Jacob Smith

Our paper makes three contributions to moral injury (MI) research. First, we observe that while researchers have repeatedly acknowledged limitations with prevailing definitions of moral injury and offered alternatives, the underlying core conceptual model—which characterizes moral injury as intrapsychic damage to belief structures—has remained largely unchanged. We argue that this is a significant impediment to research progress. Second, through conceptual analysis of the most influential etiological accounts, we identify numerous implicit and untested assumptions about morality that burden the standard model. We propose that adopting a minimalist, social-functionalist conception of morality, toward which the literature is already drifting, could reduce this conceptual burden. We further hypothesize that the literature retains these assumptions because they appear logically necessary to sustain the causal link between belief violation and MI outcomes. Third, we observe that current leading treatments already target relational repair, reconditioning, and rehabilitation, which suggests that moral injury may be better understood as a form of relational disruption rather than belief violation. We acknowledge that developing this alternative would need to be pursued by the clinical research community itself. While our findings and analysis require additional development and testing to have actionable application in clinical contexts, we believe our conceptual analysis serves as sufficient justification for reconsideration of the prevailing conceptual paradigm.

In Dogwhistles and Figleaves, Jennifer Saul argues that publicly calling out prejudicial dogwhistles likely will not undo their harmful effects. This is a point of departure from her earlier work, which was much more optimistic about callouts. Saul believes that changes in the political landscape in recent years give us less reason for the optimism about callouts she once held. Callouts, on her view, once were a reliable way to respond to dogwhistles but only recently have become less reliable. I offer an alternative diagnosis about why callouts don’t work. I argue that callouts face, and have largely always faced, significant social and epistemic obstacles to their success. First, callouts are successful when they facilitate a shift in how the addressee of the callout attends to the relevant dogwhistle. In previous work, Saul called this attentional shift “self-monitoring.” But dogwhistle terms function to express one’s political identity because they signal one’s belonging to a shared political in-group. Self-monitoring complicates one’s ability to perform this expression, which means it comes with potentially significant social costs. Second, I draw upon recent work in the epistemology of attention to argue that the mode of attention that addressees already hold toward a dogwhistle is likely resilient and difficult to change. Changing this mode of attention, though, is necessary in order for a callout to be successful. For these reasons, we have always had good reason for skepticism about the success of callouts.

The predominant account of the etiology of moral injuries among Veterans and military personnel in the clinical psychological and psychiatric literature construes morality as inherent in belief structures. This supports the conceptualization of moral injuries as intrapsychic phenomena resulting from exposure to high-stakes events in which fixed beliefs are contravened in ways that result in psychological harms, including maladaptive beliefs and distress. We identify several problems with this formulation and offer suggestions for modification, including greater focus on: 1) experiences rather than events in identifying circumstances in which moral injuries occur, and 2) degradation of relevant relationships rather than conflicts with and among moral contents. These shifts in framing could have epidemiological salience, facilitating more robust case characterization and enabling a variety of approaches to reestablishing the moral conditions that support life affirmation.

This article seeks to describe in general terms what has become the standard way of conceptualizing moral injury in the clinical psychological and psychiatric literature, which is the key source for applications of the concept in other domains. What we call “the standard model” draws on certain assumptions about beliefs, mental states, and emotions as well as an implicit theory of causation about how various forms of harm arise from certain experiences or “events” that violate persons’ moral beliefs and systems. Our analysis makes these assumptions more explicit and subjects them to critical scrutiny. In so doing, we survey the current literature and identify basic features of how moral injuries are defined, how they are thought to occur, and the forms of treatment or repair that appear to be indicated. We caution that it matters how moral experience is characterized and argue that an alternative understanding of what is the moral in moral injury is important for overcoming critical challenges to the standard model. Moreover, recently evolving approaches to moral repair could be more consistent with an alternative model. Our concluding suggestion is that a more robust account of the nature of moral experience and its relations to self-identity and social experience more generally could advance understanding of the etiology of moral injury and promote rehabilitation.

Many jurisdictions prohibit or severely restrict the use of evidence about a defendant’s character to prove legal culpability. Situationists, who argue that conduct is largely determined by situational features rather than by character, can easily defend this prohibition. According to situationism, character evidence is misleading or paltry. Proscriptions on character evidence seem harder to justify, however, on virtue ethical accounts. It appears that excluding character evidence either denies the centrality of character for explaining conduct—the situationist position—or omits probative evidence. Situationism is, after all, presented as antithetical to virtue ethics. This essay provides a virtue ethical defense of character evidence exclusion rules. We show that existing virtue ethical rebuttals to situationism themselves support prohibitions on character evidence; even if behavior arises from stable character traits, character evidence should be prohibited. In building our case, we provide a taxonomy of kinds of character judgment and reconcile the ubiquity and reasonableness of character judgments in ordinary life with the epistemic legitimacy of character evidence prohibitions in law.