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Information processing, phenomenal consciousness, and Molyneux's questionIn José Luis Bermúdez (ed.), Thought, reference, and experience: themes from the philosophy of Gareth Evans, Clarendon Press. 2005.
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1Visual Attention and the Epistemic Role of AttentionIn Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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173Joint attention and common knowledgeIn Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 287--297. 2005.This chapter makes the case for a relational version of an experientialist view of joint attention. On an experientialist view of joint attention, shifting from solitary attention to joint attention involves a shift in the nature of your perceptual experience of the object attended to. A relational analysis of such a view explains the latter shift in terms of the idea that, in joint attention, it is a constituent of your experience that the other person is, with you, jointly attending to the obj…Read more
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131Molyneux's question and cognitive impenetrabilityIn Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.), Cognitive Penetrabiity of Perception: Attention, Strategies and Bottom-Up Constraints, Nova Science. 2005.
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14What Is It to Know What ‘I’ Refers To?The Monist 87 (2): 206-218. 2004.We can make a distinction between the conceptual role of the first person and the reference of the first person. By ‘conceptual role’ I mean the use that is made of the term: the kinds of procedures that we use in verifying judgements using the term and the kinds of actions we perform on the basis of judgements involving the term. In “Self-Notions,” Perry talks about conceptual role using the phrase, ‘epistemic/pragmatic relations’. He says there are “normally self-informative” ways of getting i…Read more
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18Editorial introductionBusiness Ethics: A European Review 22 (4): 374-379. 2013.This special issue brings to a close a series of three issue of this journal that have sought to expand the philosophical vocabulary of those concerned with business ethics. Previous issues treated the work of Emmanuel Levinas (Business Ethics: A European Review 2007, 16:3) and Jacques Derrida (Business Ethics: A European Review 2010, 19:3), whereas this issue is organised around engagements with the work of Alain Badiou. The three issues together seek to show ways in which the idea of the ethic…Read more
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7The importance of enabling a wide range of people to participate in reserach and evaluation reflects continuing calls for service users to be a part of the decision-making which goes on around them. Involving service users in project work is not without its challenges, raising pertinent ethical and practical issues which need to be considered and reflexively responded to. In this paper we will provide a summary of the key ethical and governance issues to consider when undertaking qualitative res…Read more
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5Comment: Psychological Causation without Physical CausationIn Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology, Johns Hopkins University Press. pp. 184--195. 2008.
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105Visual Attention and the Epistemic Role of AttentionIn Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 323. 2011.
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111A Straightforward Solution to Berkeley's PuzzleThe Harvard Review of Philosophy 18 (1): 31-49. 2012.
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8The aim of this systematic review was to summarize and assess the quality of asthma intervention health economic studies from 2002 to 2007, compare the study findings with clinical management guidelines, and suggest avenues for future improvement of asthma health economic studies. Forty of the 177 studies met our inclusion criteria. We assessed the quality of studies using The Quality of Health Economic Studies validated instrument (total score range: 0-100). Six studies (15%) had quality catego…Read more
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1Relational vs Kantian responses to Berkeley's puzzleIn Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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56Review of mark Balaguer, Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (5). 2010.
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86Philosophy of MindIn Peter Clark & Katherine Hawley (eds.), Philosophy of science today, Oxford University Press. pp. 131. 2003.
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3An Object-Dependent Perspective on Joint AttentionIn Axel Seemann (ed.), Joint Attention: New Developments, Mit Press. 2011.
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136Ir IS winmx HELD that the capacity for spatial thought depends upon the ability to refer to physical things. The argument is that the identification of places depends upon the identification of things; places in themselves are all very much alike and can be distinguished only by their spatial relations to things. So one could not so much as think about places unless one could think about things (Strawson, 1959). It has to be acknowledged that our identifications of places are greatly enriched by…Read more
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255Information-processing, phenomenal consciousness and Molyneux's questionIn José Luis Bermúdez (ed.), Thought, reference, and experience: themes from the philosophy of Gareth Evans, Clarendon Press. 2005.Ordinary common sense suggests that we have just one set of shape concepts that we apply indifferently on the bases of sight and touch. Yet we understand the shape concepts, we know what shape properties are, only because we have experience of shapes. And phenomenal experience of shape in vision and phenomenal experience of shape in touch seem to be quite different. So how can the shape concepts we grasp and use on the basis of vision be the same as the shape concepts we grasp and use on the bas…Read more
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297Berkeley's puzzleIn Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford University Press. 2002.But say you,surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees,for instance,in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no dif?culty in it:but what is all this,I beseech you,more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of anyone that may perceive them? But do you not yourself perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpos…Read more
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Berkeley's puzzleIn Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford University Press. 2002.But say you,surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees,for instance,in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no dif?culty in it:but what is all this,I beseech you,more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of anyone that may perceive them? But do you not yourself perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpos…Read more
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5Consciousness and referenceIn Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. 2007.in Brian McLaughlin and Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind (Oxford, Oxford University Press, in press)
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Manipulating colourIn Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience, Oxford University Press. 2006.It seems a compelling idea that experience of colour plays some role in our having concepts of the various colours, but in trying to explain the role experience plays the first thing we have to describe is what sort of colour experience matters here. I will argue that the kind of experience that matters is conscious attention to the colours of objects as an aspect of them on which direct intervention is selectively possible. As I will explain this idea, it is a matter of being able to use experi…Read more
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519Consciousness and ReferenceIn Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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70Critical Notice: Paul Russell’s The Riddle of Hume’s Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and IrreligionCanadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1): 127-137. 2015.In The Riddle of Hume's Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion, Paul Russell makes a strong case for the claim that “The primary aim of Hume's series of skeptical arguments, as developed and distributed throughout the Treatise, is to discredit the doctrines and dogmas of Christian philosophy and theology with a view toward redirecting our philosophical investigations to areas of ‘common life,’ with the particular aim of advancing ‘the science of man’”. Understanding Hume in this way, a…Read more
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318Wiley-Blackwell: A Companion to Free Will (edited book)Wiley. 2023."We wish this volume to be a sure companion to the study of free will, broadly construed to include action theory, moral and legal responsibility, and cohort studies feathering off into adjacent fields in the liberal arts and sciences. In addition to general coverage of the discipline, this volume attempts a more challenging and complementary accompaniment to many familiar narratives about free will. In order to map out some directions such accompaniment will take, in this introduction we anchor…Read more
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12Histology agnosticism: Infra-molecularizing disease?Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 104 (C): 14-22. 2024.
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57A Companion to Free Will (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2022.The concept of free will is fraught with controversy, as readers of this volume likely know. Philosophers disagree about what free will is, whether we have it, what mitigates or destroys it, and what it's good for. Indeed, philosophers even disagree about how to fix the referent of the term 'free will' for purposes of describing and exploring these disagreements. What one person considers a reasonably neutral working definition of 'free will' is often considered question-begging or otherwise mis…Read more
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Meaning and Truth: Investigations in Philosophical Semantics (edited book)Seven Bridges Press. 2002.
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43Mission-oriented climate change research is often unverifiable. Therefore, many stakeholders look to peer-reviewed climate change research for trustworthy information about deeply uncertain and impactful phenomena. This is because peer-review signals that research has been vetted for scientific standards like reproducibility and replicability. Here we evaluate the transparency of research methodologies in mission-oriented computational climate research. We find that only five percent of our samp…Read more
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Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mathematics |