a phenomenological lens, I argue that the dominant model of autonomous, male-centered subjectivity fails to account for the relational and plural nature of selfhood. By revisiting theological symbols such as the image of God and the act of naming, I propose a renewed vision of the self as inherently relational and pre-subjectively connected to others. This perspective challenges the prevailing framework of philosophy of religion (PoR) and calls for an inclusive rethinking that acknowledges the plurality and interdependence of human existence.

In this paper the concept of temporality in the theories of Bergson, Husserl, and Heidegger is analyzed from a phenomenological perspective. Husserl and Heidegger studied the problems of consciousness and existence in the framework of their analysis of time. Bergson, as one of the proto-phenomenological forerunners, reveals the core connections of the phenomenological concept of temporality to the wider range of philosophy. Based on their theories on time, I suggest a three dimensional system for understanding of time in relation to motion and existence.

In »Sein und Zeit« interpretiert Heidegger den Begriff Dasein als das Seiende, dem es in seinem Sein um sein Sein geht, in Bezug auf seine Seinsart. Als endlich Existierendes ist das Dasein in die Welt geworfen und entwirft die Möglichkeit seines Seins. Diese Bewegung bezeichnet Heidegger als Zeitlichkeit, in deren Struktur sich die Existenz des Daseins enthüllt. Wie die Struktur der Zeitlichkeit zur Erscheinung kommt, ist eine hermeneutische Frage, die sich auf die Phänomenologie als Methode der Ontologie des Daseins bezieht. Ein Leitfaden für eine neue Interpretation der Daseinsphänomenologie besteht darin, dass Heidegger die Existenz des Daseins als Geschehen bezeichnet. Das Sein des jeweiligen Daseins als seine eigene Geschichte soll erzählt werden, damit das Dasein als Individuum seine Existenz als sein faktisch lebendes Sein offenbaren kann.

The concept of guilt in relation to conscience and anxiety is not referred to as a feeling or an emotion in existential philosophy. Rather, the phenomenon of guilt is analyzed through the structure of existence. In Being and Time, Heidegger interprets guilt in the context of Dasein’s understanding of its own Being. The nature of Dasein as a finite entity permeates the analysis of guilt, which is based on the analysis of negation and the time structure of Dasein. An existential interpretation of guilt, conscience, and anxiety offers a new dimension of the study of emotions with regard to the understanding of human Being.