Ignacio L. Moya

Is it possible to explain the existence of evil under the supposition of a supremely good creator? Are we ourselves the cause of most of the suffering that befalls us? Is life generally more painful than it is pleasant, and if so is non-existence preferable to existence? Is happiness ever even attainable? These questions occupied some of the best-known philosophers of the 17th to 19th centuries—figures such as G. W. Leibniz, Pierre Bayle, David Hume, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Voltaire, Immanuel Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Friedrich Nietzsche. These questions were also richly discussed by writers often since excluded from the philosophical canon, such as Ottobah Cugoano, Mary Astell, and Olga Plumacher. For these thinkers, philosophy was not only a fair-weather friend; it was also a companion in storms and in darkness—it was a way of thinking about, thinking through, and contending with the profoundly unsettling. In this unique and provocative anthology, one will find philosophers bending their intellectual efforts to the darker side of life.

I argue that the nineteenth-century German pessimist philosopher Philipp Mainländer is unique in that he views boredom as the driving force behind the creation of the universe and at the same time the driving force behind our inevitable extinction. In order to show this, I explain why he claims that God was at one point bored with His existence and why humanity should strive for the construction of an advanced just and egalitarian society as a way to hasten our demise. Along the way, I contrast Mainländer’s views on boredom with those of Leopardi and, crucially, with the views of his philosophical inspiration, Schopenhauer.

(ENGLISH) In this paper I propose a concept of the self that allows us to address and solve some of the issues associated with problem of diachronic personal identity. That is, by virtue of what can we consider that I am today the same person I was yesterday? The problem of continuity in time of identity has a long history in analytic philosophy. I argue that the continuity of personal identity over time can be ensured by resorting to the concept of "extended self as the center of gravity" presented here. My central argument is that a person does not know and is not in control of her personal identity. Identities are not dependent on particular individuals, but always extend outward toward others. Therefore, the continuity of my identity is guaranteed by the others. ------------- (SPANISH) En este trabajo propongo un concepto del Yo que nos permite abordar y solucionar algunos de los problemas asociados con la identidad personal diacrónica. Esto es, en virtud de qué podemos considerar que hoy yo soy la misma persona que fui ayer. Este problema de la continuidad en el tiempo de la identidad personal tiene una larga historia en la filosofía analítica. Yo sostengo que la continuidad de la identidad personal en el tiempo se puede garantizar acudiendo al concepto del “yo extendido como centro de gravedad” que aquí presento. Mi argumento central es que una persona individual no conoce ni está en control de su identidad ya que las identidades no dependen de los individuos particulares, sino que siempre se extienden hacia fuera, hacia los otros. Es decir, la continuidad de mi identidad está garantizada por los otros.

This paper introduces the hypothesis that boredom may be a decisive factor in the social outbreak that took place in Chile in 2019. It is based on another hypothesis that postulates that boredom can become a political emotion capable of unleashing a revolution when it affects an entire community. The main objective of the work is to explain the theoretical, philosophical framework in which the second hypothesis is inscribed and to give reasons why, if this is true, it could be applied to the specific case of Chile. In this sense, an unpublished definition of the concept of boredom is first outlined and the literature that describes boredom as a reactive and political emotion is examined. Then, the Chilean socio-political context of the last forty years is analyzed in search of isolatable factors that may be related to the experience of boredom. Lastly, an original line of research is proposed on which to work to test both hypotheses in a broader project that aims to be able to predict when a social system is on the verge of collapse because of boredom.

My aim is to explore how the notion of personhood is tied to the notion of space--both physical and moral space. In particular, I argue against the Cartesian view of the disengaged/disembodied self and in favour of Charles Taylor's and Martin Heidegger's view of the engaged and embedded self. I contend that space, as the transcendental condition for the possibility of human agency, is the place where questions of identity are possible and answers, if any, are to be found. Thus, personal identity and space are inexorably tied and dependent on one another.