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20Prudence, Rules, and Regulative EpistemologyPhilosophies 8 (5): 91. 2023.Following Ballantyne, we can distinguish between descriptive and regulative epistemology. Whereas descriptive epistemology analyzes epistemic categories such as knowledge, justified belief, or evidence, regulative epistemology attempts to guide our thinking. In this paper, we argue that regulative epistemologists should focus their attention on what we call epistemic prudence. Our argument proceeds as follows: First, we lay out an objection to virtue-based regulative epistemology that is analogo…Read more
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4Subject‐Involving LuckIn Duncan Pritchard & Lee John Whittington (eds.), The Philosophy of Luck, Wiley-blackwell. 2015.In recent years, philosophers have tended to think of luck as being a relation between an event (taken in the broadest sense of the term) and a subject; to give an account of luck is to fill in the right‐hand side of the following biconditional: an event e is lucky for a subject S if and only if ——. We can call such accounts of luck subject‐relative accounts of luck, since they attempt to spell out what it is for an event to be lucky relative to a subject. This essay argues that we should unders…Read more
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The philosophy of luck and experimental philosophyIn Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck, Routledge. 2019.
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8SIEGEL, HARVEY, Education’s Epistemology: Rationality, Diversity, and Critical Thinking, Oxford University Press, New York, 2017, 304 pp (review)Anuario Filosófico 398-401. 2018.
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24Newman’s Skeptical ParadoxAmerican Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1): 105-123. 2020.John Henry Newman starts the second half of the Grammar of Assent by laying out a “paradox,” and he announces that the purpose of the following chapters of the book is to resolve it. Surprisingly, recent scholarship has tended not to question the nature of this paradox. In this paper, I argue that we should understand Newman’s paradox to be a kind of skeptical paradox that arises when we accept “Lockean rationalism.” I then show how Newman deals with the paradox. One of the upshots of this readi…Read more
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76New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism (edited book)Routledge. 2019.This is the first volume dedicated solely to the topic of epistemological disjunctivism. The original essays in this volume, written by leading and up-and-coming scholars on the topic, are divided into three thematic sections. The first set of chapters addresses the historical background of epistemological disjunctivism. It features essays on ancient epistemology, Immanuel Kant, J.L. Austin, Edmund Husserl, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The second section tackles a number contemporary issues related …Read more
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530Two Forms of Memory Knowledge and Epistemological DisjunctivismIn Casey Doyle, Joseph Milburn & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism, Routledge. 2019.In our paper, we distinguish between two forms of memory knowledge: experiential memory knowledge and stored memory knowledge. We argue that, mutatis mutandis, the case that Pritchard makes for epistemological disjunctivism regarding perceptual knowledge can be made for epistemological disjunctivism regarding experiential memory knowledge. At the same time, we argue against a disjunctivist account of stored memory knowledge.
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35Faith and Reason in the Oxford University SermonsAmerican Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3): 483-497. 2018.I argue that we can understand John Henry Newman as defending the Principle of Faith throughout the University Sermons. According to the Principle of Faith, belief in the Christian message is in itself a good act of the mind, and it has moral significance. I argue that Newman’s developed account of faith and its relation to reason in Sermons 10 through 12 are designed to defend the Principle of Faith. Finally, I argue that we can understand Newman’s defense of the Principle of Faith as a reactio…Read more
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34Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology as Religious Epistemology: A Response to BobierPhilosophia 43 (2): 427-434. 2015.In a recent paper, Christopher Bobier has argued that Duncan Pritchard’s Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology cannot account for knowledge that we have through Divine Revelation. This gives philosophers who believe that Divine Revelation can be source of knowledge reason to reject ALVE. Bobier’s arguments are specifically against ALVE, but they serve as arguments against all sorts of virtue epistemologies. In this paper then, I will critically examine Bobier’s argument, and contend that virtue epistemo…Read more
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43Subject‐Involving LuckMetaphilosophy 45 (4-5): 578-593. 2014.In recent years, philosophers have tended to think of luck as being a relation between an event and a subject; to give an account of luck is to fill in the right-hand side of the following biconditional: an event e is lucky for a subject S if and only if ____. We can call such accounts of luck subject-relative accounts of luck, since they attempt to spell out what it is for an event to be lucky relative to a subject. This essay argues that we should understand subject-relative luck as a secondar…Read more
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26Faith and Reason in the Oxford University SermonsAmerican Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3): 483-497. 2018.I argue that we can understand John Henry Newman as defending the Principle of Faith throughout the University Sermons. According to the Principle of Faith, belief in the Christian message is in itself a good act of the mind, and it has moral significance. I argue that Newman’s developed account of faith and its relation to reason in Sermons 10 through 12 are designed to defend the Principle of Faith. Finally, I argue that we can understand Newman’s defense of the Principle of Faith as a reactio…Read more
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Universidad de NavarraProfesor Visitante
Pamplona, Navarra, Spain
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Religion |