• In this paper, I propose a solution to an almost ignored problem in metaphysics and metametaphysics: what is categorial fundamentality and non-fundamentality? My proposal builds on E. J. Lowe’s view on the issue. By means of the newcomer notion of generic identity, I can give an account of something that Lowe did not explicate: the constitution of formal ontolog- ical relations. Formal ontological relations (e.g. instantiation) are internal relations that deter- mine ontological form and categor…Read more
  • Away with Dispositional Essences in Trope Theory
    In Ludger Jansen & Petter Sandstad (eds.), Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Formal Causation, Routledge. pp. 106-123. 2021.
    A specific variety of formal causation is dispositional essentialism. This chapter argues that dispositional essentialism is incompatible with any trope bundle theory committed to the primitive identity of tropes, such as Keith Campbell’s account and the authors’ own Strong Nuclear Theory. Dispositional essentialism would render at least some tropes identity-dependent on other tropes, while all tropes must be considered identity-independent existents in these trope theories. Furthermore, disposi…Read more
  •  103
    The handout of my talk at the Nordic Network in Metaphysics webinar on Friday 2/10/2020
  •  162
    What are Tropes, Fundamentally? A Formal Ontological Account
    Acta Philosophica Fennica 94 129-159. 2018.
    In this paper, I elaborate on the Strong Nuclear Theory (SNT) of tropes and substances, which I have defended elsewhere, using my metatheory about formal ontology and especially fundamental ontological form. According to my metatheory, for an entity to have an ontological form is for it to be a relatum of a formal ontological relation or relations jointly in an order. The full fundamental ontological form is generically identical to a simple formal ontological relation or relations jointly in an…Read more
  • David Hume: Esseitä (edited book)
    with Juha Koivisto and Lauri Mehtonen
    Vastapaino. 2006.
  •  81
    Hume on the Unity of Determinations of Extension
    History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 22 (1). 2019.
    We do not fully understand Hume’s account of space if we do not understand his view of determinations of extension, which is too much ignored a topic. In this paper, I argue for an interpretation that determinations of extension are unities in Hume’s view: single beings in addition to their components. This realist reading is reasonable on both textual and philosophical grounds. There is strong textual evidence for it and no textual reason to reject it. Realism makes perfect sense of the metaphy…Read more
  •  152
    Taxonomy of Relations: Internal and External
    In Daniele Bertini & Damiano Migliorini (eds.), Relations. Ontology and Philosophy of Religion, Mimesis International. pp. 93-121. 2018.
    In this paper, we discern different types of possible relations. We focus on the distinction between internal and external relations and their various possible sub-types. In the first section, we present what is nowadays more or less the standard distinction between internal and external relations. In the second section, we make two contributions to the literature of internal relations: a new taxonomy of internal relations and a novel distinction between formal and material ontological relation…Read more
  •  540
    Quantity Tropes and Internal Relations
    with Markku Keinänen and Antti Keskinen
    Erkenntnis 84 (3): 519-534. 2019.
    In this article, we present a new conception of internal relations between quantity tropes falling under determinates and determinables. We begin by providing a novel characterization of the necessary relations between these tropes as basic internal relations. The core ideas here are that the existence of the relata is sufficient for their being internally related, and that their being related does not require the existence of any specific entities distinct from the relata. We argue that quantit…Read more
  •  238
    In Lowe’s Four-Category Ontology, instantiation is a basic formal ontological relation between particulars (objects, modes) and their kinds (kinds, attributes). Therefore, instantiation must be considered as a metaphysically necessary relation, which also rules out the metaphysical possibility of kind change. Nevertheless, according to Lowe, objects obtain their identity conditions in a more general level than specific natural kinds, which allows for kind change. There also seems to be actual ex…Read more
  • Skottilainen valistus - David Hume
    In Petri Koikkalainen and Paul-Erik Korvela (ed.), Klassiset poliittiset ajattelijat, Vastapaino. pp. 299-339. 2012.
    The title in English: Scottish Enlightenment - David Hume. This is a chapter on Hume's political philosophy that I wrote to a Finnish textbook of the history of political thought.
  •  1
    Scepticism as epochê
    In Kaisa Luoma, Erna Oesch & Risto Vilkko (eds.), Philosophical Studies in honorem Leila Haaparanta, Tampereen Yliopistopaino. pp. 233-242. 2004.
  •  928
    Voittiko Messi vai Voittiko Barcelona? Jalkapallojoukkueiden olemisen tavasta
    In Jussi Antti Saarinen & Mikael Vilhelm Melan (eds.), Sokrateen syöksypusku –jalkapallon filosofiaa, Docendo. pp. 54-69. 2014.
    Title in English: Did Messi win or did Barcelona? On the mode of being of soccer teams.
  • David Humen Of Essay Writing
    In Lauri Mehtonen & Kari Väyrynen (eds.), Järjen todellisuus Juhlakirja Markku Mäelle, Oulun Yliopistopaino. pp. 69-83. 2002.
  • Toimittajien esipuhe
    with Juha Koivisto and Lauri Mehtonen
    In Jani Hakkarainen, Juha Koivisto & Lauri Mehtonen (eds.), David Hume: Esseitä, Vastapaino. pp. 7-9. 2006.
  •  58
    Humen teoria avaruuden ymmärtämisestä
    In Valtteri Viljanen, Helena Siipi & Matti Sintonen (eds.), Ymmärrys, Uniprint. pp. 67-75. 2012.
    Title in English: Hume's Theory of Understanding Space
  •  53
    Kontekstualistinen vastaus Agrippan argumentille
    In Ahti Pietarinen, Sami Pihlström & Pilvi Toppinen (eds.), Usko, Juvenes Print. pp. 93-98. 2009.
    Title in English: : A Contextualist Answer to Agrippa's Argument
  •  362
    According to standard trope nominalism, there are simple tropes that do not have parts or multiply distinct aspects. Douglas Ehring’s reductio ad absurdum against this standard view concludes that there are no simple tropes. In this paper, we provide a response to Ehring defending the standard view. Ehring’s argument may be refuted by (1) distinguishing the ontological form of tropes from their contribution to the ontological content of the world, and (2) construing tropes as having primitive id…Read more
  •  783
    Why Realists Need Tropes
    Metaphysica 17 (1): 69-85. 2016.
    We argue that if one wishes to be a realist, one should adopt a Neo-Aristotelian ontology involving tropes instead of a Russellian ontology of property universals and objects. Either Russellian realists should adopt the relata-specific relational tropes of instantiation instead of facts, or convert to Neo-Aristotelian realism with monadic tropes. Regarding Neo-Aristotelian realism, we have two novel points why it fares better than Russellian realism. Instantiation of property universals by trope…Read more
  •  101
    In this paper, I will reconstruct Hume's argument for the ontological (in the sense of rigid existential) independence of simple properties in A Treatise of Human Nature , Book 1 (1739). According to my reconstruction, the main premises of the argument are the real distinctness of every perception of a simple property, Hume's Separability Principle and his Conceivability Principle. In my view, Hume grounds the real distinctness of every perception of a simple property in his atomistic theory of …Read more
  •  214
    Hume on Spatial Properties
    In Guigon Ghislain & Rodriguez-Pereyra Gonzalo (eds.), Nominalism About Properties: New Essays, Routledge. pp. 79-94. 2015.
    I defend a reading of David Hume’s nominalism that he comes close to Keith Campbell's contemporary trope theory in the specific case of spatial properties. I argue that Hume's view should be construed as classifying spatial properties as Campbellian tropes (particular properties): abstract, particular, determinate and qualitatively simple properties. This has implications for reconstructing Hume's answer to the problem of universals. I argue that Hume’s account of objects resembling each other i…Read more
  •  81
    Why Hume Cannot Be A Realist
    Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10 (2): 143-161. 2012.
    In this paper, I argue that there is a sceptical argument against the senses advanced by Hume that forms a decisive objection to the Metaphysically Realist interpretations of his philosophy – such as the different naturalist and New Humean readings. Hume presents this argument, apparently starting with the primary/secondary qualities distinction, both in A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, Part 4, Section 4 (Of the modern philosophy) (1739) and An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Section …Read more
  •  171
    Kaila's Reception of Hume
    Acta Philosophica Fennica 89 147-162. 2012.
    In this paper, I discuss Eino Kaila's (1890-1958) understanding of David Hume. Kaila was one of the leading Finnish philosophers of the 20th century and a correspondent of the Vienna Circle. He introduced logical empiricism into Finland and taught Georg Henrik von Wright. Final draft
  •  144
    Concrete Universals and Spatial Relations
    European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 11 (1): 57-71. 2015.
    According to strong immanent realism, proposed for instance by David M. Armstrong, universals are concrete, located in their instances. E.J. Lowe and Douglas Ehring have presented arguments to the effect that strong immanent realism is incoherent. Cody Gilmore has defended strong immanent realism against the charge of incoherence. Gilmore’s argument has thus far remained unanswered. We argue that Gilmore’s response to the charge of incoherence is an ad hoc move without support independent of str…Read more
  •  103
    Hume's Scepticism and Realism
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (2): 283-309. 2012.
    In this article, a novel interpretation of one of the problems of Hume scholarship is defended: his view of Metaphysical Realism or the belief in an external world (that there are ontologically and causally perception-independent, absolutely external and continued, i.e. Real entities). According to this interpretation, Hume's attitude in the domain of philosophy should be distinguished from his view in the domain of everyday life: Hume the philosopher suspends his judgement on Realism, whereas H…Read more
  •  44
    In this paper, I argue that Hume has an insight into the heart of most of “new philosophy” when he claims that according to it, proper sensibles are not Real properties of material substance and Real bodies. I call this tenet “the Proper Sensibles Principle” (PSP). In the second part of the paper, I defend the interpretation - mainly against Don Garrett’s doubts - that the PSP is a rational tenet in Hume’s view and he thus endorses it. Its rationality means that the PSP has a firm foundation in …Read more
  •  335
    Persistence of Simple Substances
    Metaphysica 11 (2): 119-135. 2010.
    In this paper, we argue for a novel three-dimensionalist solution to the problem of persistence, i.e. cross-temporal identity. We restrict the discussion of persistence to simple substances, which do not have other substances as their parts. The account of simple substances employed in the paper is a trope-nominalist strong nuclear theory, which develops Peter Simons' trope nominalism. Regarding the distinction between three dimensionalism and four dimensionalism, we follow Michael Della Rocca's…Read more
  •  225
    Metametafysiikkaa kategorioilla ja ilman
    Ajatus 73 225-253. 2016.
    Title in English translation: Metametaphysics - with and without Categories. A comment paper on An Introduction to Metametaphysics by Tuomas Tahko. Ehdotan artikkelissa uutta olevan ja sen muodon välistä erottelua. Erottelun avulla voidaan antaa täsmällinen käsitys ontologisen kategorian käsitteestä ja metafysiikan tutkimuskohteesta. Argumentoin myös, että metafysiikan epistemologiaa ja semantiikkaa sekä metafyysistä selitttämistä pitää lähestyä kategorianäkökulmasta. Artikkeli on kommentti Tuom…Read more
  •  276
    In this paper, we argue that formal ontological relations avoid Bradley's reductio of relations, including his famous relation regress.