Jesper Kallestrup

According to knowledge-first epistemology, knowledge is irreducible to true belief plus something else, and yet knowledge entails belief. Moreover, knowledge plays an ineliminable role in causal explanation of action. This paper develops and defends an entirely new line of reasoning against this view: in conjunction with two independently plausible principles about explanatory realism and causal exclusion, this view leads to the conclusion that beliefs are epiphenomenal in cases of knowledge, which is when and only when action is deemed epistemically rational. Even worse, if a causal criterion of ontological commitment is accepted, it follows that postulating the existence of beliefs in cases of knowledge is redundant. Several specific objections are raised, followed by replies. While the paper does not pretend to exhaust all lines of resistance, the upshot is that the burden is now squarely on friends of knowledge-first epistemology to pursue one or more of these further.

This chapter investigates connections between Knowledge-First epistemology and a meta-epistemological thesis defended elsewhere by the authors (and in opposition to robust forms of virtue epistemology) under the description of _epistemic anti-individualism._ Epistemic anti-individualism is a denial of the epistemic individualist’s claim that warrant—i.e. what converts true belief into knowledge—supervenes on internal physical properties of individuals, perhaps in conjunction with local environmental properties. The chapter has two central aims. First, it argues that ‘epistemic twin earth’ thought experiments which reveal robust virtue epistemology (RVE) are problematically committed to epistemic individualism also show that _evidentialist mentalism_ is likewise committed to individualism. Second, it argues that, even though a _knowledge-first_ approach in epistemology is in principle (unlike RVE and evidentialist mentalism) consistent with epistemic _anti_-individualism, this approach fails to offer a plausible account of epistemic supervenience. The chapter suggests this point is a reason to pursue epistemic anti-individualism outside the knowledge-first framework.

One of the most important research programs in contemporary cognitive science is that of extended cognition. In this area of study, features of a subject’s cognitive environment can, in certain conditions, become constituent parts of the cognitive process itself. The aim of this volume is to explore the epistemological ramifications of this idea. The book brings together papers written by a range of distinguished and emerging academics, from a variety of different perspectives, to investigate the very idea of an extended epistemology. The first part of the volume explores foundational issues with regard to an extended epistemology as well as from a critical perspective. The second part of the volume examines the applications of this idea, and the new theoretical directions that it might take us. These include the relevance of Chinese philosophy, the ethical ramifications of extended epistemology, and its import to the epistemology of education, moral ethics, and emerging digital technologies.

The disagreement between generalists, who claim that conspiracy theories can be evaluated as a class, and particularists, who claim that each conspiracy theory must be evaluated on its own merits, has been one of the main dividing lines in the literature on conspiracy theories, although it has recently been suggested that consensus has settled in favour of particularism. In this paper we first argue that as it stands this disagreement is merely verbal: both sides are correct, given what they mean by ‘conspiracy theory’. We then revive a substantial version of the debate by adopting the project of analysing the ordinary concept of a conspiracy theory, which offers clear criteria on a correct definition. Our proposal is that the definition that best fits these criteria is one on which conspiracy theories are undermined by the testimony of epistemic superiors. Importantly, our definition implies the truth of generalism. While the paper is centrally concerned with advancing a novel view on the nature of conspiracy theories, its broader interest lies in the important connections it draws between this topic and recent discussions of epistemic authority, testimony, and defeat.

Just as Dummett famously argued that there is no such thing as bare predicative knowledge, this paper argues that there is no such thing as bare prepositional knowledge: all such knowing is knowing in a specifc way. It is frst argued that seeing that so-and-so can be epis-temically understood to constitute a way of knowing that so-and-so. Three arguments are then advanced in support of the stronger claim that there is no such knowing unless there is a way of knowing. Finally, four objections to these two claims are addressed. © 2013 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

The best strategy for getting away with lying is to lie small by only deviating from the truth as much as is necessary to achieve the intended deception. Why then do some demagogues lie big? One set of views has it that the only difference between small and big lies concerns the size of their contents. They claim that the purpose of big lies is the formation of false beliefs in their literal contents via counterfactual reasoning, conspiracy theories, or the illusory truth effect. The negative part of this paper questions these accounts. The positive part proposes a different explanation for why demagogues use big lies and argues that big lies may serve three distinct purposes for demagogues: they reinforce their supporters’ deeply held beliefs, test the loyalty of their close followers, or publicly demonstrate the demagogue’s power. For a big lie to serve these purposes, genuine belief in the lie is not required – in fact, few are likely to believe it. What matters is that the demagogue’s supporters publicly endorse the lie. We contend that they do so, either because they interpret them as motivational statements or use them to express or justify their shared emotions or convictions.

Virtue epistemology has long struggled with the “Creditability Dilemma”: how can knowledge gained through deference be creditable to the knower if it primarily depends on others’ cognitive work? We propose a novel solution by developing a telic account of doxastic deference as a distinctive kind of social-epistemic performance. On our view, such deference succeeds when a deferrer forms a true belief that p in domain d, which answers their query, on the basis of the fact that a deferee states that p because of their epistemically superior competence in d. Drawing on Sosa's framework of performance assessment, we identify a metaphysical hierarchy of increasingly creditable achievements in deferential belief-formation, from mere accurate doxastic deferral through to fully apt doxastic deferral. This hierarchy reveals that the apparent tension between individual credit and epistemic dependence rests on an ‘inverse creditability’ thesis which fails to apply in cases of deferential belief. Instead, the highest forms of deferential achievement often align with and track the cognitive achievements of those deferred to. This framework also illuminates expert identification and epistemic trespassing as problems of exercising deferential skill under suitably normal conditions.

Call knowledge where so-and-so, knowledge who so-and-so, etc., knowledge-wh. The reductive view says that knowledge-wh reduces to the two-place knowledge relation Ksp. Schaffer (2007) argues that this view has no viable response to the problem of convergent knowledge: how can a knowing-wh ascription be reduced to a Ksp ascription if a second knowing-wh ascription intuitively inequivalent to the first can be reduced to the same Ksp ascription? Instead he suggests that knowledge-wh be understood as a three-place knowledge relation Kspq, where q is a contextually salient contrast proposition. I argue firstly that once we realise that wh-questions can have more than one true answer, the reductivist has an obvious response to this problem. Secondly, I pose a revenge problem for Schaffer’s contrastivist alternative: how can a knowing-wh ascription be reduced to a Kspq ascription if a second knowing-wh ascription intuitively equivalent to the first can be reduced to a distinct Kspq ascription?

ABSTRACT What is it for a proposition p to be part of an agent’s (S) evidence? Some place a doxastic constraint such that p is part of S’s evidence if and only if S at least justifiably believes that p. That raises a problem when S is a group in that if justified group belief is under voluntary control, as some inflationists maintain, groups can ignore or fabricate evidence for illegitimate reasons, and thus conveniently avoid blame for not acting on their evidence. Based on two modified cases from Lackey (2000), this paper argues that Brown’s (2024) testimonial account of justified group belief also faces a problem about manipulation of evidence. Instead, inflationists should adopt a group-level version of Simion’s (2024) account of evidence as knowledge indicators, which merely requires that S be in a position to know p, where p increases S’s evidential probability. This wouldn’t allow groups to manufacture epistemic positions that favour their non-epistemic interests, and so inflationists can explain why attributions of blame are appropriate.

Sosa (2021) has recently presented a dichotomy between, as he puts it, the humanistic domain, in which we seek first-hand understanding of why-questions of value and normativity through our own intuitive insight, and the practical domain in which we defer to epistemic authorities for information that correctly answers utilitarian questions. However, this neat picture is too simplistic. To use Sosa’s terminology, whereas gnoseology also applies in the humanistic domain, intellectual ethics is very much equally about the practical domain. Moreover, the distinction between first- and second-hand knowledge does not coincide with any such distinction between domains of inquiry. In this paper, we first develop a virtue-theoretic account of epistemic deferral, which displays Sosa’s (2021) triple-A and triple-S structures, and reflects his different levels of telic assessment. We then show how this account not only pertains to both domains, but also explains why there is no real tension between conducting our epistemic inquiries autonomously and deferring to the epistemic authorities for knowledge that we are incapable of acquiring ourselves.

Deflationism about group knowledge is the view that a group has knowledge if and only if most of its members have that knowledge. The case against deflationism has revolved around epistemic divergence arguments, which typically aim to show that members’ knowledge isn’t necessary for group knowledge. This paper is instead devoted to objections against members’ knowledge being sufficient for group knowledge. Focusing on structured groups in which members occupy roles that are connected by internal links in a social network, we develop a notion of knowledge qua such occupancy. We proceed to argue that if deflationists adopt such knowledge-qua as what constitutes structured group knowledge, they have the resources to counter worries about the sufficiency condition. If instead groups are taken to be feature collectives, then similar worries are much less pressing. Finally, we elaborate on the societal function of knowledge-qua, as well as the different epistemic assessments that arise, depending on whether the role or its occupant is considered.

The hypothesis of extended cognition says that cognitive processes and mental states extend to include extra-organismic parts of the external world, provided certain conditions on cognitive integration are satisfied. Moreover, if knowledge is assumed to be a mental state, knowledge is, by a similar line of reasoning, equally extended. However, extended knowledge presents an additional challenge to do with cognitive bloat, given that knowledge is widely regarded as a distinctive cognitive achievement. This paper explores the idea that different types of software systems, rather than specific external devices, may serve to extend knowledge beyond our bodily boundaries, and if so whether this new hypothesis of digitally extended knowledge leads to any untoward expansion of knowledge.

Methods and Skills for Philosophy introduces students to methodologies, strategies, heuristics and formal tools which are typically employed in contemporary analytic philosophy. This helpful resource gets the reader to engage with the analytical skills required to master postgraduate studies in philosophy. In conjunction with analysing texts, reflecting on arguments and trying to solve problems, the book will help instil in students the kind of understanding, knowledge and skills they need to succeed at the postgraduate level. More specifically, students will have a better grasp of how to pose a succinct research question and then critically pursue the proposed topic by engaging with relevant literature, reflecting on philosophical presuppositions, selecting suitable argumentative strategies and defend a preferred view against objections. Topics covered include: the nature and character of arguments conceptual analysis analytical truths logic and language models of explanation and reduction strategies and dialectics rational intuitions. Methods and Skills for Philosophy: An Advanced Guide provides a comprehensive and accessible introduction to philosophical methods. It is a must-read for advanced undergraduate or postgraduate students of philosophy, and also suitable for those studying postgraduate philosophy who have a background in other academic disciplines.

A prominent question in social epistemology concerns the epistemic profile of groups. While inflationists and deflationists agree that groups are fit to constitute knowers, they disagree about whether group knowledge is reducible to knowledge of their individual members. This paper develops and defends a weak inflationist view according to which some, but not all, group knowledge is over and above any knowledge of their members. This view sits between the deflationist view that all group knowledge is reducible to individual knowledge, and the strong inflationist view that some such knowledge even fails to supervene on features of individuals. Thus, some group knowledge is irreducible, but all such knowledge is anchored in, and so doesn't float freely from, individual features.

First, a theoretical background to the volume’s topic, extended epistemology, is provided by a brief outline of its cross-disciplinary theoretical lineage and some key themes. In particular, it is shown how and why the emergence of recent and more egalitarian thinking in the cognitive sciences about the nature of human cognizing and its bounds—viz., the so-called ‘extended cognition’ program, and the related idea of an ‘extended mind’—has important and interesting ramifications in epistemology. Second, an overview is provided of the papers included as chapters in the volume. The sixteen contributions are divided into two categories: those that engage with foundational issues to do with extended epistemology, and those that pursue applications of extended epistemology to new areas of research.

Our main aim in this paper is to contribute towards a better understanding of the epistemology of absence-based inferences. Many absence-based inferences are classified as fallacies. There are exceptions, however. We investigate what features make absence-based inferences epistemically good or reliable. In Section 2 we present Sanford Goldberg’s account of the reliability of absence-based inference, introducing the central notion of epistemic coverage. In Section 3 we approach the idea of epistemic coverage through a comparison of alethic and evidential principles. The Equivalence Schema–a well-known alethic principle–says that it is true that $p$ if and only if $p$ . We take epistemic coverage to underwrite a suitably qualified evidential analogue of the Equivalence Schema: for a high proportion of values of $p$ , subject $S$ has evidence that $p$ due to her reliance on source $S^{*}$ if and only if $p$ . We show how this evidential version of the Equivalence Schema suffices for the reliability of certain absence-based inferences. Section 4 is dedicated to exploring consequences of the Evidential Equivalence Schema. The slogan ‘absence of evidence is evidence of absence’ has received a lot of bad press. More elaborately, what has received a lot of bad press is something like the following idea: absence of evidence sufficiently good to justify belief in $p$ is evidence sufficiently good to justify belief in $\sim p$ . A striking consequence of the Evidential Equivalence Schema is that absence of evidence sufficiently good to justify belief in p is evidence sufficiently good to justify belief in $\sim p$ . We establish this claim in Section 4 and show how this supports the reliability of an additional type of absence-based inference. Section 4 immediately raises the following question: how can we make philosophically good sense of the idea that absence of evidence is evidence of absence? We address this question in Section 5. Section 6 contains some summary remarks

You've just read the first sentence of this paper. Would you have read it if some butterfly in Brazil had had some extra nectar for breakfast? You probably think so. But this trivial observation apparently has very dramatic consequences. For instance, it seems to imply that you would have read that very sentence even if someone had offered you $1.000.000 not to do so. This paper is about what thus looks like a paradox in that a counterintuitive conclusion can seemingly be derived from plausible premises and assumptions. The key is to recognise that ‘you would have read the sentence if the butterfly had feasted’ admits of distinct readings: one on which it is false, which is the traditional counterfactual implying causal relevance, and another on which it is true, which we call an irrelevant semifactual. While a fully satisfactory solution would need to develop and defend a semantic analysis of such conditional sentences, our modest aim is merely to sketch how the paradox might be solved. The underpinning theoretical work is for a different paper.

Our aim is to provide a topography of the relevant philosophical terrain with regard to the possible ways in which knowledge can be conceived of as extended. We begin by charting the different types of internalist and externalist proposals within epistemology, and we critically examine the different formulations of the epistemic internalism/externalism debate they lead to. Next, we turn to the internalism/externalism distinction within philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In light of the above dividing lines, we then examine first the extent to which content externalism is compatible with epistemic externalism; second, whether active externalism entails epistemic externalism; and third whether there are varieties of epistemic externalism that are better suited to accommodate active externalism. Finally, we examine whether the combination of epistemic and cognitive externalism is necessary for epistemology and we comment on the potential ramifications of this move for social epistemology and philosophy of science.

Suppose you assert a proposition p that you falsely believe to be false with the intention to deceive your audience. The standard view has it that you lied. This paper argues against orthodoxy: deceptive lying requires that p be in actual fact false, in addition to your intention to deceive by means of untruthfully asserting that p. We proceed as follows. First, an argument is developed for such falsity condition as the non-psychological component of lying. The problem with the standard view, we profess, is exactly that lying is a purely psychological relation between disbelief, assertion, and intention. Then, by scrutinising familiar cases, we revisit the alleged intuitive support for the existence of true lies. It turns out these intuitions can be explained away once we reflect on the characteristic deceptive hallmarks that are associated with the distinction between lying and botched attempts at lying. Finally, we examine the morality of lying in the light of said falsity condition. The resultant view emphasises our moral sensitivity to the practical consequences of acts of lying, while still accommodating those moral considerations that pertain exclusively to the psychological components of lying.

A prominent question in social epistemology concerns the epistemic profile of groups. While inflationists and deflationists agree that groups are fit to constitute knowers, they disagree about whether group knowledge is reducible to knowledge of their individual members. This paper develops and defends a weak inflationist view according to which some, but not all, group knowledge is over and above any knowledge of their members. This view sits between the deflationist view that all group knowledge is reducible to individual knowledge, and the strong inflationist view that some such knowledge even fails to supervene on features of individuals. Thus, some group knowledge is irreducible, but all such knowledge is anchored in, and so doesn't float freely from, individual features.

Extended cognition theorists argue that cognitive processes constitutively depend on resources that are neither organically composed, nor located inside the bodily boundaries of the agent, provided certain conditions on the integration of those processes into the agent’s cognitive architecture are met. Epistemologists, however, worry that in so far as such cognitively integrated processes are epistemically relevant, agents could thus come to enjoy an untoward explosion of knowledge. This paper develops and defends an approach to cognitive integration—cluster-model functionalism—which finds application in both domains of inquiry, and which meets the challenge posed by putative cases of cognitive or epistemic bloat.