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Isaiah Good

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    51
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  • All publications (51)
  •  192
    A good explanation of an event is not necessarily corroborated by the event
    Philosophy of Science 49 (2): 251-253. 1982.
    It is shown by means of a simple example that a good explanation of an event is not necessarily corroborated by the occurrence of that event. It is also shown that this contention follows symbolically if an explanation having higher "explicativity" than another is regarded as better
    ConfirmationInference to the Best Explanation
  •  352
    A historical comment concerning novel confirmation
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (2): 184-185. 1985.
    The Problem of Old Evidence
  •  247
    A causal calculus (II)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 12 (45): 43-51. 1961.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  205
    A correction concerning complexity
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (3): 289. 1974.
    Science, Logic, and MathematicsComplexity
  •  190
    A bayesian approach in the philosophy of inference (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (2): 161-166. 1984.
    Bayesian Reasoning, Misc
  •  289
    The white shoe qua Herring is pink
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (2): 156-157. 1968.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  458
    The white shoe is a red Herring
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 17 (4): 322. 1966.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  109
    Replies
    Synthese 30 (1-2). 1975.
    Philosophy of Consciousness
  •  142
    Reviews (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22 (4): 382-387. 1971.
    Gödelian Arguments Against AI
  •  26
    Reviews (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (3): 289-292. 1976.
  •  13
    Reviews (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9 (35): 251-255. 1958.
  •  66
    Physical probability, surprise, and certainty
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1): 70-70. 1983.
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of Linguistics
  •  389
    Godel's theorem is a red Herring
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (4): 357-8. 1968.
    Gödelian Arguments Against AI
  •  468
    Human and machine logic
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (2): 145-6. 1967.
    Gödelian Arguments Against AI
  •  289
    Free will and speed of computation
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22 (1): 48-50. 1971.
    Free Will and PsychologyComputationalism
  •  129
    Discussion of Bruno de finetti's paper 'initial probabilities: A prerequisite for any valid induction'
    Synthese 20 (1). 1969.
    Chance-Credence PrinciplesDegrees of BeliefPrior ProbabilitiesInduction, Misc
  •  91
    Comments on Ronald Giere
    Synthese 30 (1-2). 1975.
    Good expresses agreement that the controversy between Bayesian and non-Bayesian statistics is more fundamental than that between Carnap and Popper, and points out that his own position is a Bayes/non-Bayes compromise.
    Bayesian Reasoning, Misc
  •  375
    Corroboration, explanation, evolving probability, simplicity and a sharpened razor
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (2): 123-143. 1968.
    Explanatory ValueConfirmationSimplicity and ParsimonyProbabilistic ReasoningInterpretation of Probab…Read more
    Explanatory ValueConfirmationSimplicity and ParsimonyProbabilistic ReasoningInterpretation of Probability
  •  133
    A reinstatement, in response to Gillies, of Redhead's argument in support of induction
    Philosophy of Science 54 (3): 470-472. 1987.
    Science, Logic, and MathematicsPhilosophy of Psychology
  •  165
    A pragmatic modification of explicativity for the acceptance of hypotheses
    with Alan F. McMichael
    Philosophy of Science 51 (1): 120-127. 1984.
    The use of a concept called "explicativity", for (provisionally) accepting a theory or Hypothesis H, has previously been discussed. That previous discussion took into account the prior probability of H, and hence implicitly its theoretical simplicity. We here suggest that a modification of explicativity is required to allow for what may be called the pragmatic simplicity of H, that is, the simplicity of using H in applications as distinct from the simplicity of the description of H
    Simplicity and ParsimonyTheoretical Virtues, Misc
  • Human and Machine Logic
    Etica E Politica 5 (1): 1. 2003.
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