Iris Vidmar Jovanović

My aim in this article is to defend the view that art is a relevant source of knowledge, including moral knowledge, in the absence of empirical evidence corroborating this view. In the first part, I discuss what is known as the causal question, that is, the question regarding art's impact on spectators. I argue that the alleged failure of art to impact us may be a matter of moral motivation and the particular circumstances of moral reasoning more than the cognitive and ethical character of a work. To support my claim, I rely on contemporary research on moral reasoning. I conclude by sketching a wider context within which we should consider art's impact, stressing the relevance of cognitive sciences and moral psychology.

In this paper, I address the question of engaged philosophy with an emphasis on aesthetics and the philosophy of art. Referring to some specific problems discussed in these areas – in particular climate change, ecological crisis and immoral art – I demonstrate that philosophy can be engaged in two ways: (i) in its aspiration to question social reality, culture, human experience and the strategies for making sense of and finding value in that experience; (ii) in the aspiration to contribute to the well-being of individuals and society through its contribution to understanding that reality and experience. First, I point to the connection between the philosophical questions and the fundamental intellectual aspirations of human beings as social and cultural beings, but also as autonomous knowers and valuers. Second, I respond to two objections that can be directed against engaged philosophy: (i) one that points to a lack of consensus among philosophical responses (the problem of disagreement), and (ii) one that highlights the irrelevance of philosophical debates to our social practice.

Poetry and philosophy have had a long and convoluted relation, characterized often by mutual antipathy and rarely by mutual acknowledgment and respect. Plato was one influential philosopher who trashed poetry’s capacities to trade in the domain of truth and knowledge, but it was J. L. Austin who blew the final whistle by dismissing it as non-serious. And while for many poets that was an invitation to dismiss Austin, for many philosophers that was a confirmation of the overall discomfort they had already felt with respect to poetry. Just how wrong both parties were in this standoff is revealed in the latest book by Maximilian De Gaynesford, The Rift in the Lute: Attuning Poetry and Philosophy, which calls for a dismissal of the separation of the two and for their mutual cooperation. In this paper, we look at De Gaynesford’s proposal, mostly praising its strong points and occasionally raising doubts regarding its success.

In this article, I defend the cognitive value of certain generic television series. Unlike media and television scholars, who have been appreciative of the informative capacity of television fiction, philosophers have been less willing to acknowledge the way in which these works contribute to our understanding of our social reality. My aim here is to provide one such account, grounded in aesthetic cognitivism, that is, the view that fiction is a source of knowledge. Focusing on crime and courtroom dramas, I start by offering some examples of the cognitive benefits available in some of these series and I argue that the more beneficial cases establish superior mimetic relations with reality, enhancing their capacity to present ethically challenging issues. I then examine whether the fictional dimension of these works presents an obstacle to their informative potential and I conclude that it does not. A central aspect of my account is the claim that the degree of cognitive benefit depends on the underlying narrative strategy of the series. Specifically, there are clues in any given show, including the treatment of ongoing characters, which signal the extent to which it can be taken as mimetically reliable and thus, cognitively valuable. I complete my account by addressing anti-cognitivists’ arguments which call to doubt the informative aspect of television series and their capacity to address ethical concerns.

With his thesis on the genius who does not know from where their ideas come from and how they create, Kant left an indelible mark on thought concerning art and artistic creation. He insisted that it represents a unique act by natural gift, and thus specific for the domain of art, and specifically not belonging to the domain of science. Although today we know that such a disposition is wrong, many of Kant’s claims are supported in contemporary theories in cognitive science, but also by the artistic practice. In this paper, I will analyse Kant’s theory of beautiful art and artistic creation in the context of contemporary research on creativity and talent and show how much is Kant’s theory on beautiful art and artistic creation rich explanatory, especially for understanding and thinking the artistic creation, artistic reception and artistic practice.

This article lies at the intersection of two problems: the one concerning the potential of fictional works to inform us about our social reality and foster our understanding of its various aspects, and the one concerning their potential to engage with philosophical issues. I bring these two together by analyzing the hit television series Law and Order: Special Victims Unit. According to my interpretation, the series is informative about our social world, and it raises philosophical concerns about it. This makes it well-equipped to fulfill the educative function attributed to mass art by Noël Carroll, and to stand out as an example of what he calls popular philosophy. To support this interpretation, I rely on contemporary views regarding the nature of our engagements with fictional narratives. I then explore how philosophical concerns are generated and I elaborate on the role they have in deepening one’s understanding of one’s social circumstances. I further show how the series provides innovative and independent philosophical knowledge by means specific to the medium of generic serialized fiction. The central part of my argument is an analysis of the narrative strategies which enable the informative and philosophical aspects of the series to generate the series’ educative function.

Contemporary debates within analytic philosophy regarding the relation between literature and philosophy focus on the capacity of some literary works to engage with philosophical problems. While some philosophers see literature as a welcome contribution to philosophy, or as an alternative to pursuing philosophical questions, some are more sceptical with respect to its capacity to tackle philosophical concerns. As a contribution to this debate, in this paper I look at similarities and dissimilarities between the two practices, with the aim of mitigating some views which see them as too diverse to allow for literary treatment of philosophical issues. As points of contact, I focus on the shared thematic concerns of the two practices, i.e. on the fact that literature and philosophy both deal with issues that humans generally care for. I argue that both practices, despite the stylistic, linguistic and methodological differences in their approach, manage to fulfil ‘the recognition requirement’, namely, recognize and engage with those issues, situations and context of human predicament in the world which are in need of intellectual refinement. I then move on to dismiss arguments which purport to discredit literary treatments of philosophy on the basis of literature’s alleged subjectivity and emotional dimension, which are contrasted with philosophical objectivity and rationality. I end by emphasizing the impact of academic constraints on professional philosophy, in order to suggest that pursuing philosophical concerns is not an invention of the practice, but a natural inclination of reflective, inquisitive human mind.

In this paper I address Jerome Stolnitz’s famous article “On the cognitive triviality of art,” with the aim of defending aesthetic and literary cognitivism against the charges Stolnitz issues at it therein. My defence of literary cognitivism is grounded in contemporary epistemology, which, I argue, is more embracive of cognitive values of literature traditionally invoked by literary cognitivists. My discussion is structured against Stolnitz’s individual arguments, dedicated in particular to the problem of literary truth. After exploring what such notion might amount to, I move on to address the problems of applicability and triviality of literary truths, and I end by defending literature as a cognitively valuable social practice.

In this paper I address Jerome Stolnitz’s famous article “On the cognitive triviality of art,” with the aim of defending aesthetic and literary cognitivism against the charges Stolnitz issues at it therein. My defence of literary cognitivism is grounded in contemporary epistemology, which, I argue, is more embracive of cognitive values of literature traditionally invoked by literary cognitivists. My discussion is structured against Stolnitz’s individual arguments, dedicated in particular to the problem of literary truth. After exploring what such notion might amount to, I move on to address the problems of applicability and triviality of literary truths, and I end by defending literature as a cognitively valuable social practice.

Big philosophical questions—about the mind, the idea of the good, justice, beauty, knowledge—have been the prime interest of philosophers ever since Plato first raised them in his dialogues. However, regardless of how hard philosophers have been trying to find answers to them, it seems that all they have ever managed to do was to find reasons for disagreements, and, on the whole, to have failed to reach a consensus on pretty much anything. Some philosophers now claim that there hasn’t been much progress in philosophy, especially when compared to the sciences. I take up this verdict and try to refute it, first by offering an alternative view on what counts as progress, and then by analyzing big philosophical questions and their relevance for our intellectual and practical pursuits. I argue that, due to the distinctive nature of philosophical curiosity, coming up with answers to the big philosophical questions is an ideal that can hardly be met, but that philosophy nevertheless delivers various benefits, intellectual and practical, which the proponents of the No-Progress View tend to ignore.

One of the most contentious question in today’s discussions on the educational policies concerns the role and values of the humanities in contemporary society and education. Many see the humanities as empty, unnecessary, inefficient, phony and worthless. This paper offers a rundown of arguments adduced to support this view, followed by an overview of Helen Small’s The Value of the Humanities, which offers an exceptionally critical and insightful analysis into the current debate over the value of the humanities. The paper ends by emphasizing further the need to recognize the contribution that the humanities make to the production of knowledge and enhancement of the quality of life, as well as to the much needed sense of purpose and meaning.

In diesem Paper möchten wir den unterschiedlichen epistemologischen Vorzügen auf den Grund gehen, die wir in der Arbeit mit einigen Kunstwerken erlangen, wobei unser Schwerpunkt in der narrativen Kunst liegt. Wir behaupten, die narrativen Künste könnten in gewissem Sinne dem Zeugnis ähneln, insofern sie Informationen besorgten, die epistemologisch wertvoll für kognitive Agenten wie uns seien. Wir identifizieren zumindest zwei breite Kategorien dieser epistemologischen Vorzüge, die Erste schließt „Tatsachenangaben“ ein und ist in diesem Sinne vergleichbar mit dem paradigmatischen Fall des Zeugnisses, wo die Aussagen des Zeugen als Wissensquelle, als bloße Faktenaneignung für sein Publikum zu dienen vermögen . Dies dagegen ist nicht die eigenartigste und distinktivste Art der epistemologischen Werte, die uns die Kunst verschafft. Die andere hat es mit der Bewusstseinssteigerung sowie Verständnisvertiefung bezüglich gewisser Fragestellungen zu tun, entweder durch spezifische, kraftvolle und involvierende Art der Tatsachenvermittlung , oder eben durch die Präsentierung der Haltung, Einstellung oder Ansicht des Künstlers, welche sich für uns als erhellend oder herausfordernd herausschälen könnten

U ovom radu želimo istražiti različite epistemološke koristi koje dobivamo putem nekih umjetničkih djela, pri čemu smo primarno usredotočeni na narativne umjetnosti. Tvrdimo da u određenom smislu, narativne umjetnosti mogu biti slične svjedočanstvu, utoliko što pružaju informacije koje mogu biti epistemološki vrijedne za kognitivne djelatnike kakvi smo mi. Razlikujemo barem dvije šire kategorije tih epistemoloških vrijednosti, od kojih prva uključuje ‘navođenje činjenica’ i u tom je smislu pandan paradigmatskom slučaju svjedočanstva u kojem ono što informator govori može biti izvor znanja za publiku koja time naprosto dobiva činjenice . Međutim, to nije najsvojstvenija i najznačajnija vrsta epistemoloških vrijednosti koje dobijemo iz umjetnosti. Druga kategorija tiče se povećavanja svijesti ili produbljivanja razumijevanja o nekom fenomenu, koji se može odvijati na dva načina: ili pružanjem činjenica na specifično snažan i prožimalački način , ili prezentiranjem stajališta, stava ili mišljenja umjetnika koji nam može biti prosvjetljujući ili pak predstavljati izazov našem stajalištu