• Virtue epistemology
    with John Turri
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2017.
    This entry introduces many of the most important results of the contemporary Virtue epistemology (hereafter 'VE') research program. These include novel attempts to resolve longstanding disputes, solve perennial problems, grapple with novel challenges, and expand epistemology’s horizons. In the process, it reveals the diversity within VE. Beyond sharing the two unifying commitments mentioned above, its practitioners diverge over the nature of intellectual virtues, which questions to ask, and whic…Read more
  • Introduction to Virtue Epistemology
    with John Turri
    In John Greco & John Turri (eds.), Virtue epistemology: contemporary readings, Mit Press. 2012.
    Virtue epistemology is by now a broad and varied field. Also by now, there are various helpful overviews of the field available, some of which are included in this volume (see especially Battaly 2008 and Baehr 2008).1 This introduction will not provide another. Rather, we will begin with a brief characterization of what virtue epistemology is (Section 1), and then briefly describe some of the topics that are treated in this volume (Section 2). Some of these are topics that have occupied ep…Read more
  • The Transmission of Knowledge
    Cambridge University Press. 2020.
    How do we transmit or distribute knowledge, as distinct from generating or producing it? In this book John Greco examines the interpersonal relations and social structures which enable and inhibit the sharing of knowledge within and across epistemic communities. Drawing on resources from moral theory, the philosophy of language, action theory and the cognitive sciences, he considers the role of interpersonal trust in transmitting knowledge, and argues that sharing knowledge involves a kind of sh…Read more
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    The Price of Doubt
    Mind 111 (441): 149-152. 2002.
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    Sense and Certainty
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (3): 689-693. 1991.
  • The Social Value of Reflection
    In Luca Tateo & Waldomiro Silva-Filho (eds.), Thinking About Oneself, Springer Verlag. 2019.
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    Common Knowledge
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3): 309-325. 2016.
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    I defend two theses here. First, I argue that at least many of the commitments that Wittgenstein identifies as “hinge commitments” are plausibly what cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence call “procedural knowledge.” Procedural knowledge can be implemented in cognitive systems in a variety of ways, and these modes of implementation, I argue, predict several properties of Wittgensteinian hinge commitments, including their functional profile, as well as other of their characteristic fea…Read more
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    The transmission of knowledge and garbage
    Synthese 1-12. forthcoming.
    Almost everyone will grant that knowledge is often transmitted through testimony. Indeed, to deny this would be to accept a broad-ranging skepticism. Here is a problem: Knowledge seems to be transmitted right along side lots of garbage. That is, besides transmitting genuine knowledge, we manage to transmit lots of beliefs that are irrational, superstitious, self-deceiving, and flat out false. So how is that possible? How is it that the very same channels manage to transmit both knowledge and gar…Read more
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    Epistemologia Pós-Gettier
    Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 60 (3): 421-437. 2015.
    Neste ensaio, argumenta-se que as diferenças entre a epistemologia da era Gettier e a epistemologia pós-Gettier podem ser amplamente reduzidas a diferenças em metodologia. Faremos uma “reconstrução racional” do modo como fazíamos as coisas então, do modo como fazemos agora e de quais considerações nos levaram a fazer as coisas de modo diferente. Em resumo, durante a era Gettier a metodologia da epistemologia era basicamente o que Chisholm chamou de “particularismo” e Rawls chamou de “o método do…Read more
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    Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches (edited book)
    with Christoph Kelp
    Cambridge University Press. 2020.
    Virtue epistemology is one of the most flourishing research programmes in contemporary epistemology. Its defining thesis is that properties of agents and groups are the primary focus of epistemic theorising. Within virtue epistemology two key strands can be distinguished: virtue reliabilism, which focuses on agent properties that are strongly truth-conducive, such as perceptual and inferential abilities of agents; and virtue responsibilism, which focuses on intellectual virtues in the sense of c…Read more
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    Transmitting Faith
    European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (3): 85. 2018.
    Part One of the paper argues against evidentialism and individualism in religious epistemology, and in favor of a “social turn” in the field. The idea here is that human belief in general, and religious belief in particular, is largely characterized by epistemic dependence on other persons. An adequate epistemology, it is agued, ought to recognize and account for social epistemic dependence. Part Two considers a problem that becomes salient when we make such a turn. In short, how are we to under…Read more
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    Correction to: Safety in Sosa
    Synthese 1-1. forthcoming.
    Shortly after the publication of this paper, I had the opportunity to discuss related issues with Thomas Grundmann, who convinced me that the final section contains a demonstrable mistake.
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    Safety in Sosa
    Synthese 1-11. forthcoming.
    What is the relationship between virtue and safety? This paper argues that Sosa’s positions in A Virtue Epistemology and in Judgment and Agency regarding this question are, despite appearances to the contrary, in fact consistent. Moreover, Sosa’s position there is well motivated—his Virtue Epistemology explains why knowledge should require apt belief, and why aptness should imply safety. Finally, the paper shows how two kinds of safety are importantly related to Sosa’s response to the Pyrrhonian…Read more
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    The Force of Hume’s Skepticism About Unobserved Matters of Fact
    Journal of Philosophical Research 23 289-306. 1998.
    According to a popular objection, Hume assumes that only deductive inferences can generate knowledge and reasonable belief, and so Hume’s skepticism can be avoided by simply recognizing the role of inductive inferences in empirical matters. This paper offers an interpretation of Hume’s skepticism that avoids this objection. The resulting skeptical argument is a powerful one in the following sense: it is not at all obvious where the argument goes wrong, and responding to the argument forces us to…Read more
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    Reid’s Critique of Berkeley and Hume: What’s the Big Idea?
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2): 279-296. 1995.
    Reid thought that the linchpin of his response to\nskepticism was his rejection of the theory of ideas. I\nargue that Reid's assessment of his own work is incorrect;\nthe theory of ideas plays no important role in at least one\nof Berkeley's and Hume's arguments for skepticism, and\nrejecting the theory is therefore neither necessary nor\nsufficient as a reply to that argument. Reid does in fact\nanswer the argument, but with his theory of evidence rather\nthan his rejection of the theory of ide…Read more
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    Two Kinds of Intellectual Virtue (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1): 179. 2000.
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    Modern Ontology and the Problems of Epistemology
    American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (3). 1995.
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    Escepticismo y géneros epistémicos: comentarios sobre Christopher Hookway
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 19 (3): 183-193. 2000.
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    Epistemic Value
    Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2018.
    Epistemic value is a kind of value possessed by knowledge, and perhaps other epistemic goods such as justification and understanding. The problem of explaining the value of knowledge is perennial in philosophy, going back at least as far as Plato’s Meno. One formulation of the problem is to explain why and in what sense knowledge is valuable. Another version of the problem is to explain why and in what sense knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief or opinion. This article looks at vario…Read more
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    [From SEP]: Contemporary virtue epistemology (hereafter ‘VE’) is a diverse collection of approaches to epistemology. At least two central tendencies are discernible among the approaches. First, they view epistemology as a normative discipline. Second, they view intellectual agents and communities as the primary focus of epistemic evaluation, with a focus on the intellectual virtues and vices embodied in and expressed by these agents and communities. This entry introduces many of the most impor…Read more
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    Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemic Angst
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (1): 51-61. 2018.
    _ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 1, pp 51 - 61 _Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of our Believing_. By Duncan Pritchard. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016. Pp. xv + 239. ISBN 978-0-691-16723-7.
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    Further Thoughts on Agent Reliabilism: Replies to Cohen, Geivett, Kvanvig, and Schmitt and Lahroodi
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2): 466-480. 2003.
    This paper replies to various concerns raised in a symposium on Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry.
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    Introduction
    Res Philosophica 93 (3): 507-507. 2016.
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    Perception as Interpretation
    Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 72 229-237. 1998.
  • The Foundationalism-Coherentism Debate in Epistemology
    Dissertation, Brown University. 1989.
    The central concern of the dissertation is the debate in epistemology between foundationalism and coherentism. However, my working assumption is that progress in this debate can be made only after an extended investigation into epistemic justification and its relation to knowledge. ;My strategy is to defend a picture of knowledge in which two kinds of virtue are required. First, in order for p to be knowledge for S, S must be justified in believing p in the sense that S's believing p is epistemi…Read more
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    Murray Murphey's Work and C. I. Lewis's Epistemology: Problems with Realism and the Context of Logical Positivism
    with John Corcoran, Stephen F. Barker, Eric Dayton, Naomi Zack, Richard S. Robin, Joel Isaac, and Murray G. Murphey
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (1): 1-77. 2006.