Kaj Zeller

Ruth Chang believes that one can intrinsically resolve the question of whether a vague predicate F applies to its borderline case a through arbitrary stipulation—one can resolve it by fiat. First, I clarify what it is to intrinsically resolve a question by arbitrary stipulation. Next, I argue that Chang’s view is wrong. Cases that involve vagueness are cases of (what I’ll call) competing similarity. For this reason, for any borderline case 'a' of a vague predicate 'F', we have intrinsic reason to classify 'a' as 'F' and intrinsic reason to classify 'a' as 'not-F'. If we have such reasons, then we cannot intrinsically resolve the question of whether 'a' is 'F' by arbitrary stipulation. My conclusion has significant upshots: it undermines Chang’s case for parity as a fourth relation of comparability, and it suggests that supervaluationists ought to distance their view from Chang’s. Moreover, this paper makes progress on the so-called characterization problem of vagueness.

This article addresses the ‘Indirection Problem’ in Sartrean ethics of authenticity and compares it to the problem of the same name in virtue ethics. Both ethical frameworks encounter a disharmony between core concepts and proper motivation. The article reviews the indirection problem in virtue ethics, highlighting Swanton's solution of defining virtues as promoting specific values. It then explores how Sartrean ethics faces a more profound indirection problem due to the elusive nature of its core concept—authenticity. The motivation for authenticity cannot be its rationale (salvation). Freedom seems to be a more direct value, but the desire for freedom itself risks falling into being yet another pursuit of being. The article advocates a radically negative motivation for authenticity—a resignation from futile, inauthentic projects.