Javier Aguirre

Ante la reciente publicación de la última obra sistemática del filósofo alemán J. Habermas titulada _Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie_ (y su pronta traducción al español), el texto se propone mostrar las características fundamentales de la comprensión habermasiana sobre la misma actividad filosófica. Para esto, primero se describe la base teórica sobre la cual Habermas construye el sentido de sus reflexiones filosóficas, esto es, el sentido posmetafísico desde el cual Habermas desarrolla su pensamiento filosófico. Posteriormente, se exponen los tres roles que Habermas asigna a la actividad filosófica y se concluye evidenciando las conexiones entre la filosofía posmetafísica de Habermas y la democracia; conexiones que nos permitirían caracterizar a la filosofía posmetafísica habermasiana como una filosofía democrática y, sobre esta base, leer mejor el supuesto «giro religioso» de la filosofía de Habermas.

This paper presents key elements of Paolo Prodi´s historiagraphic theory that allow us to include him in the contemporary debate on the rol of religion and morality within democratic societies. The text is developed in three moments. First, we will briefly describe the aforementioned debate. Second, we will present the theorical elements found in Prodi’s works which are more relevant for the topic discussed. Finally, we will offer some critical comments in order to present what, for us, is still an open discussion.

This article is meant as a response to Cristina Lafont’s critiques of Habermas’ view of religion’s role in the public sphere. For Lafont, the burdens that Habermas places on secular citizens, by requiring them to avoid secularism, may entail dangerous consequences for a correct understanding of the concept of deliberative democracy. For this reason, she presents a proposal of her own in which no citizen, whether religious or secular, has the obligation to engage in a way of thinking alien to his or her own cognitive stance. Although subtle and revealing, Lafont’s critiques face two great problems. On the one hand, she does not discuss Habermas’ thoughts on the nature and value of religion, and, on the other, she overestimates sincerity as an element of an ethics of citizenship. I have divided my text in three sections. First, I will present Lafont’s criticism on Habermas’ proposal. For presenting Lafont’s objections I will use and expand an example mentioned by Lafont herself, namely, a political public debate about same-sex marriage. Second, I will answer Lafont’s objections, and finally, I will offer some conclusions regarding the philosophical bases on which Habermas’ account rests.