-
320The white shoe is a red HerringBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 17 (4): 322. 1966.
-
311The paradox of confirmation (II)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 12 (45): 63-64. 1961.
-
260The philosophy of exploratory data analysisPhilosophy of Science 50 (2): 283-295. 1983.This paper attempts to define Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA) more precisely than usual, and to produce the beginnings of a philosophy of this topical and somewhat novel branch of statistics. A data set is, roughly speaking, a collection of k-tuples for some k. In both descriptive statistics and in EDA, these k-tuples, or functions of them, are represented in a manner matched to human and computer abilities with a view to finding patterns that are not "kinkera". A kinkus is a pattern that has a …Read more
-
259The paradox of confirmationBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 11 (42): 145-149. 1960.
-
227A suspicious feature of the popper/miller argumentPhilosophy of Science 57 (3): 535-536. 1990.The form of argument used by Popper and Miller to attack the concept of probabilistic induction is applied to the slightly different situation in which some evidence undermines a hypothesis. The result is seemingly absurd, thus bringing the form of argument under suspicion.
-
205Corroboration, explanation, evolving probability, simplicity and a sharpened razorBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (2): 123-143. 1968.
-
189Godel's theorem is a red HerringBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (February): 357-8. 1968.
-
171Free will and speed of computationBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22 (1): 48-50. 1971.
-
162A historical comment concerning novel confirmationBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (2): 184-185. 1985.
-
128The white shoe qua Herring is pinkBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (2): 156-157. 1968.
-
116Two forms of the prediction paradoxBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (61): 50-51. 1965.
-
93A bayesian approach in the philosophy of inference (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (2): 161-166. 1984.
-
91A suggested resolution of Miller's paradoxBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21 (3): 288-289. 1970.
-
85A good explanation of an event is not necessarily corroborated by the eventPhilosophy of Science 49 (2): 251-253. 1982.It is shown by means of a simple example that a good explanation of an event is not necessarily corroborated by the occurrence of that event. It is also shown that this contention follows symbolically if an explanation having higher "explicativity" than another is regarded as better
-
69A correction concerning complexityBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (3): 289. 1974.
-
58Errata and corrigenda for good and goodBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 13 (49): 88. 1962.
-
43A pragmatic modification of explicativity for the acceptance of hypothesesPhilosophy of Science 51 (1): 120-127. 1984.The use of a concept called "explicativity", for (provisionally) accepting a theory or Hypothesis H, has previously been discussed. That previous discussion took into account the prior probability of H, and hence implicitly its theoretical simplicity. We here suggest that a modification of explicativity is required to allow for what may be called the pragmatic simplicity of H, that is, the simplicity of using H in applications as distinct from the simplicity of the description of H
-
41Comments on Ronald GiereSynthese 30 (1-2). 1975.Good expresses agreement that the controversy between Bayesian and non-Bayesian statistics is more fundamental than that between Carnap and Popper, and points out that his own position is a Bayes/non-Bayes compromise.