Jane Dryden

Autistics are often viewed and treated as a vulnerable population. But what does vulnerability mean in this context, based on first-person, autistic perspectives and our own self-understandings and community-grown reflections, rather than neuronormative expectations? To explore this, we focus on the phenomenon of autistic masking, and what masking and unmasking in different contexts enables and reveals. Drawing on feminist scholarship on conceptualizing vulnerability and treating neurodiversity as an axis of intersectionality, we argue that it is useful to distinguish between what we call openness vulnerability and harm vulnerability, in order to appreciate not only the risks but also the benefits of autistic unmasking. We begin with the notion of neuronormativity, how it is harmful to autistics, and how it institutes an unjust vulnerability economy. We then introduce the concepts of harm vulnerability and openness vulnerability at the core of our argument for a shift in the vulnerability economy toward more just allocations of vulnerability between autistics and neurotypicals. Next, we look more closely at how these unjust vulnerability dynamics play out in the contexts of higher education and healthcare. Finally, we consider strategies for resisting neuronormativity under the non-ideal circumstances of the status quo.

Digestion is a fundamental bodily process that involves breaking down and absorbing external substances such as food or medicine into our bodies. A familiar part of our daily life, it is also a frequent metaphor for taking something in or assimilating it. For instance, when we digest a difficult concept, we make it our own, to be used for our purposes. Contemporary phenomenology’s concern with the lived experience of embodiment has not generated extensive meditation on digestion in its literal sense, despite its importance to our ongoing survival and the fact of its functioning (and ill-functioning) frequently intruding into our conscious awareness. Dwelling with digestion can add to our reflection on phenomenological topics such as the mind-body relation, appearance and disappearance, embodied activity and passivity, vulnerability and mastery, assimilation, our openness to the world, and encounters with otherness. This entry will consider some of the treatment of digestion in three of the phenomenological tradition’s forebears, Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche, before proceeding to thematic discussion of how phenomenology does engage, or might engage, with digestion. Digestion also connects with themes such as hunger, eating, embodiment, pain and illness, health, as well as recognition of the other generally, that are beyond the scope of this entry.

The Life Worth Living is particularly valuable for its phenomenological approach to disability and pain, which can serve to draw attention to their complexity and multifacetedness, and allows attention to the interweaving of components of experience—embodied, social, relational, and so on. It also points out the ways in which abilities are relational and contextual, and that we depend on a range of caring systems as part of our human being-in-the-world (14). The book’s final chapter and conclusion highlight the role of community, relationship, and care in making “habitable worlds for all” (160). My comments take up Reynolds’s discussion of living with pain and will mostly draw from chapter 2, “A Phenomenology of Chronic Pain.” I then turn to the broader context of reading this book amidst an ongoing pandemic and climate crisis.

Disability is a significant issue in contemporary social theory, and its im- portance is gradually becoming more recognized within philosophy itself. Examining disability throughout the history of philosophy, allows us to excavate assumptions about what kinds of bodies and minds are worthwhile, and what kinds of perspectives have been excluded. This paper discusses what Hegel says explicitly about disability, and then use poverty and participation in the system of needs as a case study demonstrating the questions and philosophical avenues opened up by critical consideration of disability in his work.

Healthism and ableism intertwine through an imperative of normalcy and the ensuing devaluing of those who fail to meet societally dominant norms and expectations around “normal” health. This paper tracks the effect of that imperative of normalcy through current research into gut microbiome therapies, using therapies targeting fatness and autism as examples. The complexity of the gut microbiome ought to encourage us to rethink our conception of ourselves and our embeddedness in the world; instead, the microbiome is transformed into one more tool for controlling unruly bodies and minds.

German idealist philosophers Kant and Hegel, who have had a significant influence on contemporary social and political theory, both insist on universal human freedom and dignity. However, they maintain teleological frameworks of human development which depend on distancing free and rational human agency from nature, leaving animality and “savageness” behind for a rational and spiritually developed future. This has implications for their implicit and explicit accounts of disability, which risk being reiterated today: insofar as disability is associated with being a static product of nature, these frameworks situate it at best as that which must be overcome, and at worst as something that bars someone from full humanity. Recognizing and understanding the place of disability within their work is vital if we want to avoid their exclusions in our inherited ideas.

“Gut issues” refers to any condition that affects our digestive systems and that causes pain or discomfort. The term points to the experience of our gut being an issue for us – interfering with our plans, undermining our bodily self-control, threatening our well-being. This paper aims to do three things: (1) to introduce and justify a disability theory approach to gut issues; (2) to use this lens to argue that the experience of gut issues has a social and relational dimension that could be otherwise; and (3) to argue for a shared responsibility to ameliorate this dimension.

_The first look at the philosophy behind the Green Lantern comics—timed for the release of the _Green Lantern_ movie in June 2011_ The most recent _Green Lantern_ series—_Blackest Night_—propelled GL to be the top-selling comic series for more than a year, the latest twist in seven decades of Green Lantern adventures. This book sheds light on the deep philosophical issues that emerge from the Green Lantern Corps's stories and characters, from what Plato's tale of the Ring of Gyges tells us about the Green Lantern ring and the desire for power to whether willpower is the most important strength to who is the greatest Green Lantern of all time. Gives you a new perspective on Green Lantern characters, story lines, and themes Shows what philosophical heavy hitters such as Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant can teach us about members of the Green Lantern Corp and their world Answers your most pressing Green Lantern questions, including: What motivates Hal Jordan to be a Green Lantern? Does the Blackest Night force us to confront old male/female stereotypes? What is the basis for moral judgment in the Green Lantern Corps? Is Hal Jordan a murderer? Whether you're a new fan or an elder from Oa, _Green Lantern and Philosophy_ is a must-have companion.

The trajectory of the “Anthropology” section of Hegel’s Encyclopedia brings us from the uncultivated, natural soul which humans share with non-human animals, to the point where it becomes an individual subject, ready to become the “I” of the “Phenomenology” section. Much of this entails the transformation of the body from something purely determined by nature to being a home for spirit as it freely relates itself to the world. The “Anthropology” thus dwells on the theme of liberation from nature. Especially in the Zusätze and in the 1827/8 Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit, Hegel notes that that cultivation is associated with minimizing the effects of natural determinations on one’s body. Insofar as nature is associated with particularity and reason with universality, it may seem as though idiosyncratic embodiments are incompatible with the kind of mastery of the body Hegel envisions. At the same time, given that the focus of the “Anthropology” is on the development of the soul rather than the matter of the body itself, there may be a range of compatible bodily possibilities. This raises the question of how much the body and its comportment ought to correspond to an ideal, and what the implications may be for those humans whose embodiment marks them out (in Hegel’s system) as closer to nature. Are there limitations to embodiments that may be appropriated and claimed as my own? Since coming to own our natural determinations is an ongoing process throughout a lifetime, despite the location of the “Anthropology” in the Encyclopedia, it is important to consider the role of our free decision-making in the transformation of our body. Attending to the story of the body within the “Anthropology” helps us to appreciate it more fully as a crucial link between the Philosophy of Nature and the rest of the Philosophy of Spirit.

When discussing the problem of evil, philosophers often distinguish between physical evil (harm caused within the natural world such as natural disasters, disease, and the like), and moral evil (harm caused by human agency). Mapping this traditional distinction is mapped onto the third section of Fichte’s The Vocation of Man would at first seem fairly straightforward: for Fichte, evil arising from nature occurs through “blind mechanism” and is unfree; in contrast, evil done by human beings arises out of free agency. The answer may be more complicated, however, in two different ways. First, Fichte holds that nature is to be cultivated and controlled by human beings so that it is no longer a source of harm; this may imply that the continuing harm done by nature is the result of humans’ failure to have sufficiently tamed nature. In that case, some of the harm caused by nature may be attributable to free human causality and thus no longer be a clearcut instance of natural evil. Second, Fichte repeatedly states that those who fail to act morally and who fail to conform their wills to the moral law are still be in the power of the mechanisms of nature. Even though we must think of them as free, Fichte compares their actions to the operation of nature and its mechanism of necessity. By presenting a careful and nuanced Fichtean account of the traditional distinction between physical and moral evil, we can better appreciate how Fichte understood the meaning and scope of human responsibility.

People with gut issues are often constrained in the foods they are able to eat. The choices they are able to make about food, however, are shaped not merely by specific medical and dietary needs but also by social, relational, and environmental factors such as the presence of trusted and supportive others who take their needs seriously. Drawing on work in disability theory and relational autonomy, as well as interviews undertaken in summer 2019, the paper explores the ways that choices are enabled or undermined, and argues that these should be taken into account in work on the ethics and politics of food.

À partir de Fichte et Hegel, ce texte explore l’argument selon lequel la vulnérabilité est importante parce que, partagée par tous les êtres incarnés, elle contribue à nous lier avec les autres. La reconnaissance de notre vulnérabilité contribue aussi à la connaissance de soi. Leurs philosophies sont comparées pour démontrer que le système de Fichte l’incite à essayer de contrôler la vulnérabilité, tandis que celui de Hegel décrit une interaction entre la liberté et la détermination qui nous permet de nous réconcilier avec notre état de vulnérabilité.

This paper will consider the differing ways that empirical individuality is dealt with in Fichte’s philosophy, focusing especially on the System of Ethics. It will attempt to defend Fichte against some of his critics who suggest that individuality and individual freedom are lost within the more universalist account given in the System of Ethics, by showing how Fichte has different purposes in the doctrine of right and the doctrine of ethics. However, on the other side, it will also caution against seeing Fichte as valuing individual freedom for the sake of individuality itself, in a way at odds with the directives of his ethics.

Although feminist philosophers have been critical of the gendered norms contained within the history of philosophy, they have not extended this critical analysis to norms concerning disability. In the history of Western philosophy, disability has often functioned as a metaphor for something that has gone awry. This trope, according to which disability is something that has gone wrong, is amply criticized within Disability Studies, though not within the tradition of philosophy itself or even within feminist philosophy. In this paper, I use one instance of this disability metaphor, contained within a passage from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, in order to show that paying attention to disability and disability theory can enable identification of ableist assumptions within the tradition of philosophy and can also open up new interpretations of canonical texts. On my reading, whereas Hegel’s expressed views of disability are dismissive, his logic and its treatment of contingency offer up useful ways to situate and re-evaluate disability as part of the concept of humanity. Disability can in fact be useful to Hegel, especially in the context of his valorization of experiences of disruption and disorientation. Broadening our understanding of the possible ways that the philosophical tradition has conceived human beings allows us to better draw on its theoretical resources.

Recent work in the philosophy of biology argues that we must rethink the biological individual beyond the boundary of the species, given that a key part of our essential functioning is carried out by the bacteria in our intestines in a way that challenges any strictly genetic account of what is involved for the biological human. The gut is a kind of ambiguous other within our understanding of ourselves, particularly when we also consider the status of gastro-intestinal disorders. Hegel offers us theoretical tools to describe and understand our relationship to our gut. His description of our selves as continually mediated through otherness is strikingly compatible with the kind of structure contemporary biology presents us with. His accounts of digestion and habit, contextualized by his logic, help point toward an understanding of selfhood as porous and yet still capable of being sufficiently unified for us to make sense of ourselves, one which allows us to acknowledge otherness within us while still having enough unity for agency.