James Daly

Cutting out all reference to the popular and polemical, psychological and ideological resonances evoked in and by Sartre, this study takes up the challenge of considering the impressive work of Sartre as the latest metamorphosis of the Western philosophical heritage. As Professor Hartmann explains, he has included sufficient exposition of Sartre’s views to enable the reader without extensive knowledge of Sartre to follow the interpretation, but expects him to be conversant with Hegel and, to a lesser extent, with Husserl and Heidegger. If this does not suit the generality of English-speaking students of philosophy who usually know of Sartre, Heidegger, Husserl and Hegel in that order of detail, nevertheless the Hegelian bias of the lengthy critical exposition gives us a new, incisive, and it seems to me, definitive treatment of Sartre which will benefit those who have come to him through phenomenology.

Le Volontaire et l’Involontaire was published in 1950, as the first volume of Ricoeur’s La Philosophie de la Volonté. The whole project has a sweeping range, reflected even in this first volume. It is a philosophy of the will, taking in analysis of concepts of behaviour with a critique of scientific psychology: analysis of our moral experience: of our attitudes to our life and to the whole of reality: of our experience of evil and guilt and our dreams of innocence and hopes of salvation. In the first volume Ricoeur imposes not only phenomenological brackets, examining our experience ‘descriptively’ and not causally, but also eidetic brackets, examining possible behaviour and not actual behaviour. This means that he suspends consideration of ‘the fault’, our experience of evil. This is left to the second volume Finitude et Culpabilité which in two parts, L’Homme Faillible and La Symbolique du Mal analyses the experience of evil, the latter part in a hermeneutic analysis of myth, a subject with which Ricoeur has come to the forefront of recent structuralist debate in his book De l’Interprétation A third volume of the Philosophy of the Will will deal with hermeneutic analysis of ‘transcendence’—of the dream of innocence, the hope of deliverance from evil, as expressed in poetry and myth.

This is a very welcome addition to the invaluable Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. Originally published in France as La Notion d’ a priori in 1959, this book is chronologically as well as logically central to Dufrenne’s thinking as it has been expressed from the time of Karl Jaspers et la philosophie de l’existence, written with Paul Ricoeur in 1947, through Phénoménologie de l’expérience esthétique in 1953, to Le Poétique and Jalons in 1963 and 1966. Perhaps it cannot be fully understood without reference to these other books, which it must be hoped will be translated into English. Dufrenne has written several articles in English, as well as the Mahlon Powell Lectures for 1959, published as Language and Philosophy all of which are listed in a Dufrenne bibliography which the translator has appended to the present book. He has translated as preface Paul Ricoeur’s near-definitive review of the book in Esprit, March 1961. Apart from his own very helpful introduction and index the translator has done intensive research in tracking down sources which throw light on the often cryptic allusions sewn into the text in Dufrenne’s highly-condensed style, which in spite of his eulogy to the poetic offers no concessions to readability, and few to the imagination.

Marx's thought about justice is essentialist and dialectical. It has been interpreted in terms of immoralism. It is rather a synthesis of the traditional natural law, based on the Aristotelian concept of nature as the potential for perfection or ideal fulfilment, radically different from the Hobbesian reductionist concept of nature as atomistic and mechanical; of the tradition of dialectics in its German idealist form; and of Feuerbach's humanism. Marx's explicitly realist idea of science reveals 'veiled wage-slavery'. Concentration on the market exchange, to the exclusion of the subsequent exploitative use of labour power, deceives exclusively analytic observers into the belief that there is some justice in capitalism. Marx characterized the proletariat as the 'universal class', capable of bringing about the fulfilment of the human essence in a family-style mode of production, because it is the victim of total injustice. However, he criticized workers for not rising above such bourgeois selfishness as demanding 'a fair wage', which is not even a coherent concept. Capitalism is not only a moral injustice, but an ontological injustice, a violation of the worker's humanity. It is coercion into alienation, fetishism and idolatry.