•  102
    Conflicting appearances, necessity and the irreducibility of propositions about colours
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (2): 219-235. 2005.
    Parts I and II of 'Conflicting Appearances, Necessity and the Irreducibility of Propositions about Colours' review the argument from 'conflicting appearances' for the view that nothing has any one colour. I take further a well-known criticism of the argument made by Austin and Burnyeat. In Part III I undertake the task of positive construction, offering a theory of what it is that all things coloured a particular colour have in common. I end, in Part IV, by arguing that the resulting 'colour phe…Read more
  •  89
    Is Life Absurd?
    with Christopher Cherry
    Philosophy 65 (252). 1990.
    Thomas Nagel believes, with some existentialists, that life is absurd. We shall criticize his belief, as well as the anodyne he offers
  •  75
    Silhouettes are Shadows
    Acta Analytica 26 (2): 187-197. 2011.
    Sorensen’s celebrated problem about the eclipse of Near and Far is given a solution in which what is seen is Far, silhouetted. Near cannot be seen, as it is in the shadow of Far. A silhouette is a shadow. The so–called Yale Puzzle is a linguistic confusion
  •  59
    _Philosophical Propositions_ is a fresh, up to date, and reliable introduction to philosophical problems. It takes seriously the need for philosophy to deal with definitive and statable propositions, such as God, certainty, time, personal identity, the mind/body problem, free will and determinism, and the meaning of life
  •  54
    Colour: Physical or phenomenal?
    Philosophy 73 (284): 301-304. 1998.
    We wish to defend Jonathan Westphal's view that colour is complex against a recent ‘phenomenological’ criticism of Eric Rubenstein. There is often thought to be a conflict between two kinds of determinants of colour, physical and phenomenal. On the one hand there are the complex physical facts about colour, such as the determination of a surface colour by an absorption spectrum. There is also, however, the fact that the apparently simple phenomenological quality of what is seen is a function of …Read more
  •  46
    Mind 98 (October): 585-9. 1989.
  •  45
    Dans la première méditation, Descartes a conclu, en regard des songes, « qu'il n'y a point d'indices concluants, ni de marques assez certaines par où l'on puisse distinguer nettement la veille d'avec la sommeil [...] » . À la fin de la sixième méditation, il a conclu qu'il y a de tels indices, mais qu'on a besoin de la garantie de Dieu pour savoir si ces indices sont réellement des indices de la veille. Cottingham a proposé une objection générale contre tels indices de la veille: On peut rêver c…Read more
  •  30
    Sources of Error in the Metaphysics of Time
    Philosophical Investigations 19 (2): 131-139. 1996.
  •  24
    Review. Colours: their nature and representation. Barry Maund (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1): 143-148. 1997.
  •  23
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 25 (4). 1982.
    In Remarks on Colour Wittgenstein discusses a number of puzzling propositions about brown, e.g. that it cannot be pure and that there cannot be a brown light. He does not actually answer the questions he asks, and the status of his projected ?logic of colour concepts? remains unclear. I offer a real definition of brown from which the puzzle propositions follow logically. It is based on two experiments from Helmholtz. Brown is shown to be logically complex in the sense that the concept of brown c…Read more
  •  22
    Colours: Their Nature and Representation
    with Barry Maund
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1): 143-150. 1995. xv + 247 p.
    The world as we experience it is full of colour. This book defends the radical thesis that no physical object has any of the colours we experience it as having. The author provides a unified account of colour that shows why we experience the illusion and why the illusion is not to be dispelled but welcomed. He develops a pluralist framework of colour-concepts in which other, more sophisticated concepts of colour are introduced to supplement the simple concept that is presupposed in our ordinary …Read more
  •  21
    Reply to Gilbert
    Mind 97 (388): 603-604. 1988.
  •  19
    Review. Colours: their nature and representation. Barry Maund
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1): 143-148. 1997.
  •  19
    Letters to the Editor
    with Laurence Hitterdale, Steven M. Cahn, Marcus Verhaegh, Christopher W. Stevens, Tibor R. Machan, and Steven Yates
    Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 75 (5). 2002.
  •  18
    Certainty (edited book)
    Hackett Pub. Co.. 1995.
    "The selections are well chosen... the Introduction and headnotes are extremely clear and well written... appropriately pegged for a very introductory audience." --Steven Gerrard, Williams College
  •  18
    The complexity of quality
    Philosophy 59 (230): 457-71. 1984.
    Many philosophers have believed that colours and the other qualia ofexperience are simples and that colour terms are unanalysable. Colour termsare unanalysable because colours are simples, colours are known to be simple because colour terms are unanalysable. I shall try to show that things are not as simple as this. Nothing in the paper will depend on the general Wittgensteinian thesis of the relativity of simplicity. The thought I shallpursue is the more specific one that the philosophers who h…Read more
  •  17
    My Body," "My X," and "I
    American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (3). 2008.
  •  17
    On Value and Value: A Reply to Quentin Smith
    with Christopher Cherry
    Philosophy 66 (258). 1991.
  •  16
    How can the logic of colour concepts apply to aferimage colours?
    In Jonathan D. Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science, Mit Press. pp. 245. 2010.
    This chapter focuses on the incompatibility of afterimage colors. Several quasilogical, semantic, and metaphysical questions having to do with incompatibility come up in color theory, and the problem is so complicated and fragile that it is argued here that, despite some marvelous work on the topic, the problem remains to be sorted out. Every naive subject who encounters afterimages without prejudice has agreed that they have color; this is mentioned here because it is the initial and also the c…Read more
  •  15
    Universals and Creativity
    Philosophy 65 (253). 1990.
    There are many problems of universals, at least the four distinguished by Jenny Teichmann. Consider her second one. ‘How can we form a general term when we are faced with easily distinguishable, widely differing examples?’ The term ‘blue’, for example, covers a wide range of—well, what does it cover a wide range of? A wide range of the colour blue? This is nonsense. What it covers is a wide range of blues —shades of blue. But we do not form a general term when faced with or referring to these it…Read more
  •  15
    Leibniz and the Problem of Other Minds
    Studia Leibnitiana 33 (2). 2001.
    Robert McRae vertritt in seinem Artikel „As Though Only God and It Existed in the World“ die Ansicht, Leibniz habe seine Meinung darüber geändert, ob und wie wir wissen können, dass es ‚andere‛ gibt und dass sie Bewusstsein haben. Ich vertrete dagegen hier in meinem Aufsatz die Auffassung, dass man die relevanten Texte falsch interpretiert und weder der Stärke noch der Komplexität des Leibniz'sehen ‚Indifferenzarguments‛ gerecht wird
  •  14
    Time (edited book)
    Hackett Pub. Co.. 1993.
    This book contains more than 20 texts plus suggested further readings.
  •  13
    On Value and value: A Reply to Quentin Smith: Discussion
    Philosophy 66 (258): 525-526. 1991.
    In ‘Concerning the Absurdity of Life’ Quentin Smith accuses us of contradicting ourselves in our argument against Thomas Nagel. On the one hand we said that Mozart's Piano Concerto No. 23 is not ‘insignificant’ compared with cosmic radiation. On the other we said that the life of a man of integrity or humanity could be lived without a formal claim to Value, so that there was nothing for Nagel's external perspective to negate. But where is the contradiction? We put ‘emotional value’, used of Moza…Read more