Keota Fields

I argue that for Berkeley the meaning of a general term is constituted by the multiple particular ideas indifferently signified by that term. This reading faces two challenges. First, Berkeley argues that the meaning of sentences containing general terms is constituted by the one idea signified by the name in that sentence rather than by multiple ideas, implying that general terms are meaningful although they do not signify multiple ideas. Second, Berkeley writes that finite minds know the meaning of the biblical phrase ‘good thing’ even though that phrase fails to signify any ideas at all. Both challenges are met by deploying Berkeley’s account of mediate perception.

In this reply, I use an act theory to explain divine ideas and Berkeley’s archetype–ectype distinction. I argue that divine ideas are acts of divine self-consciousness in reply to the objection that if divine ideas are acts, then for Berkeley they are acts without objects. The result is a much more plausible account of Berkeley’s archetype–ectype distinction than is available on representationalist interpretations. Lastly, while arguments from illusion are indispensable to representationalist theories, Berkeley’s rejection of arguments from illusion is evidence that he endorsed an act theory of ideas.

Keota Fields develops an original interpretation. Against “non-ideational” interpretations of Berkeley’s theory of meaning, which entail that words need not signify ideas at all to be meaningful, Fields argues that, for Berkeley, the meaning of a general term is all the multiple particular ideas indifferently signified by that term. This reading respects Berkeley’s rejection of the existence of abstract ideas but comes up against two problems. First, in places, Berkeley’s remarks suggest that a general term’s meaning is a single, particular idea that it signifies. Second, Berkeley also maintains that a word like “good” can be meaningful to a language-user even if does not signify any ideas at all. To address these problems, Fields appeals to Berkeley’s theory of mediate perception, arguing that some terms mediately signify ideas beyond those they immediately pick out.

Commentators are divided over whether Berkeley holds that physical objects are immediately perceived by sense. As I read Berkeley, discrimination is necessary for perceiving physical objects by sense. Berkeley says that discrimination requires perceiving motion. Since motions can only be mediately perceived according to Berkeley, physical objects can only be mediately perceived by sense. I defend this reading against the following objections. First, that perception of physical objects is non-conceptual. Second, that physical objects are divinely instituted collections of ideas rather than psychologically associated collections of ideas. Third, that some physical objects are small enough to be immediately perceptually discriminated by touch. I also propose a new objection to the claim that physical objects are immediately perceived for Berkeley. I argue that immediate perception of a subset of a physical object’s sensible qualities is neither necessary nor sufficient to perceive that object by sense, according to Berkeley.

I propose to downgrade the Liar paradox from what Quine called an antinomy to a much weaker veridical paradox. I then apply Quine’s strategy of rejecting veridical paradoxes by exposing an unacceptable premise to the Liar. I argue that upon analysis the intension of a standard Liar sentence presupposes the existence of a non-empty empty set; and that since such an object is impossible this presupposition may be rejected, downgrading the Liar. I then briefly argue that Dialetheism can be motivated without supposing the existence of a non-empty empty set.

This chapter proposes an interpretation of Berkeley as a semiotic idealist. According to semiotic idealism internal ideas are signs for external divine ideas, and sensible objects are composite entities with external divine ideas as their essential parts and internal ideas of the imagination and (where applicable) sensations as their contingent parts. Signification is the ontological glue that unifies these parts into individuals. Divinely instituted normative linguistic rules govern the use of internal ideas as signs for external divine ideas. This semiotic relation gives objective form and meaning to internal ideas. Furthermore, Berkeley explicitly links this semiotic relation with rewards and sanctions, and claims that such connections allow us to make predictions about advantageous and disadvantageous courses of action. Sensible objects turn out to be values (rather than facts) because they are sources of pleasure and pain, guides to human flourishing, and sources of external meaning for Berkeley.