John Taylor

Open peer commentary on the target article “How and Why the Brain Lays the Foundations for a Conscious Self” by Martin V. Butz. Excerpt: This paper is full of stimulating and creative ideas. It posits that an anticipatory drive is what guides the development in the brain of a set of internal motor models, specifically a set of inverse and forward models. Through these models becoming increasingly complex, a conscious self develops. This is a simple and important thesis, if true. But is it? As my title suggests, it may be so for sportsmen, with their emphasis on ever more refined motor responses. However, those of a more cerebral nature may find themselves burdened by all those coupled internal motor models and not able to think as clearly as they would like. This is not to say that prediction isn’t a useful property to possess, both for finance (especially now) and in one’s general living patterns. But the question I wish to consider is: What sort of predictive model can lead to thinking?

A discussion is given as to the possibility of creating machines which have more powerful consciousnesses than our own. The approach employs, in particular, a brain-based model of human consciousness. From that model a general discussion is developed of the need for a unique central control system in any machine to enable it to be efficient in decision-making. The resulting features of the machine’s consciousness, as the highest order controller, is seen to need to be similar to our own. We conclude that beyond consciousness very likely lies only similar consciousnesses.

There is presently an ongoing debate about the relation between attention and consciousness, fuelled by results from paradigms which probe the interaction between these two faculties, such as the attentional blink, object substitution masking and change blindness. Simulations of these paradigms were shown recently to be able to provide an explanation of them from a single overarching control model of attention. This model furthermore allows exploration of how consciousness might be created as a copy of the attention movement control signal, and indicates the complex possibilities inherent in attention. The paper develops this theme and presents a set of questions and their possible answers arising from the need for the existence of a set of inner selves associated with different attention copy signals in different modalities to provide a unified phenomenological experience. The paper concludes with a set of comments on the Hilbert questions of the Special Issue

This article is an evocatively written account of Bernard Baars’ latest ideas about the Global Workspace approach to consciousness, one he pioneered in his important book on the topic in 1988. He writes fluently and brings strong images to mind, especially with the metaphor of the ‘Working Theatre’. As with everything he writes, I enjoyed reading it. It is strong and heady stuff. When I finished I sat back and attempted to assess the claim that the best answer today with which to understand the present evidence about consciousness is a ‘global workspace architecture’, especially along the lines of the Global Workspace of Baars

The functioning of the pre-reflective or inner self is considered in terms of its possible creation through the recently proposed CODAM 'attention copy' model of attention. In contradiction to the view of Western phenomenology that the inner self appears to serve no specific purpose except that of the ownership of experience, it is proposed here that the inner self acts rather as a call centre, enabling connections to be made between distant and functionally different components of brain processing. Even more importantly it functions by monitoring and speeding up ongoing calls or those about to be set up so that incorrect call routing is avoided and call switching occurs as fast as possible. The relations of such an approach to some recent and influential approaches to consciousness are described

This paper will analyse some aspects of Papineau's critique of current consciousness research. I focus on his claims about the status of verbal reports in consciousness research and on his 'methodological meltdown' argument. Papineau hopes to use these arguments to show that consciousness research will never be able to identify the neural correlates of consciousness. As such Papineau hopes to stymie the most prominent research project in current consciousness science. I hope to defend consciousness science from his critique. §1 will outline his position and the general reasons he gives for his critique. §2 will motivate concern with this critique and situate it within a wider literature. §3 will point out some errors Papineau makes in assessing the methodology of consciousness research. §4 will give the argument that Papineau takes to be most radical in his critique. Here I will dismiss the reason Papineau presents to explain why some people may think his argument is wrong. In §5 I will point out one problem with Papineau's argument, in that I think it rests upon an equivocation. §6 will point out another problem, which is that Papineau helps himself to an unjustified inference. §7 will summarize what I take myself to have shown.

The "relational mind" approach to the inner content of consciousness is developed in terms of various control structures and processing strategies and their possible neurobiological identifications in brain sites. This leads naturally to a division of consciousness into a passive and an active part. A global control structure for the "single strand" aspect of consciousness is proposed as the thalamo-nucleus reticularis thalami-cortex coupled system, which is related to experimental data on the electrical stimulation of awareness. Local control, in terms of excitatory transfer from pre-processing sites to posterior working memory regions, is supported by data on subliminal perception timing and disambiguation of poorly defined percepts. The inner content of consciousness is understood as arising from the resulting relational features between inputs and stored pre-processing and episodic memories. Strong analogies are drawn between emergent properties of the model and suggested properties of "raw feels", supporting the thesis that working memories are the initial sites for the emergence of phenomenal awareness, and the frontal lobes for its further adumbration in terms of higher cognitive processing, including the creation of self

The relation between mind and matter is considered in terms of recent ideas from both phenomenology and brain science. Phenomenology is used to give clues to help bridge the brain-mind gap by providing constraints on any underlying neural architecture suggested from brain science. A tentative reduction of mind to matter is suggested and used to explain various features of phenomenological experience and of ownership of conscious experience. The crucial mechanism is the extended duration of the corollary discharge of attention movement, with its gating of activity for related content. Aspects of experience considered in terms of the model are the discontinuous nature of consciousness, immunity to error through misidentification, and the state of 'pure' consciousness as experienced through meditation. Corollary discharge of attention movement is proposed as the key idea bringing together basic features of meditation, consciousness and neuroscience, and helping to bridge the gap between mind and matter

This paper explores a remarkable convergence of ideas and evidence, previously presented in separate places by its authors. That convergence has now become so persuasive that we believe we are working within substantially the same broad framework. Taylor's mathematical papers on neuronal systems involved in consciousness dovetail well with work by Newman and Baars on the thalamocortical system, suggesting a brain mechanism much like the global workspace architecture developed by Baars (see references below). This architecture is relational, in the sense that it continuously mediates the interaction of input with memory. While our approaches overlap in a number of ways, each of us tends to focus on different areas of detail. What is most striking, and we believe significant, is the extent of consensus, which we believe to be consistent with other contemporary approaches by Weiskrantz, Gray, Crick and Koch, Edelman, Gazzaniga, Newell and colleagues, Posner, Baddeley, and a number of others. We suggest that cognitive neuroscience is moving toward a shared understanding of consciousness in the brain.

There are now various approaches to understand where and how in the brain consciousness arises from neural activity, none of which is universally accepted. Difficulties among these approaches are reviewed, and a missing ingredient is proposed here to help adjudicate between them, that of ''perspectivalness.'' In addition to a suitable temporal duration and information content of the relevant bound brain activity, this extra component is posited as being a further important ingredient for the creation of consciousness from neural activity. It guides the development of what is termed the ''Central Representation,'' which is supposed to be present in all mammals and extended in humans to support self-consciousness as well as phenomenal consciousness. Experimental evidence and a theoretical framework for the existence of the central representation are presented, which relates the extra component to specific buffer working memory sites in the inferior parietal lobes, acting as attentional coordinators on the spatial maps making up the central representation. The article closes with a discussion of various open questions.

The ontology of ‘powerful qualities’ is gaining an increasing amount of attention in the literature on properties. This is the view that the so-called categorical or qualitative properties are identical with ‘dispositional’ properties. The position is associated with C.B. Martin, John Heil, Galen Strawson and Jonathan Jacobs. Robert Schroer ( 2012 ) has recently mounted a number of criticisms against the powerful qualities view as conceived by these main adherents, and has also advanced his own (radically different) version of the view. In this paper I have three main aims: firstly, I shall defend the ontology from his critique, arguing that his criticisms do not damage the position. Secondly, I shall argue that Schroer’s own version of the view is untenable. Thirdly, the paper shall serve to clear up some conceptual confusions that often bedevil the powerful qualities view