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202A good explanation of an event is not necessarily corroborated by the eventPhilosophy of Science 49 (2): 251-253. 1982.It is shown by means of a simple example that a good explanation of an event is not necessarily corroborated by the occurrence of that event. It is also shown that this contention follows symbolically if an explanation having higher "explicativity" than another is regarded as better
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359A historical comment concerning novel confirmationBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (2): 184-185. 1985.
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211A correction concerning complexityBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (3): 289. 1974.
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192A bayesian approach in the philosophy of inference (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (2): 161-166. 1984.
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301The white shoe qua Herring is pinkBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (2): 156-157. 1968.
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469The white shoe is a red HerringBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 17 (4): 322. 1966.
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398Godel's theorem is a red HerringBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (4): 357-8. 1968.
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295Free will and speed of computationBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22 (1): 48-50. 1971.
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96Comments on Ronald GiereSynthese 30 (1-2). 1975.Good expresses agreement that the controversy between Bayesian and non-Bayesian statistics is more fundamental than that between Carnap and Popper, and points out that his own position is a Bayes/non-Bayes compromise.
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385Corroboration, explanation, evolving probability, simplicity and a sharpened razorBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (2): 123-143. 1968.
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139A reinstatement, in response to Gillies, of Redhead's argument in support of inductionPhilosophy of Science 54 (3): 470-472. 1987.
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172A pragmatic modification of explicativity for the acceptance of hypothesesPhilosophy of Science 51 (1): 120-127. 1984.The use of a concept called "explicativity", for (provisionally) accepting a theory or Hypothesis H, has previously been discussed. That previous discussion took into account the prior probability of H, and hence implicitly its theoretical simplicity. We here suggest that a modification of explicativity is required to allow for what may be called the pragmatic simplicity of H, that is, the simplicity of using H in applications as distinct from the simplicity of the description of H