•  4
    Colours: Their Nature and Representation
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1): 143-148. 1995. xv + 247 p.
  •  1
    Life and Death (edited book)
    Hackett Publishing Company. 1993.
    _Life and Death_ brings together philosophical and literary works representing the many ways--metaphysical, scientific, analytic, phenomenological, literary--in which philosophers and others have reflected on questions about life and death.
  • Book Reviews (review)
    Mind 97 (385): 133-134. 1988.
  •  5
    Book Reviews (review)
    Mind 99 (395): 473-474. 1990.
  •  19
    Letters to the Editor
    with Laurence Hitterdale, Steven M. Cahn, Marcus Verhaegh, Christopher W. Stevens, Tibor R. Machan, and Steven Yates
    Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 75 (5). 2002.
  •  15
    Universals and Creativity
    Philosophy 65 (253). 1990.
    There are many problems of universals, at least the four distinguished by Jenny Teichmann. Consider her second one. ‘How can we form a general term when we are faced with easily distinguishable, widely differing examples?’ The term ‘blue’, for example, covers a wide range of—well, what does it cover a wide range of? A wide range of the colour blue? This is nonsense. What it covers is a wide range of blues —shades of blue. But we do not form a general term when faced with or referring to these it…Read more
  •  17
    On Value and Value: A Reply to Quentin Smith
    with Christopher Cherry
    Philosophy 66 (258). 1991.
  •  89
    Is Life Absurd?
    with Christopher Cherry
    Philosophy 65 (252). 1990.
    Thomas Nagel believes, with some existentialists, that life is absurd. We shall criticize his belief, as well as the anodyne he offers
  •  21
    Reply to Gilbert
    Mind 97 (388): 603-604. 1988.
  • Leibniz and the Problem of Induction
    Studia Leibnitiana 21 (n/a): 174-187. 1989.
    Das „Problem der Induktion", dessen Formulierung man gewöhnlich David Hume zuschreibt, hat Leibniz schon am Anfang des 18. Jahrhunderts formuliert und gelöst. Die Methode von Leibniz war sowohl „Hume-isch" als auch rationalistisch. Sie begreift in sich eine Herabsetzung des Empirischen und auch den Gebrauch der „Geheimkräfte", die Hume ausschalten wollte. Ohne solche „Geheimkräfte" gibt es keine Harmonie im klassischen Sinn von Leibniz . Für Leibniz ist eine Hypothese vorzuziehen, die eine Harmo…Read more
  •  45
    Dans la première méditation, Descartes a conclu, en regard des songes, « qu'il n'y a point d'indices concluants, ni de marques assez certaines par où l'on puisse distinguer nettement la veille d'avec la sommeil [...] » . À la fin de la sixième méditation, il a conclu qu'il y a de tels indices, mais qu'on a besoin de la garantie de Dieu pour savoir si ces indices sont réellement des indices de la veille. Cottingham a proposé une objection générale contre tels indices de la veille: On peut rêver c…Read more
  •  24
    Review. Colours: their nature and representation. Barry Maund (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1): 143-148. 1997.
  •  18
    Certainty (edited book)
    Hackett Pub. Co.. 1995.
    "The selections are well chosen... the Introduction and headnotes are extremely clear and well written... appropriately pegged for a very introductory audience." --Steven Gerrard, Williams College
  • Reality (edited book)
    with Carl Levenson
    Hackett Pub. Co.. 1994.
    _Reality_ brings together philosophical and literary works representing the many ways--metaphysical, scientific, analytic, phenomenological, literary--in which philosophers and others have reflected on questions about reality.
  •  75
    Silhouettes are Shadows
    Acta Analytica 26 (2): 187-197. 2011.
    Sorensen’s celebrated problem about the eclipse of Near and Far is given a solution in which what is seen is Far, silhouetted. Near cannot be seen, as it is in the shadow of Far. A silhouette is a shadow. The so–called Yale Puzzle is a linguistic confusion
  •  17
    My Body," "My X," and "I
    American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (3). 2008.
    None
  •  19
    Review. Colours: their nature and representation. Barry Maund
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1): 143-148. 1997.
  •  102
    Conflicting appearances, necessity and the irreducibility of propositions about colours
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (2): 219-235. 2005.
    Parts I and II of 'Conflicting Appearances, Necessity and the Irreducibility of Propositions about Colours' review the argument from 'conflicting appearances' for the view that nothing has any one colour. I take further a well-known criticism of the argument made by Austin and Burnyeat. In Part III I undertake the task of positive construction, offering a theory of what it is that all things coloured a particular colour have in common. I end, in Part IV, by arguing that the resulting 'colour phe…Read more
  •  22
    Colours: Their Nature and Representation
    with Barry Maund
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1): 143-150. 1995. xv + 247 p.
    The world as we experience it is full of colour. This book defends the radical thesis that no physical object has any of the colours we experience it as having. The author provides a unified account of colour that shows why we experience the illusion and why the illusion is not to be dispelled but welcomed. He develops a pluralist framework of colour-concepts in which other, more sophisticated concepts of colour are introduced to supplement the simple concept that is presupposed in our ordinary …Read more
  •  14
    Time (edited book)
    Hackett Pub. Co.. 1993.
    This book contains more than 20 texts plus suggested further readings.
  •  13
    On Value and value: A Reply to Quentin Smith: Discussion
    Philosophy 66 (258): 525-526. 1991.
    In ‘Concerning the Absurdity of Life’ Quentin Smith accuses us of contradicting ourselves in our argument against Thomas Nagel. On the one hand we said that Mozart's Piano Concerto No. 23 is not ‘insignificant’ compared with cosmic radiation. On the other we said that the life of a man of integrity or humanity could be lived without a formal claim to Value, so that there was nothing for Nagel's external perspective to negate. But where is the contradiction? We put ‘emotional value’, used of Moza…Read more