•  27
    Self-Deception as a Moral Failure
    The Philosophical Quarterly. forthcoming.
    In this paper, I defend the view that self-deception is a moral failure. Instead of saying that self-deception is bad because it undermines our moral character or leads to morally deleterious consequences, as has been argued by Butler, Kant, Smith, and others, I argue the distinctive badness of self-deception lies in the tragic relationship that it bears to our own values. On the one hand, self-deception is motivated by what we value. On the other hand, it prevents us from valuing those things p…Read more
  •  129
    Knowing Yourself and Being Worth Knowing
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (2): 243-261. 2018.
    Philosophers have often understood self-knowledge's value in instrumentalist terms. Self-knowledge may be valuable as a means to moral self-improvement and self-satisfaction, while its absence can lead to viciousness and frustration. These explanations, while compelling, do not fully explain the value that many of us place in self-knowledge. Rather, we have a tendency to treat self-knowledge as its own end. In this article, I vindicate this tendency by identifying a moral reason that we have to …Read more
  •  21
    Genetic Information, the Principle of Rescue, and Special Obligations
    with S. Matthew Liao
    Hastings Center Report 48 (3): 18-19. 2018.
  •  325
    Agent-Regret and the Social Practice of Moral Luck
    Res Philosophica 94 (1): 95-117. 2017.
    Agent-regret seems to give rise to a philosophical puzzle. If we grant that we are not morally responsible for consequences outside our control, then agent-regret—which involves self-reproach and a desire to make amends for consequences outside one’s control—appears rationally indefensible. But despite its apparent indefensibility, agent-regret still seems like a reasonable response to bad moral luck. I argue here that the puzzle can be resolved if we appreciate the role that agent-regret plays …Read more