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Isaiah Good

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  •  Publications
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  • All publications (51)
  •  2
    Some Comments on Probabilistic Causality
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61 (3): 301-304. 2017.
  •  1
    A Further Comment on Probabilistic Causality: Mending the Chain
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61 (4): 452-454. 2017.
  •  2
    A Theory of Causality
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9 (36): 307-310. 1959.
  • Lattice Structure of Space-Time
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9 (36): 317-319. 1959.
  •  15
    Causal Propensity: A Review
    PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984 (2): 828-850. 1984.
    “We can judge of the perfection to which a science has come by the facility, more or less great, with which it may be approached by calculation.”Quetelet (1828), as quoted by Landau & Lazarsfeld in theInternational Encyclopedia of Statistics(p. 828).Suppose that some event F occurs and later an event E either occurs or does not. I am going to talk aboutthe extent to whichFtends to causeE, orthe causal propensityof Eprovided byF, orthe propensity or tendency of F to causeE, denoted by Q(E:F). For…Read more
    “We can judge of the perfection to which a science has come by the facility, more or less great, with which it may be approached by calculation.”Quetelet (1828), as quoted by Landau & Lazarsfeld in theInternational Encyclopedia of Statistics(p. 828).Suppose that some event F occurs and later an event E either occurs or does not. I am going to talk aboutthe extent to whichFtends to causeE, orthe causal propensityof Eprovided byF, orthe propensity or tendency of F to causeE, denoted by Q(E:F). For example, F might be the event that the captain of a firing squad shouts “Fire” and E might be that the shootee's life is_ Ended (F for Fire, E for Ended). The negation of E is denoted by E, which in this example means that the shootee does not drop dead.
  •  24
    Speculations concerning the first ultraintelligent machine
    In F. Alt & M. Ruminoff (eds.), Advances in Computers, volume 6, Academic Press. 1965.
    The Singularity
  •  3
    Probability and the Weighing of Evidence
    Philosophy 26 (97): 163-164. 1950.
  •  5
    The Estimation of Probabilities: An Essay on Modern Bayesian Methods
    with Ian Hacking, R. C. Jeffrey, and Håkan Törnebohm
    Synthese 16 (2): 234-244. 1966.
    Bayesian Reasoning, Misc
  •  19
    Aron, Raymond: Clausewitz: Philosopher of War. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983, pp. xxvi, 286, $37.50. Asquith, PD and Nickles, T.(Eds.): PSA 1982, Vol. 2. East Lansing, Philosophy of Science Association, 1983, pp. xxiv, 730, US $25. Attfield, Robin: The Ethics of Environmental Concern. Oxford, BlackweU, 1983 (review)
    with David Cooper, Jon Elster, Sour Grapes, U. P. Cambridge, and Good Thinking
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3). 1984.
  •  62
    Causal Propensity: A Review
    PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984. 1984.
    The causal propensity of an event F to cause another event E is explicated as the weight of evidence against F if E does not occur, given the state of the universe just before F occurred. This definition, first given in 1961, is sharpened, defended, and applied to several examples. In this definition the concept of weight of evidence in favor of a proposition, provided by another one, is to be understood in a technical sense that is intended to capture its most customary informal meaning.
  •  31
    The interface between statistics and the philosophy of science
    In Jens Erik Fenstad, Ivan Timofeevich Frolov & Risto Hilpinen (eds.), Logic, methodology, and philosophy of science VIII: proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Moscow, 1987, Sole Distributors For the U.s.a. and Canada, Elsevier Science. 1989.
  • Creativity and duality in perception and recall
    In Proceedings of the IEE/NPL Conference on Pattern Recognition No. 42, Inst Elec Eng Npl. 1968.
    Modularity and Cognitive Penetrability
  •  8
    The Scientist Speculates (edited book)
    Heineman. 1961.
    Consciousness and the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
  • Proceedings of the IEE/NPL Conference on Pattern Recognition No. 42
    Inst Elec Eng NPL. 1968.
    Philosophy of Psychology
  •  126
    Comments on David Miller
    Synthese 30 (1-2). 1975.
    International Ethics
  •  90
    Comments on Joseph Agassi
    Synthese 30 (1-2). 1975.
    Sociology of Science
  •  153
    A note on Richard's paradox
    Mind 75 (299): 431. 1966.
    Paradoxes
  •  73
    Some Comments on Probabilistic Causality
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61 (3): 301-304. 1980.
    Statistical Theories of Causation
  •  90
    A Further Comment on Probabilistic Causality: Mending the Chain
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61 (4): 452-454. 1980.
    Statistical Theories of Causation
  •  262
    Two forms of the prediction paradox
    with B. Meltzer
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (61): 50-51. 1965.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  420
    The philosophy of exploratory data analysis
    Philosophy of Science 50 (2): 283-295. 1983.
    This paper attempts to define Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA) more precisely than usual, and to produce the beginnings of a philosophy of this topical and somewhat novel branch of statistics. A data set is, roughly speaking, a collection of k-tuples for some k. In both descriptive statistics and in EDA, these k-tuples, or functions of them, are represented in a manner matched to human and computer abilities with a view to finding patterns that are not "kinkera". A kinkus is a pattern that has a …Read more
    This paper attempts to define Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA) more precisely than usual, and to produce the beginnings of a philosophy of this topical and somewhat novel branch of statistics. A data set is, roughly speaking, a collection of k-tuples for some k. In both descriptive statistics and in EDA, these k-tuples, or functions of them, are represented in a manner matched to human and computer abilities with a view to finding patterns that are not "kinkera". A kinkus is a pattern that has a negligible probability of being even partly potentially explicable. A potentially explicable pattern is one for which there probably exists a hypothesis of adequate "explicativity", which is another technical probabilistic concept. A pattern can be judged to be probably potentially explicable even if we cannot find an explanation. The theory of probability understood here is one of partially ordered (interval-valued), subjective (personal) probabilities. Among other topics relevant to a philosophy of EDA are the "reduction" of data; Francis Bacon's philosophy of science; the automatic formulation of hypotheses; successive deepening of hypotheses; neurophysiology; and rationality of type II
    Scientific MethodStatisticsPhilosophy of StatisticsSimplicity and ParsimonyProbabilistic FrameworksI…Read more
    Scientific MethodStatisticsPhilosophy of StatisticsSimplicity and ParsimonyProbabilistic FrameworksInterpretation of Probability, Misc
  •  473
    The paradox of confirmation
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 12 (45): 63-64. 1961.
    Paradox of ConfirmationBayesian Reasoning, Misc
  •  417
    The paradox of confirmation
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 11 (42): 145-149. 1960.
    Paradox of Confirmation
  •  99
    Reviews (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (3): 382-387. 1976.
  •  127
    Reviews (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9 (35): 382-387. 1958.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  159
    Lattice structure of space-time
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9 (33): 317. 1958.
    Science, Logic, and MathematicsQuantum Logic
  •  362
    Errata and corrigenda
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 13 (49): 88-88. 1962.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicTopics in ConsequentialismVarieties of Value
  •  142
    A theory of causality
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9 (33): 307. 1958.
    Science, Logic, and MathematicsQuantum Mechanics
  •  362
    A suspicious feature of the popper/miller argument
    Philosophy of Science 57 (3): 535-536. 1990.
    The form of argument used by Popper and Miller to attack the concept of probabilistic induction is applied to the slightly different situation in which some evidence undermines a hypothesis. The result is seemingly absurd, thus bringing the form of argument under suspicion.
    Popper: InductionPopper: Philosophy of ProbabilityBayesian Reasoning
  •  264
    A suggested resolution of Miller's paradox
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21 (3): 288-289. 1970.
    Science, Logic, and MathematicsParadoxes
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