•  320
    This foreword serves as a gateway to the group of papers on the BAL-looping framework. It is written entirely outside the framework’s vocabulary – without technical terms such as neuronal proxies, PTD, looping, and so on – and covers four things: 1) First, for readers not familiar with the philosophy of mind, it explains the gist of what is meant by “subjective experience.” This down-to-earth explanation may also be useful to readers familiar with philosophy of mind, but who may have drifted awa…Read more
  •  634
    What if Hylas and Philonous had known about the BAL-looping functional framework when George Berkeley set forth their famous Three Dialogues? This hypothetical Fourth Dialogue presents what they might have said from this new point of view. When the place of conscious perception in brain function is shifted from input to output, they happily find that they can finally agree. What seemed like irreconcilable differences – between the idealist and materialist views – vanish once they isolate a confu…Read more
  •  862
    This glossary introduces key terms from the BAL-looping framework, explained in detail in Seven Dialogs between Haplous and Synergos. According to this functional framework, every mode of subjective experience begins when the brain learns to attend to the natural resonance created by incipient activity in its own speech output channel. This is a special case of what neuroscientists call neural reuse; in this framework, it is defined as BAL-looping. Grounded in evolutionary theory, the BAL-loopin…Read more
  •  1494
    This book-length series of dialogues presents a functional model of consciousness called the BAL-looping framework, which accounts for all forms of subjective experience – including recollection, imagination, and conscious perception. The model begins with a basic principle: any functioning brain, even a nonhuman animal brain, must build an internal model of its environment, using internal stand-ins called neuronal proxies to represent things in the world and guide goal-directed behavior. In hu…Read more
  •  935
    Philosophical accounts of concept mastery often wrestle with how to draw a meaningful line between deep understanding and mere competence – or worse, a kind of linguistic mimicry grounded in social deference (cf. Burge 1979). While externalist approaches have illuminated important dynamics of linguistic and communal coordination, they may leave underexamined the internal, functional state of the individual mind, a gap Rabin (2018) exposes by showing that mastery is not reducible to belief, infer…Read more
  •  1148
    This paper offers a functional reframing of split-brain phenomena – but not one developed for that purpose. The framework described here was originally constructed to explain core features of brain function: perception, imagination, planning, internal modeling, and subjective access. Only once the model was complete did it become clear that it also accounted – with striking precision – for the puzzling dissociations observed after callosotomy. That unplanned alignment lends weight to the structu…Read more