Jan Almäng

NLA Høgskolen
  • NLA Høgskolen
    Regular Faculty
University of Gothenburg
Department of Philosophy, Linguistics, Theory of Science
PhD, 2007
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind
  •  1
    An Argument Against Disjunctivism
    In Christer Svennerlind, Almäng Jan & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations: Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday, Ontos Verlag. pp. 15-41. 2013.
  •  52
    During the last decades, Ingvar Johansson has made a formidable contribution to the development of philosophy in general and perhaps especially to the development of metaphysics. This volume consists of original papers written by 50 philosophers from all over the world in honour of Ingvar Johansson to celebrate his 70th birthday. The papers cover traditional issues in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, applied ethics and applied metaphysics, the nature of human rights, the philosophy of eco…Read more
  •  50
    Chalmers’ Argument from Relativity
    Erkenntnis 87 (4): 2047-2052. 2020.
    David Chalmers has recently argued that Relativity Theory supports the notion that shapes are Twin-Earthable. In this paper this argument is challenged. I reconstruct the argument in five steps where the last step is the conclusion. I proceed to argue that one step in the argument can be interpreted in two different ways. The problem is that on the first interpretation of the step, the conclusion does not follow. And on the second interpretation of the step, it contradicts a previous step in the…Read more
  •  36
    A problem for extensional theories of time-consciousness
    Synthese 199 (5-6): 14865-14880. 2021.
    Extensionalist theories of the specious present suggest that every perceptual experience is extended in time for a short while, such that they are co-extensive in time with the time experienced in them. Thus, there can be no experience of time, unless the experience itself is extended in time. Accordingly, there must be something that unites the temporal parts of a perceptual experience into temporally extended wholes. I call this the “glue-problem for extensionalism”. In this paper I suggest th…Read more
  •  74
    The Impoverished Representations of Brains in Vats
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 97 (3): 475-494. 2020.
    In the present paper, the notion that brains in vats with perceptual experiences of the same type as ours could perceptually represent other entities than shapes is challenged. Whereas it is often held that perceptual experiences with the same phenomenal character as ours could represent computational properties, I argue that this is not the case for shapes. My argument is in brief that the phenomenal character of a normal visual experience exemplifies shapes – phenomenal shapes – which function…Read more
  •  46
    Twin Earth and perceptual content
    Synthese 198 (7): 6089-6109. 2019.
    This paper presents a framework for analysing perceptual Twin Earth thought experiments. Visual content normally has an analogue character, and it is argued in this paper that this sets certain constraints on the extent to which Twin Earth thought experiments can be successful. The argumentation in the paper is developed by using examples from visual spatial content. It is argued that visual spatial content can only be “twin-earthed” in a very limited way. Whereas the metrics of space can be twi…Read more
  •  37
    War, vagueness and hybrid war
    Defence Studies 19 (2): 189-204. 2019.
    It has frequently been observed in the literature on hybrid wars that there is a grey zone between peace and war, and that hybrid wars are conflicts which are not clear cases of war. In this paper, I attempt to illuminate this grey zone and the concept and nature of war from the philosophical discussions of vagueness and institutional facts. Vague terms are characterized by the fact that there is no non-arbitrary boundary between entities which lie in their extension, and entities which do not l…Read more
  •  504
    Perceiving Exploding Tropes
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (1): 42-62. 2016.
    The topic of this paper is the perception of properties. It is argued that the perception of properties allows for a distinction between the sense of the identity and the sense of the qualitative nature of a property. So, for example, we might perceive a property as being identical over time even though it is presented as more and more determinate. Thus, you might see an object first as red and then as crimson red. In this case, the property is perceived as identical over time, even though the s…Read more
  •  6
    Legal Facts and Dependence on Representations
    Journal of Social Ontology 2 (1): 1-15. 2016.
    Barry Smith has recently argued against John Searle’s thesis that institutional facts exist because they are represented as existing in a certain community. Smith argues that institutional facts can exist even though they are not represented as existing and that institutional facts can fail to obtain even though they are represented as obtaining. In this paper it is argued that Smith’s challenge can be met for a certain class of legal facts. I argue that in order to solve the problem posed by Sm…Read more
  •  100
    This is a paper about The Causal Self-Referential Theory of Perception. According to The Causal Self-Referential Theory as developed by above all John Searle and David Woodruff Smith, perceptual content is satisfied by an object only if the object in question has caused the perceptual experience. I argue initially that Searle's account cannot explain the distinction between hallucination and illusion since it requires that the state of affairs that is presented in the perceptual experience must …Read more
  •  32
    Heidegger on Sinn
    Philosophical Communications. 2008.
    This paper is an exegetical study of Heidegger’s concept of Sinn (meaning). Heidegger’s comments regarding the notion is analysed from three different perspective: In the first section, the relationship between Sinn and worldhood is analysed. The conclusion is that an entity can have Sinn for Dasein, only insofar it can enter into the network of functional relations constituting the world. Since the world is constituted by social practices and customs, Sinn is also derivately thus constituted.…Read more
  •  488
    Perceptual Transparency and Perceptual Constancy
    Husserl Studies 30 (1): 1-19. 2014.
    A central topic in discussions about qualia concerns their purported transparency. According to transparency theorists, an experience is transparent in the sense that the subject having the experience is aware of nothing but the intended object of the experience. In this paper this notion is criticized for failing to account for the dynamical aspects of perception. A key assumption in the paper is that perceptual content has a certain temporal depth, in the sense that each act of perception can …Read more
  •  43
    An Argument Against Disjunctivism
    In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday, Ontos Verlag. pp. 5--15. 2013.
    According to disjunctivism the object of perception is a part of the perceptual experience. This however raises the question of what the other constituents of the perceptual experience might be. In this paper I suggest that there may be no answer to this question that does not violate another core claim of disjunctivism, viz. that veridical perceptual experiences are experiences of different kinds than hallucinatory experiences
  •  173
    This paper explores the distinction between perceiving an object as extended in time, and experiencing a sequence of perceptions. I argue that this distinction cannot be adequately described by any present theory of time-consciousness and that in order to solve the puzzle, we need to consider perceptual content as having three distinct constituents: Explicit content, which has a particular phenomenal character, modal content, or the kind of content that is contributed by the psychological mode, …Read more
  •  145
    Intentionality and intersubjectivity
    Dissertation, Göteborg University. 2007.
    1. Introduction. The problems of other minds ; Body, mind and other minds ; The analogical theory ; The critical theory ; Functionalism and mental states as theoretical entities ; A brief outline of things to come -- 2. Functionalism and the nature of mental representations. Functionalism and cognitive psychology ; Folk psychology and the representational theory of mind -- 3. Theory theory and simulation theory. A very short introduction to the world of theory theory and simulation theory …Read more
  •  162
    Russellian Propositions and Properties
    Metaphysica 13 (1): 7-25. 2012.
    This paper discusses a problem for Russellian propositions. According to Russellianism, each word in a sentence contributes its referent to the proposition expressed by the sentence. Russellian propositions have normally been conceived of as problematic for two reasons, viz. they cannot account for the unity of the proposition and they have problems with non-referring singular names. In this paper, I argue that Russellianism also faces a problem with respect to properties. It is inconsistent wit…Read more
  •  325
    An Argument for Shape Internalism
    Erkenntnis 82 (4): 819-836. 2017.
    This paper is a defense of an internalist view of the perception of shapes. A basic assumption of the paper is that perceptual experiences have certain parts which account both for the phenomenal character associated with perceiving shapes—phenomenal shapes—and for the intentional content presenting shapes—intentional shapes. Internalism about perceptions of shapes is defined as the claim that phenomenal shapes determine the intentional shapes. Externalism is defined as the claim that perceptual…Read more
  •  184
    Time, Mode and Perceptual Content
    Acta Analytica 27 (4): 425-439. 2012.
    Francois Recanati has recently argued that each perceptual state has two distinct kinds of content, complete and explicit content. According to Recanati, the former is a function of the latter and the psychological mode of perception. Furthermore, he has argued that explicit content is temporally neutral and that time-consciousness is a feature of psychological mode. In this paper it is argued, pace Recanati, that explicit content is not temporally neutral. Recanati’s position is initially prese…Read more
  •  76
    McDowell's Naturalism
    In Björn Haglund & Helge Malmgren (eds.), Kvantifikator för en Dag. Essays Dedicated to Dag Westerståhl on his Sixtieth Birthday, Philosophical Communications. 2006.
    This is an essay on McDowell’s naturalism. It is, pace some commentators, argued that McDowell’s naturalism does not end up in any strange metaphysical positions in the philosophy of mind, because second nature non-reductively supervenes on first nature and have causal powers. Pace certain other commentators, it is also argued that McDowell can be read as drawing a clear line between ethical platonism, and his own naturalized platonism, but only at the cost of landing in standard naturalism.
  •  385
    Tense as a Feature of Perceptual Content
    Journal of Philosophy 111 (7): 361-378. 2014.
    In recent years the idea that perceptual content is tensed in the sense that we can perceive objects as present or as past has come under attack. In this paper the notion of tensed content is to the contrary defended. The paper argues that assuming that something like an intentionalistic theory of perception is correct, it is very reasonable to suppose that perceptual content is tensed, and that a denial of this notion requires a denial of some intuitively very plausible principles. The paper di…Read more
  •  44
    A Note on Shapes
    Journal of Philosophical Research 40 469-471. 2015.
    It has recently been argued that the Special Theory of Relativity entails that shapes are not intrinsic properties of objects. Rather, they are properties an object has only relative to an inertial frame. In this discussion note I argue that this position, while correct, is incomplete. Objects have frame-dependent shapes because they have an intrinsic property that is the same in all inertial frames.
  •  191
    Affordances and the nature of perceptual content
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2): 161-177. 2008.
    According to John McDowell, representational perceptual content is conceptual through and through. This paper criticizes this view by claiming that there is a certain kind of representational and non-conceptual perceptual content that is sensitive to bodily skills. After a brief introduction to McDowell's position, Merleau-Ponty's notion of body schema and Gibson's notion of affordance are presented. It is argued that affordances are constitutive of representational perceptual content, and that …Read more
  •  179
    It is often argued that for a perceptual experience to be able to justify perceptual judgments, the perceptual experience must have a propositional content. For, it is claimed, only propositions can bear logical relations such as implication to each other. In this paper, this claim is challenged. It is argued that whereas perceptions and judgments both have intentional content, their contents have different structures. Perceptual content does not have a propositional structure. Perceptions and j…Read more