Josef Mattes

Donald Hoffman, in his book The Case Against Reality and in a number of scientific publications (together with several coauthors), has argued that we see none of reality veridically. Supposedly, evolution unavoidably drives organisms with even partially veridical perception to extinction. This conclusion was claimed to follow both from evolutionary game theory-based simulations and from abstract mathematical work. I analyze these arguments in more detail than has been done before, leading to what seem to be novel objections to it: On the one hand, I show that simulations that incorporate aspects of evolution that Hoffman himself acknowledges as valid, yield results inconsistent with Hoffman’s claim. On the other hand, I point out that the attempted inference from the mathematical theorem to Hoffman’s conclusion suffers from a number of problems, including that it relies on an assumption that begs the question against the realist.

The relationship between science and philosophy is contentious. Quine saw philosophy as continuous with science (broadly understood), but many philosophers see a dichotomy between them. The present paper discusses cases where the relevance of certain scientific findings has been denied (related to Zeno’s Dichotomy paradox and to the appeal of skeptical arguments) or overlooked (one argument related to the frame problem of artificial intelligence and Nagel’s “bat” argument). The results caution against overly quick dismissal of the import of science on philosophical questions, whether the latter be of a more theoretical or practical nature.

Parallels between the ancient Hellenistic philosophies of the Stoics and Epicureans, on the one hand, and modern cognitive psychotherapy, on the other, are well known and a topic of current discussion. The present article argues that there are also important parallels between Pyrrhonism, the third of the major Hellenistic philosophies, and the currently state-of-the-art “3rd wave” cognitive-behavioral therapies in general, and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (act) in particular. This provides a crucial insight into Pyrrhonism: understanding Sextus’ term adoxastos using the technical act term ‘defusion’ illuminates the psychological condition of the Pyrrhonist and explains why the apraxia objection against Pyrrhonism is misguided.

The present article critiques standard attempts to make philosophy appear relevant to the scientific study of well-being, drawing examples in particular from works that argue for fundamental differences between different forms of wellbeing (by Besser-Jones, Kristjánsson, and Kraut, for example), and claims concerning the supposedly inherent normativity of wellbeing research (e.g., Prinzing, Alexandrova, and Nussbaum). Specifically, it is argued that philosophers in at least some relevant cases fail to apply what is often claimed to be among their core competences: conceptual rigor—not only in dealing with the psychological construct of flow, but also in relation to apparently philosophical concepts such as normativity, objectivity, or eudaimonia. Furthermore, the uncritical use of so-called thought experiments in philosophy is shown to be inappropriate for the scientific study of wellbeing. As an alternative to such philosophy-as-usual, proper attention to other philosophical traditions is argued to be promising. In particular, the philosophy of ZhuangZi (a contemporary of Aristotle and one of the most important figures in Chinese intellectual history) appears to concord well with today’s psychological knowledge, and to contain valuable ideas for the future development of positive psychology.

Background: A number of meta-analyses of mindfulness have been performed, but few distinguished between different facets of mindfulness, despite it being known that facets of mindfulness behave differently in different populations; and most studied the outcome of interventions, which tend to involve additional ingredients besides mindfulness. Furthermore, there has recently been some concern regarding possible publication bias in mindfulness research. Objective: Systematic review and meta-analysis of the relationship of different facets of mindfulness with various outcomes, taking into account possible moderators, and controlling for publication bias using a method appropriate given the substantial heterogeneity present. Methods: Random effects meta-analysis with a number of robustness checks and estimation of the possible impact of publication bias on the results. Included are all studies that report correlations of outcomes with all five FFMQ facets, in English, French, German, or Spanish. Study Registration: PROSPERO International prospective register of systematic reviews ID=CRD42016041863. Results: For the designated primary measure (SWLS) estimated correlations were: 0.15 [0.07, 0.22] for the Observing facet, 0.31 [0.27, 0.36] for Describing, 0.35 [0.31, 0.38] for Acting-with-Awareness, 0.30 [0.10, 0.47] for Non-judging and 0.28 [0.18, 0.37] for Non-reacting. Grouping all desirable outcomes together, Describing has the highest zero-order (though not partial) correlation; Non-judging the highest effect on avoiding undesirable outcomes. Results seem to be reasonably robust even to severe publication bias.

Motivated by recent controversies concerning the relationship between modern mindfulness-based interventions and Buddhism, this article discusses the relationship between mindfulness and dogmatism in general, and dogmatism in ethics in particular. The point of view taken is primarily that of the psychology of judgment and deci-sion making: Various cognitive illusions affect the feelings of righteousness and certainty that tend to accompany ethical and moral judgments. I argue that even though there is some evidence that mindfulness practice im-proves judgment and decision making, thisimprovement is rarely as strong as is implied in various contributions to the above-mentioned controversies. In addition, I reflect on claims that “the original teachings of the Buddha” jus-tify the moral stances taken. I argue that these stances likely arise, at least in part, due to the cultural transmission of cognitive dissonance of early Christianity rather than being inherent in the Buddha’s teachings.

The present paper discusses the claim that value-free science is impossible. After applauding the observation of Colombo et al. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7: 743–763, that this is at least to a considerable extent a psychological question, and should therefore be studied using the methods of psychological science, the studies performed by these authors were examined and unfortunately found seriously wanting in various respects. Beyond the merits or demerits of that particular piece of work, the discussion lead to a conclusion likely relevant to the entire discussion about the alleged impossibility of value-free science: Showing the impossibility of value-free science would entail at least a) defining what the term science is intended to cover, b) providing high level evidence that few if any scientists in the relevant area are immune to non-epistemic influences, c) that these influences meaningfully bias the results of science, d) that there is no way to correct for these influences, and e) explain why – unlike epistemic appraisal in science – the epistemic appraisal of this argument can be trusted.

In this paper we define an algebra structure on the vector space $L$ generated by links in the manifold $\Sigma \times [0,1]$ where $\Sigma $ is an oriented surface. This algebra has a filtration and the associated graded algebra $L_{Gr}$ is naturally a Poisson algebra. There is a Poisson algebra homomorphism from the algebra of chord diagrams $ch$ on $\Sigma $ to $L_{Gr}$. We show that multiplication in $L$ provides a geometric way to define a deformation quantization of the algebra of chord diagrams, provided there is a universal Vassiliev invariant for links in $\Sigma\times [0,1]$. The quantization descends to a quantization of the moduli space of flat connections on $\Sigma $ and it is universal with respect to group homomorphisms. If $\Sigma $ is compact with free fundamental group we construct a universal Vassiliev invariant.