Lalit Saraswat

This paper re-examines John Searle’s notion of status function and argues that his theory underestimates the role of dynamicity and deliberation within social institutions. While Searle’s deontological model of collective intentionality rests upon rule-governed recognition of functions, this paper highlights a crucial limitation, namely, his assumption of stability within institutional structures. Drawing upon Aristotle’s concept of ergon (function) and aretē (virtue), the study argues that social collectives are inherently dynamic, shaped by reflective deliberation and evolving intentions. The analysis identifies two missing links in Searle’s framework: the absence of a mechanism explaining conflicts between individuals’ “I” intentions and collective “We” intentions, and the lack of attention to the transformative processes within institutions. The comparative reading with Aristotle reveals that functional reasoning must involve critical reflection and teleological evaluation to sustain the integrity of the collective. Hence, Searle’s model, though insightful, remains overly static when compared to the dynamic and virtue-oriented Aristotelian approach.

In Chapter 4, the notion of ‘being at the same level’ is further defined using the notions of production (thick causation) as discussed by Gillett, Glennan and other mechanists and conditional independence as introduced by James Woodward. The goal here is to come up with an objective set of criteria grounded in scientific practice based on which one could identify the levels in a mechanism and the things present at each level. This chapter also discusses in detail the interventionist framework developed by Woodward and shows how interventionist (thin) causation is different from production (thick causation) in the new mechanist framework. It also discusses to which things in mechanisms interventions can be introduced, whether the variables used in interventionist causal models strictly refer to things in mechanisms and whether causation can exist between unrelated mechanisms. This chapter shows how interventionism, as a methodological thesis about causation, is useful in identifying the presence of downward causation in mechanisms.

In Chapter 5, using the developed new mechanist framework and the account of levels in mechanisms, the arguments provided by James Woodward and Denis Noble for the presence of downward causation in the HH model are analysed. As a response to Woodward’s argument, the chapter argues that the membrane potential (V) and the overall ionic conductances (gK and gNa) are not at different levels and therefore there is no downward causation in the HH model as Woodward suggested. As a response to Noble’s argument, the chapter argues that the structural constraints at any level in a mechanism cannot be considered to provide any sort of downward causal or determinative influence within the new mechanist framework. However, if we use Gillett’s account of emergence in the form of downward determination, we can show that it is possible for the membrane potential to have a downward determinative influence on the electric fields and a species of mediated downward causation on the individual ion channel conductances (not the overall conductances gK and gNa).

Chapter 6 contains a nascent proposal for a concept of emergence that also derives its meaning through relation to scientific practice. It begins with a question of whether the accounts of emergence and downward causation discussed in the previous chapter are fruitful in the new mechanist framework. The concepts of electric potential and electric field as they are employed in physics are used to argue that there is no way to verify the empirical claim that the membrane potential has a downward determinative influence on the electric fields associated with the ions in the membrane, as was suggested in the previous chapter. Following this, to address the question of fruitfulness of the concepts of emergence and downward causation, an operational definition of emergence is proposed, according to which any attribution of emergence (understood as the qualitative and/or quantitative difference at a higher level) should lead to the experimental identification of a species of downward causation/determination (different from the structural constraints) from the higher level in the mechanism governing the phenomenon and as a result the experimental identification of novel empirical interventions and detections with respect to the phenomenon. The requirement of novel empirical interventions and detections essentially implies that incorporating emergence in our explanation should lead to novel means of manipulation and control of the phenomenon under study. This harks back to the ontic conception of explanation discussed in Chapter 1. If emergence as a concept is to be employed meaningfully in our research such that it refers to something that exists in the world, it needs to have practical consequences, i.e., changes in scientific practice (new ways of manipulating and controlling phenomena in which emergence is proposed to be present). If it doesn’t lead to any change in scientific practice, then it is not a fruitful concept. This is the conclusion that is reached in the final chapter of this dissertation. Then different questions related to the operational definition of emergence such as how a researcher identifies the presence of qualitative/quantitative difference at a higher level, how interventions and detections can be performed at different levels in a complex mechanism, etc., are analysed, and finally the possibility of applying the definition to other potential examples of downward causation is discussed.

Consciousness, a perplexing scientific mystery acknowledged since ancient times in both Eastern and Western cultures, continues to elude modern science. We are all familiar with the subjective experience of consciousness but where does it originate? What creates consciousness? The prevailing assumption in modern neuroscience is that every aspect of consciousness emerges entirely from neural interactions within the brain. This materialistic worldview that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain is inadequate in explaining the subjective experience of consciousness. The reason and process behind this phenomenon remain poorly understood. If consciousness is more than the complex neural interactions, we need to explore new ways of thinking. This study endeavours to address the enigma of consciousness—its origin—by integrating insights from Madhyasth Darshan (MD) to bridge the gap in our current understanding of reality. Lastly, the author concludes that MD’s view on Consciousness, that it is a fundamental property of a constitutionally complete evolved atom, which is yet to be discovered experimentally is more promising as it may solve the conundrum “what is or what creates consciousness” and also explains some of the mysterious phenomena of consciousness.

John Searle argues for a notion of ‘collective intentionality’ that produces social actions with the attributed deontic status function on an external reason, simultaneously recognized by all the members. Social actions depend on the acceptance of a propositional attitude in the light of a constitutive rule and the ‘we intention’ of each member. However, Searle’s intentional theory of actions argues that human beings are rational in nature and freely choose to act as per a desire independent of reason; hence, offering a possibility of unreflective obedience towards social rules. What implications and considerations may emerge while explicating relationships between intentionality, intentional action, the notion of power, and coerced life? This paper assesses the scope of such collective participation (in the Searlean sense) that boils down to a coerced life. The viewpoint of a coerced life is examined along with the notion of intentionality and background, and how these notions translate into a concept of power.

Simona Ginsburg & Eva Jablonka (G&J), in _The Evolution of the Sensitive Soul (2019)_, explore the nature and status of the mind and subjective experiences from an evolutionary perspective. They raise a fundamental question about ‘the origin of animal consciousness during evolution’ (pg.1). The book begins by tracing the roots of consciousness studies from the Aristotelian perspective on the sensitive soul, referring to the dynamics of the living organization, percepts, and feelings. They use “subjective experiencing” to refer to both sentience and consciousness. They argue that to have an evolutionary account of subjective experiences, we need to develop an understanding of minimal consciousness or a marker like unlimited associative learning (UAL) indicating subjective experiences. In the book, the origin of life is marked by the evolution of goal-directed systems where the system can manifest unlimited heredity. They state that all the questions about the origin of minimal consciousness deal with ‘the emergence of new types of goal-directed systems’ (p.1).

Meno’s paradox raises serious challenges against most fundamental epistemological quest regarding the possibility of inquiry and discovery. In his response, Socrates proposes the theory of anamnesis and his ingenious distinction between doxa and episteme. But, he fails in his attempt to solve the paradox and some recent responses have also not succeeded in settling it, satisfactorily. We shall argue that epistemological issues approached in a Darwinian spirit offer a therapeutic resolution without rejecting the basic tenets of Plato’s epistemology. Drawing from Popper’s evolutionary theory of knowledge, Darwinism is regarded as a metaphysical research program, rather than using it to collapse Plato’s metaphysics into biology.