John Fisher

THIS PAPER ATTEMPTS TO PROVIDE A SYSTEMATIC CHARACTERIZATION OF THE UNDERSTANDING PRESUPPOSED BY PROPOSITIONAL KNOWLEDGE. BEGINNING WITH THE HYPOTHESIS THAT THE UNDERSTANDING UNDERLYING KNOWLEDGE IS LINGUISTIC IN NATURE, A HYPOTHESIS I CALL "LT," I STATE AND CRITICIZE DANTO'S VERSION OF LT, WHICH ANALYZES THIS UNDERSTANDING AS THE UNDERSTANDING OF SENTENCES. I SHOW THAT HIS (INTELLECTUALIZED) VIEW OF WHAT IT IS TO UNDERSTAND LANGUAGE IS INCORRECT. BY DISTINGUISHING A COMPETENCE FROM A PERFORMANCE SENSE OF "UNDERSTANDS "S"," AND BY NOTING THAT LANGUAGE FORMS A SYSTEM, I SHOW THAT WE MUST REPLACE SENTENCE UNDERSTANDING WITH KNOWLEDGE OF RULES OF LANGUAGE

Searle's Chinese Room argument is a general argument that proves that machines do not have mental states in virtue of their programming. I claim that the argument expresses powerful but mistaken intuitions about understanding and the first person point of view. A distinction is drawn between a competence sense and a performance sense of ‘understanding texts’. It is argued that the Chinese Room intuition looks for a special experience (performance) of comprehension, whereas artificial intelligence is attempting to explain the knowledge (competence) required to understand texts. Moreover, a dilemma is sketched for the argument: either Searle hasn't identified the appropriate subject of understanding or he may understand after all. Finally, I question the underlying assumption that the general definition of mental states requires a projectable‐by‐us first person point of view.

I define "perfect realism" as a style of replicative sculpture: exact replicas of inanimate objects or humans. Differentiating perfect realism from "photo" or "super" realism, and from representation, I criticize various defenses of this type of art. I argue that to understand perfect realism we need a theory of replication, which I sketch. Part of the account involves X (a replica) causing the perceptual experience that it is a Y when it is not. Hence perfect realism turns on the generic identities of things; it involves a metaphysical exploration of the way we constitute everyday reality

Searle's Chinese Room argument is a general argument that proves that machines do not have mental states in virtue of their programming. I claim that the argument expresses powerful but mistaken intuitions about understanding and the first person point of view. A distinction is drawn between a competence sense and a performance sense of ‘understanding texts’. It is argued that the Chinese Room intuition looks for a special experience (performance) of comprehension, whereas artificial intelligence is attempting to explain the knowledge (competence) required to understand texts. Moreover, a dilemma is sketched for the argument: either Searle hasn't identified the appropriate subject of understanding or he may understand after all. Finally, I question the underlying assumption that the general definition of mental states requires a projectable‐by‐us first person point of view.

It is difficult to place jazz within a philosophy of music dominated by the concepts and practices of classical music. One key puzzle concerns the nature and role, if any, of musical works in jazz. I briefly describe the debate between those who deny that there are musical works in jazz (Kania) and those who affirm that there are such (Dodd and others). I argue that musical works are performed in jazz but that jazz performance of works is very different from performance of classical music works. The first step toward resolving the puzzle is to embrace the descriptive concept of a musical work and reject inappropriate normative concepts of a musical work. In particular, I argue against the accounts of musical works by Kania and Goehr, each of which implies a no-works thesis for jazz performance. I contrast the norms governing work performance in classical music with the practices governing performances of works in jazz, which I call realization or staging. Finally, I propose a model of jazz appreciation that incorporates a role for jazz works and that differs from the appreciation of classical music.