Karina Ortiz Villa

This chapter canvases some notable historical accounts of the philosophical dimensions of work within the context of Latin American philosophy, including reflections by Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, José Vasconcelos, José Mariategui, and Rosario Castellanos. The chapter examines how labor was conceptualized prior to the European invasion of the Americas, and how labor figured in philosophical discussions of colonialism, socialism, capitalism, and resistance. It also discusses the socioeconomic conditions that shaped labor practices prior to, during, and after European colonization of the Americas. The chapter also considers various philosophical discussions of the way in which social identities—being a woman, being Indigenous, and so on—interacted with labor practices. In so doing, the chapter highlights the ways in which Latin American philosophy addresses the role of work in the construction of collective identity and social transformation.

There are two main theories of how express consent and tacit consent determine societal membership and political obligation in Locke’s political philosophy. On the “Serious Stake” interpretation, all and only those who have a stake in the community (including some who only tacitly consent to membership) are members of society. On the “Express Consent” interpretation, all and only those who expressly consent to be or become members are members, and tacit consent determines political obligation. This essay articulates a version of the Express Consent interpretation on which express consent to X is given by means of conduct that has semantic meaning sufficient to count as agreement to X. It then explains how this interpretation can meet standard objections to the Express Consent interpretation while avoiding the serious textual problems that face the Serious Stake interpretation

In this paper, I argue that Gloria Anzaldúa’s own philosophical concept of la facultad captures a form of active, embodied, epistemic agency. I further argue that when an agent uses la facultad, they acquire a novel form of knowledge, one that is only accessible through this capacity. In Section II, I define la facultad as consisting in the active integration of conscious self-awareness, bodily experiences, motor skills, and sensory information with the rational mind to engage with and navigate the world. As such, the actions we choose to are not solely determined by reasoning or mere mental states but are fundamentally shaped by the dynamic interplay between our bodies, sensory perceptions, emotions, and the situational context in which we find ourselves. In Section III, I elaborate on the epistemological contribution of la facultad. Finally, in Section IV, I conclude with some questions for further research.

I argue that men can be oppressed by virtue of being men; however, our definitions of men and masculinity must be redefined and reclaimed from the dominant white perspective. My claims are: (1) current arguments on the oppression of men simpliciter are misguided as they fail to encompass the experiences of all men; (2) any question regarding the oppression of men must reject the current static and universal definition of men; (3) the oppression of men is an instantiation of structural oppression that allows for men to be both privileged and oppressed in different, forms, degrees, and dimensions; (4) the oppression of Latino men qua Latino men is an example of men being oppressed as men. Therefore, (5) we must redefine and reclaim the definition of “men” and “masculinity.” Last, (6) this redefinition cannot be done a priori but must use intersectionality as a regulative method to illuminate the oppression of men that remains obscured in other, one-dimensional approaches to the topic of the oppression of men.