Kelsey Berry

Many health care organizations made public commitments to become antiracist in the wake of George Floyd's murder. These actions raise questions about the appropriateness of health care's engagement in racial justice and social justice movements generally. We argue that health care organizations can be usefully thought of as having two roles: a functional role to care for the sick and a meta‐role as an organizational citizen. Fulfilling the role of citizen may require participating in the pursuit of social justice, including efforts to achieve racial equity. The demands of these two roles will need to be balanced, but the role of organizational citizen has been largely ignored and merits serious attention.

Over the past twenty-five years, thirty-seven states and the US Congress have passed mental health and substance use disorder (MH/SUD) parity laws to secure nondiscriminatory insurance coverage for MH/SUD services in the private health insurance market and through certain public insurance programs. However, in the intervening years, litigation has been brought by numerous parties alleging violations of insurance parity. We examine the critical issues underlying these legal challenges as a framework for understanding the areas in which parity enforcement is lacking, as well as ongoing areas of ambiguity in the interpretation of these laws. We identified all private litigation involving federal and state parity laws and extracted themes from a final sample of thirty-seven lawsuits. The primary substantive topics at issue include the scope of services guaranteed by parity laws, coverage of certain habilitative therapies such as applied behavioral analysis for autism spectrum disorders, credentialing standards for MH/SUD providers, determinations regarding the medical necessity of MH/SUD services, and the application of nonquantitative treatment limitations under the 2008 federal parity law. Ongoing efforts to achieve nondiscriminatory insurance coverage for MH/SUDs should attend to the major issues subject to private legal action as important areas for facilitating and monitoring insurer compliance.

Transplantation programs commonly rely on clinicians’ judgments about patients’ social support (care from friends or family) when deciding whether to list them for organ transplantation. We examine whether using social support to make listing decisions for adults seeking transplantation is morally legitimate, drawing on recent data about the evidence-base, implementation, and potential impacts of the criterion on underserved and diverse populations. We demonstrate that the rationale for the social support criterion, based in the principle of utility, is undermined by its reliance on tenuous evidence. Moreover, social support requirements may reinforce transplant inequities, interfere in patients’ personal relationships, and contribute to biased and inconsistent listing procedures. As such, accommodating the needs of patients with limited social support would better balance ethical commitments to equity, utility, and respect for persons in transplantation. We suggest steps for researchers, transplantation programs, and policymakers to improve fair use of social support in transplantation.