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1A Further Comment on Probabilistic Causality: Mending the ChainPacific Philosophical Quarterly 61 (4): 452-454. 2017.
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Lattice Structure of Space-TimeBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9 (36): 317-319. 1959.
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15Causal Propensity: A ReviewPSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984 (2): 828-850. 1984.“We can judge of the perfection to which a science has come by the facility, more or less great, with which it may be approached by calculation.”Quetelet (1828), as quoted by Landau & Lazarsfeld in theInternational Encyclopedia of Statistics(p. 828).Suppose that some event F occurs and later an event E either occurs or does not. I am going to talk aboutthe extent to whichFtends to causeE, orthe causal propensityof Eprovided byF, orthe propensity or tendency of F to causeE, denoted by Q(E:F). For…Read more
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24Speculations concerning the first ultraintelligent machineIn F. Alt & M. Ruminoff (eds.), Advances in Computers, volume 6, Academic Press. 1965.
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5The Estimation of Probabilities: An Essay on Modern Bayesian MethodsSynthese 16 (2): 234-244. 1966.
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19Aron, Raymond: Clausewitz: Philosopher of War. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983, pp. xxvi, 286, $37.50. Asquith, PD and Nickles, T.(Eds.): PSA 1982, Vol. 2. East Lansing, Philosophy of Science Association, 1983, pp. xxiv, 730, US $25. Attfield, Robin: The Ethics of Environmental Concern. Oxford, BlackweU, 1983 (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3). 1984.
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62Causal Propensity: A ReviewPSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984. 1984.The causal propensity of an event F to cause another event E is explicated as the weight of evidence against F if E does not occur, given the state of the universe just before F occurred. This definition, first given in 1961, is sharpened, defended, and applied to several examples. In this definition the concept of weight of evidence in favor of a proposition, provided by another one, is to be understood in a technical sense that is intended to capture its most customary informal meaning.
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31The interface between statistics and the philosophy of scienceIn Jens Erik Fenstad, Ivan Timofeevich Frolov & Risto Hilpinen (eds.), Logic, methodology, and philosophy of science VIII: proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Moscow, 1987, Sole Distributors For the U.s.a. and Canada, Elsevier Science. 1989.
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90A Further Comment on Probabilistic Causality: Mending the ChainPacific Philosophical Quarterly 61 (4): 452-454. 1980.
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262Two forms of the prediction paradoxBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (61): 50-51. 1965.
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420The philosophy of exploratory data analysisPhilosophy of Science 50 (2): 283-295. 1983.This paper attempts to define Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA) more precisely than usual, and to produce the beginnings of a philosophy of this topical and somewhat novel branch of statistics. A data set is, roughly speaking, a collection of k-tuples for some k. In both descriptive statistics and in EDA, these k-tuples, or functions of them, are represented in a manner matched to human and computer abilities with a view to finding patterns that are not "kinkera". A kinkus is a pattern that has a …Read more
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417The paradox of confirmationBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 11 (42): 145-149. 1960.
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159Lattice structure of space-timeBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9 (33): 317. 1958.
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264A suggested resolution of Miller's paradoxBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21 (3): 288-289. 1970.
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362A suspicious feature of the popper/miller argumentPhilosophy of Science 57 (3): 535-536. 1990.The form of argument used by Popper and Miller to attack the concept of probabilistic induction is applied to the slightly different situation in which some evidence undermines a hypothesis. The result is seemingly absurd, thus bringing the form of argument under suspicion.