•  1369
    Historical Judgement: The Limits of Historiographical Choice
    Mcgill-Queen's University Press. 2007.
    The historical profession is not noted for examining its own methodologies. Indeed, most historians are averse to historical theory. In "Historical Judgement" Jonathan Gorman's response to this state of affairs is to argue that if we want to characterize a discipline, we need to look to persons who successfully occupy the role of being practitioners of that discipline. So to model historiography we must do so from the views of historians. Gorman begins by showing what it is to model a discipline…Read more
  •  148
    The grammar of historiography
    Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 3 45-53. 2010.
  •  68
    Law as a moral idea • by Nigel Simmonds
    Analysis 69 (2): 395-397. 2009.
    This is a pugnacious book, born of ancient controversy and attempting to return the debate to a time before the central jurisprudential questions were set by Hart and other legal positivists. Simmonds addresses those familiar with current analytical philosophy of law: those of us who know our Hart, Fuller, Dworkin, Raz, MacCormick and Kramer, and who perhaps need to have our attention drawn to Plato, Aristotle, Grotius, Hobbes and Kant. Presuming an informed readership, there is no bibliography,…Read more
  •  49
    Objectivity and truth in history
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 17 (1-4). 1974.
    Examples of historical writing are analysed in detail, and it is demonstrated that, with respect to the statements which appear in historical accounts, their truth and value-freedom are neither necessary nor sufficient for the relative acceptability of historical accounts. What is both necessary and sufficient is the acceptability of the selection of statements involved, and it is shown that history can be objective only if the acceptability of selection can be made on the basis of a rational cr…Read more
  •  38
    Justice and Toleration
    The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 11 43-50. 2001.
    Are there independent standards of justice by which we are to measure our activities, or is justice itself to be understood in relativistic terms that vary with locality or historical period? I wish to examine briefly how far two inconsistent positions can both be accepted. I suggest that perhaps our ordinary understanding of reality itself—and in particular political reality—is essentially the outcome of a time of contest, and that there are areas of political reality where matters may be best …Read more
  •  30
    Historians and Their Duties
    History and Theory 43 (4): 103-117. 2004.
    We need to specify what ethical responsibility historians, as historians, owe, and to whom. We should distinguish between natural duties and obligations, and recognize that historians' ethical responsibility is of the latter kind. We can discover this responsibility by using the concept of “accountability”. Historical knowledge is central. Historians' central ethical responsibility is that they ought to tell the objective truth. This is not a duty shared with everybody, for the right to truth va…Read more
  •  28
    Some astonishing things
    Metaphilosophy 22 (1-2): 28-40. 1991.
  •  23
    In "Rights and Reason", Jonathan Gorman sets discussion of the 'rights debate' within a wide-ranging philosophical and historical framework. Drawing on positions in epistemology, metaphysics and the theory of human nature as well as on the ideas of canonical thinkers, Gorman provides an introduction to the philosophy of rights that is firmly grounded in the history of philosophy as well as the concerns of contemporary political and legal philosophy. The book gives readers a clear sense that, jus…Read more
  •  23
    C. A. J. COADY, "Testimony: A Philosophical Study"
    with C. A. J. Coady
    History and Theory 33 (2): 230. 1994.
  •  21
    On Hedgehogs and Foxes
    Philosophical Inquiry 21 (1): 61-86. 1999.
  •  21
    Philosophical Confidence: J. L. Gorman
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 22 71-79. 1987.
    Analytical philosophers, if they are true to their training, never forget the first lesson of analytical philosophy: philosophers have no moral authority. In so far as analytical philosophers believe this, they find it easy to live with. For them even to assert, let alone successfully lay claim to, moral authority would require, first, hard work of some non-analytical and probably mistaken kind and, secondly, personality traits of leadership or confidence or even charisma, which philosophers may…Read more
  •  20
    Misleading Cases (review)
    Philosophical Books 33 (4): 255-256. 1992.
  •  18
    The Expression of Historical Knowledge
    with Peter Skagestad
    History and Theory 23 (1): 116. 1984.
  •  17
    Justifying Historical Descriptions
    Philosophical Books 26 (4): 246-248. 1985.
  •  17
    The Normativity of Logic in the History of Ideas
    Intellectual History Review 21 (1): 3-13. 2011.
    (2011). The Normativity of Logic in the History of Ideas. Intellectual History Review: Vol. 21, Post-Analytic Hermeneutics: Themes from Mark Bevir's Philosophy of History, pp. 3-13. doi: 10.1080/17496977.2011.546631
  •  16
    Value and Justification
    Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 33 353-356. 1991.
  •  15
    Understanding History
    University of Ottawa Press. 1992.
    The problem of justifying historical methodologies is first set in the wider context of the philosophical problem of knowledge, then lucidly explained and ...
  •  14
    Discontinuity Pragmatically Framed
    Journal of the Philosophy of History 11 (2): 127-148. 2017.
    _ Source: _Volume 11, Issue 2, pp 127 - 148 This is an attempt to discover and clarify the philosophical nature of what Eelco Runia claims to be his new and up-to-date philosophy of history, a programme offered in his 2014 book _Moved by the Past: Discontinuity and Historical Mutation_. His suggestion that his argument is a “dance” is taken seriously, and following an analysis of historical “meaning” and its time-extended nature it is argued that the book’s presentation commits Runia to a concep…Read more
  •  13
    Paul Veyne, "writing history: Essay on epistemology" (review)
    History and Theory 26 (1): 99. 1987.
  •  13
    Convergence to agreement
    History and Theory 43 (1). 2004.
  •  13
    The Need for Quinean Pragmatism in the Theory of History
    European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 8 (2). 2016.
  •  12
    Where neuroscience gets things wrong
    History and Theory 58 (3): 483-495. 2019.
  •  12
  •  11
    Political philosophy (review)
    Philosophical Books 44 (2): 183-187. 2003.
  •  11
    Value and Justification (review)
    Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 33 353-356. 1991.