Jean-Christophe Grellety

It is widely accepted that ruling is the sole prerogative of Plato’s philosopher-rulers because they alone possess knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). This knowledge is knowledge of the Good, taken to be the only knowledge there is in Kallipolis. Let us call this the sufficiency condition thesis (the SCT). In this paper, I challenge this consensus. I cast doubt on the adequacy of the SCT, arguing that part of the training and education of the philosopher-rulers involves their gaining practical wisdom (φρόνησις) and experience (ἐμπειρία). To succeed in this, I have two main aims. First, I argue that the philosopher-rulers must attain optimum cognitive success in these three modes of cognition to function efficiently in ruling. This involves showing that Plato, for his political project, appeals to other senses of cognitive successes besides his strictly metaphysical epistemology. Second, I attempt to demonstrate how these three modes of cognition coalesce or coincide in ruling the perceptible world, especially in the judgement and determination of concrete perceptible matters.

I claim in this paper that Adeimantus’s challenge to Socrates in Book 2 of the Republic has more importance than scholars have generally recognized. The established tendency in the secondary literature is to treat Adeimantus’s objection as virtually indistinct from Glaucon’s objection. Such readings overlook the significance of Adeimantus’s contribution to the argument of the dialogue, especially the unique emphasis he puts on the role of culture and social institutions in shaping human beliefs and desires. Whereas Glaucon objects to Socrates’ conception of justice based on his views on human nature, Adeimantus introduces an indispensable political dimension to the discussion. I argue that these two objections are mutually implicating and vital to understanding why Socrates initiates an inquiry into politics in the Republic. Together, the objections show how Plato’s wide-ranging examination of issues in ethics, politics, psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics hangs together as an integrated whole. A further benefit of this reevaluation of Adeimantus’s challenge, I suggest, is the way it illuminates Plato’s views on poetry in the dialogue. According to this reading, far from advocating for the exclusion of poetry from civic life, Plato assigns it a fundamental role in the education of the philosopher due to the importance of poetic practices in cultivating the wisdom-loving part of the soul.

Plato, in dialogues such as Crito and Republic I, maintained a radical anti-harm principle (AHP): one ought never to harm oneself or another, for harming is always unjust. In this dissertation, I explain the meaning of AHP, describe and evaluate Plato's arguments for it, and situate it within the broader framework of Platonic ethics. In Chapter 1, I provide historical background and discuss anti-harm thinking in Plato's predecessors and successors. Most significantly, I argue that Xenophon's Socrates joins Plato's Socrates in opposing all harm, though Xenophon himself does not. In Chapter 2, I counter a common suggestion about AHP, namely that Plato must have carved out "justified harms" to account for cases of self-defense, war, and legal punishment. I argue that the Crito does not support this reading by showing how Socrates's anti-harm ideals differ from the more traditional mores defended by the Laws of Athens. In Chapter 3, I describe more precisely the scope and nature of Socratic harm, and I analyze the argument for AHP given in Republic I. I conclude that, contra much recent scholarship, Republic I does not show us that Socratic harm is limited to corruption of the soul's virtue; rather, the infliction of any evil is harmful. Thus, AHP retains its full radical character. Chapter 4 contains my solution to a central problem: why would anyone endorse a principle that looks as naive as AHP does? I argue that, according to a Platonic metaphysics of causation, only the good can benefit, and only the bad can harm; thus, a good character guarantees that we are not responsible for harming. We can adhere to AHP if we are able to purify our characters, and the principle gains considerable plausibility. In Chapter 5, I describe how Plato thought such purification might be possible by outlining his ideal of godlikeness. I argue that, just as the gods never harm anyone and cause all goods, the person who imitates them to the utmost extent humanly possible will also be both beneficent and non-maleficent. Finally, I conclude by discussing how Plato thought AHP might fit into political life: what concessions must rulers and legislators make under non-ideal political conditions so that citizens who cannot be entirely prevented from harming one another nonetheless harm one another as little as possible?